Corporate governance and its influence on the investment decision process of equity market's professionals: An inside view of how corporate governance issues influence the decision-making process of sell-side and buy-side professionals when analyzing Brazilian listed companies

Corporate governance has been in the spotlight for the past two decades, being subject of numerous researches all over the world. Governance is pictured as a broad and diverse theme, evolving through different routes to form distinct systems. This scenario together with 2 types of agency problems (investor vs. management and minorities vs. controlling shareholders) produce different definitions for governance. Usually, studies investigate whether corporate governance structures influence firm performance, and company valuation. This approach implies investors can identify those impacts and later take them into consideration when making investment decisions. However, behavioral finance theory shows that not always investors take rational decisions, and therefore the modus operandi of those professionals needs to be understood. So, this research aimed to investigate to what extent Brazilian corporate governance standards and practices influence the investment decision-making process of equity markets' professionals from the sell-side and buy-side. This exploratory study was carried out through qualitative and quantitative approaches. In the qualitative phase, 8 practitioners were interviewed and 3 dimensions emerged: understanding, pertinence and practice. Based on the interviews’ findings, a questionnaire was formulated and distributed to buy-siders and sell-siders that cover Brazilian stocks. 117 respondents from all over the world contributed to the study. The data obtained were analyzed through structural equation modeling and descriptive statistics. The 3 dimensions became 5 constructs: definition (institutionalized governance, informal governance), pertinence (relevance), practice (valuation process, structured governance assessment) The results of this thesis suggest there is no definitive answer, as the extent to which governance will influence an investment decision process will depend on a number of circumstances which compose the context. The only certainty is the need to present a “corporate governance behavior”, rather than simply establishing rules and regulations at firm and country level.

State ownership and corporate governance

State ownership of publicly-traded corporations remains pervasive around the world, and has been increasing in recent years. Existing literature focuses on the implications of government ownership for corporate governance and performance at the firm level. This Article, by contrast, explores the different but equally important question of whether the presence of the state as a shareholder can impose negative externalities on the corporate law regime available to the private sector. Drawing from historical experiments with government ownership in the United States, Brazil, China, and Europe, this study shows that the conflict of interest stemming from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency. It thus addresses a gap in the literature on the political economy of corporate governance by incorporating the political role of the state as shareholder as another mechanism to explain the relationship between corporate ownership structures and legal investor protection. Finally, this Article explores the promise of different institutional arrangements to constrain the impact of the state’s interests as a shareholder on the corporate governance environment, and concludes by offering several policy recommendations.

Do private equity and venture capital backed firms have better corporate governance after going public?

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas

Insights on corporate sustainability and share value: an event study for Brazilian market

Em meio ao crescente volume de publicações sobre sustentabilidade e finanças, diversas pesquisas internacionais e brasileiras têm abordado a relação entre empresas classificadas como sustentáveis e o retorno de suas ações. Nesta mesma linha, este trabalho utilizou o método de estudos de eventos para verificar se entre 2005 e 2013 houve retornos anormais quando as empresas entraram e saíram do Índice de Sustentabilidade Empresarial (ISE). Além de contemplar um período mais atualizado do que seus precedentes, este estudo difere-se dos demais ao analisar o as observações individualmente e ao buscar estabelecer uma relação dos retornos anormais acumulados com as variáveis governança corporativa, tamanho, rentabilidade e alavancagem. Os resultados mostraram que embora não haja evidências conclusivas quando os casos são tomados individualmente, em conjunto eles indicam que a inclusão e a exclusão do ISE geram retornos anormais significativos, positivos e negativos respectivamente, em linha com a teoria dos stakeholders. Quanto às variáveis de controle, nenhuma apresentou relação com os retornos anormais acumulados.

The implementation of corporate governance in Germany and Brazi l: a comparative case study

The recent promotion of best corporate governance standards by several different government institutions and non-for profit organizations resulted in the implementation of more sophisticated governance mechanisms. As consequence to the separation of ownership and control the concept of agency theory arose. Agency theory argues that without out proper control mechanism managers would behave exploit owners due to information asymmetry. Regulators have promoted corporate governance mechanisms in order to address this issue. This paper aims to contrast the implementation of best corporate governance practices in Germany and Brazil on the example of two practical examples. With this purpose in mind, this paper analyzed two companies listed in the main stock exchange in Germany and Brazil throughout a period of 5 years. In order to measure the degree of corporate governance practices implemented 3 different parameters have been chosen. In line with great part of the literature the parameters considered to be relevant are; composition, procedures and deviation from the local corporate governance code. The comparison of the data revealed that board composition in the two analyzed companies is similar regarding the proportion of independent representatives but does distinguish in size. While committees are related to the same topics it can be implied that Natura’s board is more involved in the actual management of the company. Lastly, Beiersdorf has been able to comply to a larger extend with the recommendations of the local German code than Natura to the recommendations published by Brazilian code of the IBGC.

