Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

Web 2.0, dilemmas 1.0: essay on an evolving market

Today the Internet is entwined into our everyday society. From the beginning days in 1980 to today, the Internet has been evolving. The creator of the World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee, envisioned that the Internet would be a system with everything connected to everything. The web today is changing with new applications arriving from outside the previous channels of the megalithic software companies. Thousands of individual developers are creating micro-applications to enhance the earlier framework of the web. This revolution has been coined "Web 2.0". Many observers today are skeptical that Web 2.0 is really a revolution at all, but maybe is just a continuation of Berners-Lee's original concept. This paper examines, based on a critical literature review, the discussions taking place regarding Web 2.0.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.