Investimento na Preservação do Meio Ambiente no Setor de Cosméticos: Relevância Atribuída pelos clientes de o Boticário e sua percepção quanto à conduta da Empresa

In spite of the environmental consumerism in Brazil not to meet in levels as advanced as in Europe and in the United States, some sectors are emerging as precursors of environmental relationships with their markets. Cosmetic's sector is one of them. This study discusses the subject of the ethical consumerism, especially the environmental one. It is focused in the consumer-citizen's context, more specifically in the consumer of a company of cosmetic's sector in Rio de Janeiro. To carry out this study, we chose a company that clearly assumed its commitment with the investment in the preservation of the environment: O Boticário. Initially, we investigated the relevance attributed by the customers of O Boticário to the investment accomplished in the search by the preservation of the environment by companies of this sector, comparing these results with the importance that has been imputed by the customers to traditional attributes of the Marketing. Later, we have analyzed these customers' perception in respect of the investment accomplished by the company in the search for the preservation of the environment. In the preliminary phase of the research, fourteen customers of O Boticário were interviewed. A structured questionnaire was applied to 90 respondents that have declared themselves customers of the mentioned company. The information were treated with descriptive statistics. The software employed has been the SPSS 10.0. Although the field research has indicated the characteristics of the product as priority for the consumer, the relevance attributed to the investment of the company in the search for the preservation of the environment was considered significant, with more prominence than some attributes traditionally judged as attributes-key of the Marketing. However, this apparent sensibility for the environmental subject doesn't seem to influence in search of information on environmental conduct of cosmetics' companies. In fact, a great deal of customers of O Boticário has declared that they have been unknowing about the conduct in favor of the environment on the part of the company, and a number, even larger, was not aware of the existence of the Fundação O Boticário de Proteção à Natureza.

Propaganda enganosa e persuasão : reação do consumidor e proposta de políticas públicas

A propaganda vem se difundindo de formas as mais variadas há muito tempo. Não é incomum, entretanto, que em vez de ser usada para transmitir informações e características do que é anunciado, haja empresas que fazem uso de ludíbrio e engodo em suas peças publicitárias a fim de persuadir os potenciais consumidores de uma maneira condenável em termos éticos. Esta tese analisa a reação dos consumidores quando expostos a propagandas enganosas, comparando-a à daqueles que foram expostos a propagandas sem engodo, por meio de experimentos em que 359 indivíduos foram pesquisados e hipóteses testadas, com testes de média entre duas populações e o uso da Escala de Wells, analisando ainda os argumentos de publicitários e de um representante do CONAR a respeito da atuação dos profissionais desta área. Os resultados indicam que os publicitários não se baseiam em um código de conduta para a criação de propagandas visando ao respeito ao cliente; eles indicam que se algo lesivo ou enganoso tiver sido divulgado, isto é devido ao fato de seu cliente ter fornecido um briefing inadequado. Não há, aparentemente, questionamentos dos publicitários sobre a veracidade daquilo que o cliente lhes transmite ao solicitar a concepção de uma propaganda. Com relação aos consumidores, percebe-se que a maioria não conhece as obrigações do CONAR nem leu o Código de Defesa do Consumidor. Eles creem que empresas com maior reputação apresentam mais credibilidade em relação ao que transmitem em suas propagandas, e confundem artifícios legais com enganosos. A maioria dos consumidores que já foi enganada por uma propaganda nunca agiu contra a empresa responsável após ter percebido o que ocorrera. Os principais artifícios usados em propagandas foram testados, tendo sido possível perceber que, ainda que não interfiram em grande magnitude na intenção de compra, são responsáveis por confundir em diversas situações os consumidores, como observado nos casos do uso das expressões “apenas”, “a partir de” e no uso de letras miúdas para “fornecer” informações. As políticas públicas propostas servem para organizar os achados desta tese e o que já foi publicado na literatura sobre o tema, visando a recomendar formas de se educar os consumidores, de se agir em prol de uma sociedade em que propagandas enganosas não sejam algo tão corriqueiro e de punir e controlar aquilo que é divulgado em mensagens que a cada momento atingem uma enorme quantidade de indivíduos, influenciando suas decisões de compra.

Inferring conduct under the threat of entry : the case of Brazilian cement industry

This paper demonstrates that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct are not identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. In such a setting, the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique of relying on exogenous demand perturbations to empirically distinguish between alternative hypotheses of conduct is shown to fail. The Brazilian cement industry, where the threat of imports restrains market outcomes, provides an empirical illustration. In particular, pricecost margins estimated using this established technique are considerably biased downward, underestimating the degree of market power. A test of conduct is proposed, adapted to this constrained setting, which suggests that outcomes in the industry are collusive and characterised by market division.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.