Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment

We analyze a dynamic principal–agent model where an infinitely-lived principal faces a sequence of finitely-lived agents who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of an agent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent’s effort affects the information on ability that is conveyed by performance. We characterize the equilibrium contracts and show that they display short–term commitment to employment when the impact of effort on output is persistent but delayed. By providing insurance against early termination, commitment encourages agents to exert effort, and thus improves on the principal’s ability to identify their talent. We argue that this helps explain the use of probationary appointments in environments in which there exists uncertainty about individual ability.

Employing the Components of the Human Development Index to Drive Resources to Educational Policies

A new form of composition of the indicators employed to generate the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is presented here. This form of composition is based on the assumption that random errors affect the measurement of each indicator. This assumption allows for replacing the vector of evaluations according to each indicator by vectors of probabilities of being the best or the worst according to such attribute. The probabilistic composition of such probabilities of preference according to each indicator into probabilities of being the best or the worst according to all of them generates indices that may unveil, on one hand, performances to be followed and, on the other hand, extreme conditions that an additive composition would hide. Differences between the results of application of the diverse forms of composition are examined in the case of the HDI and in the case of the districts version of the HDI employed to compare Brazilian municipalities. It is verified that the smallest correlation between the education.