Aumento dos preços dos combustíveis no país: um processo decisório racional?

Decisões são tomadas de diversas formas e em todos os momentos, mas foi o francês Henry Fayol que propôs um modelo estruturado para essa tomada de decisão, definindo o papel dos dirigentes e suas responsabilidades na administração da empresa. No desenvolvimento do trabalho, foram estudados diversos modelos de processo decisório, como o modelo clássico racionalista, o modelo da racionalidade limitada, o modelo político, as coalizões envolvidas no processo, teorias de responsabilidade social corporativa, teorias de governança corporativa, entre outros. À luz destes modelos e baseado na missão da Petrobras, de ser uma empresa segura e rentável, o autor faz uma suposição e enquadra o processo decisório da empresa no modelo clássico racionalista, focado na maximização dos lucros e resultados. Devido ao tamanho da empresa e à diversidade de assuntos para a tomada de decisão, o autor foca seus estudos na área de Abastecimento da Petrobras e analisa o processo de tomada de decisão para o aumento dos preços dos combustíveis, com o objetivo de avaliar a veracidade da sua suposição. A metodologia de pesquisa é baseada em uma pesquisa bibliográfica e investigação documental para avaliar se o modelo de tomada de decisão é realmente racional, ou se existem influências ou fatores externos que levam a um novo modelo de processo decisório. Após comparar o modelo racional com os dados e realizações da empresa, o autor faz uma triangulação de métodos, incluindo uma pesquisa de campo para avaliar a percepção dos gestores e stakeholders sobre o modelo de tomada de decisão da empresa. O autor entrevista 11 funcionários da Petrobras e 10 stakeholders externos com o intuito de coletar percepções sobre o processo decisório da Cia., finalizando com uma análise qualitativa dos dados baseada na técnica de análise de conteúdo. Com os resultados da pesquisa, o autor comprova, por meio de documentos da empresa, que a Diretoria Executiva da Petrobras é a responsável pela aprovação da política de preços da Cia. Dentre os fatores de influência no processo decisório da empresa, a inflação foi a de maior destaque, mostrando o viés político na relação entre o governo e a empresa. A política de preços da Cia. continua sendo de médio e longo prazo, acarretando em prejuízos no curto prazo para a área de Abastecimento da Petrobras. Após alcançar todos os objetivos intermediários do trabalho, o autor conclui que a suposição inicial é falsa e que o processo decisório para o aumento dos preços dos combustíveis na Petrobras se aproxima muito mais dos modelos de racionalidade limitada e político, com enfoque nos stakeholders e na competitividade do que do modelo clássico racionalista.

Multiple large shareholders in corporate governance

Large shareholders of firms with majority bIocks are often at the heIm of their companies and do not necessarily have the same interests as minority shareholders. We show that bargaining problems Ied by the presence of muItipIe controlling shareholders protect minority shareholders. The same bargaining problems, however, prevent efficient decisions. By solving this trade-off we find that i) muItipIe controlling shareholders should be present in firms with Iarge costs of diIuting minority shareholders and in firms with Iarge financing requirements, ii) an optimal ownership structure requires the presence of a dass of shareholders - the minority shareholders - with no control over corporate decisions. Evidence on the ownership structure of dose corporations in the V.S. is consistent with our model.

Corporate governance development in privately held family businesses: a multiple case analysis

The objective of this study is to better understand and illustrate the process and the motivations for corporate governance implementation in Brazilian privately held family businesses. Three case companies were analyzed through an adapted developmental framework to illustrate the progression in corporate governance in response to changes in the ownership, investment and management dimensions over time. In this development, causal relationships between corporate governance and the three other framework dimensions were identified. It was found that the analyzed companies´ corporate governance implementation was motivated by the need to curb agency costs, whereas a cornerstone in this development was the first generational change. Only after the family businesses have reached the necessary maturity on all three dimensions, corporate governance practices were implemented. Put simply, the analyzed case companies developed formal systems as they grew more complex. This study complements the academic discussions on corporate governance in family businesses by offering Brazilian evidence on its underlying motivations and sequential implementation over time.