30 resultados para electoral incentives

em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV


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A central question in political economy is how to incentivize elected socials to allocate resources to those that need them the most. Research has shown that, while electoral incentives lead central governments to transfer fewer funds to non-aligned constituencies, media presence is instrumental in promoting a better allocation of resources. This study evaluates how these two phenomena interact by analyzing the role of media in compensating political biases. In particular, we analyze how media presence, connectivity and ownership affect the distribution of federal drought relief transfers to Brazilian municipalities. We find that municipalities that are not aligned with the federal government have a lower probability of receiving funds conditional on experiencing low precipitation. However, we show that the presence of radio stations compensates for this bias. This effect is driven by municipalities that have radio stations connected to a regional network rather than by the presence of local radio stations. In addition, the effect of network-connected radio stations increases with their network coverage. These findings suggests that the connection of a radio station to a network is important because it increases the salience of disasters, making it harder for the federal government to ignore non-allies. We show that our findings are not explained by the ownership and manipulation of media by politicians.

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We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

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Theory: A classic question in political science concems ",hat deteImines the number of parties that compete in a given polity. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to answering this question, one that emphasizes the role of electorallaws in structuring coalitional incentives, another that emphasizes the importance of pre-existing social cleavages. In tbis paper, we view the number of parties as a product of the interaction between these two forces, following Powell (1982) and Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994). Hypotheses: The effective number of parties in a polity should be a multiplicative rather than an additive function ofthe peImissiveness ofthe electoral system and the heterogeneity ofthe society. Methods: Multiple regression on cross-sectional aggregate electoral statistics. Unlike previous studies, we (1) do not confine attention to developed democracies; (2) explicitly control for the influence of presidential elections, taking account of whether they are concurrent or nonconcurrent, and ofthe effective number ofpresidential candidates; and (3) also control for the presence and operation of upper tiers in legislative elections. Results: The hypothesis is confiImed, both as regards the number of legislative and the number of presidential parties .

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Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.

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The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of firms and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

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A motivação desta dissertação é responder a seguinte pergunta: qual a melhor estrutura de propriedade, pública ou privada, para a prestação do serviço de administração de unidades prisionais? Para responder a pergunta será considerada a impossibilidade de formular um Contrato Completo para a prestação do serviço e os incentivos conflitantes dos agentes envolvidos. O desenvolvimento do tema será realizado mediante a construção de um modelo funcional da rotina da unidade prisional que abordará os conceitos de competição, assimetria de informação, comportamento oportunista e influência eleitoral.

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O presente trabalho objetiva avaliar os impactos provenientes das regras eleitorais do sistema político brasileiro sobre o comportamento dos deputados federais, em particular, quanto à decisão de alocação de recursos orçamentários através das emendas feitas ao Orçamento. A literatura tradicional pressupõe que estas escolhas estarão vinculadas essencialmente à formação e manutenção do reduto eleitoral de domínio do deputado. Os incentivos, que direcionariam a ação completamente individual dos candidatos no período de eleições, permaneceriam na mesma direção durante a atuação do parlamentar eleito. Isto resultaria em uma Câmara de Deputados completamente desarticulada, sem nenhuma influência dos partidos políticos. No extremo oposto deste cenário, ainda que parcela dos autores assuma posição intermediária, interpretações recentes contestam esta visão, trazendo diferentes motivações para a atuação individual do parlamentar, mais organizadas e coordenadas, atribuindo papel ao funcionamento dos partidos. Esta literatura mais atual, porém, não investigou os incentivos para a proposição de emendas orçamentárias, lacuna que este trabalho pretendeu cobrir. Os resultados encontrados aqui corroboram a interpretação mais recente sobre o funcionamento do sistema político. No capítulo primeiro, em que são propostos indicadores que avaliam a concentração eleitoral dos deputados paulistas, os resultados indicam que as votações não são tão concentradas como a interpretação tradicional afirma. No segundo capítulo, é avaliada empiricamente a possibilidade da existência da dominância política para o caso de São Paulo. Esta investigação sugere que este conceito não pode ser afirmado como a regra para o sistema político. Em seu lugar, os modelos trabalhados, em que as eleições para deputado e prefeito mostram ser correlacionadas, parecem refletir melhor o funcionamento do sistema político nacional. Por fim, o terceiro capítulo verifica os incentivos para a proposição de emendas. Seus resultados sugerem que os deputados se influenciam não só por seus resultados individuais nas eleições, mas levam em conta as cidades em que os prefeitos são de seu partido. Além disto, os dados sugerem haver a existência de um ciclo de alocação de emendas de acordo com o momento ao longo do mandato. As evidências trazidas por este trabalho sugerem avanços na literatura recente sobre o sistema político brasileiro e merecem novas investigações que ampliem a compreensão sobre tema tão relevante.

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O modelo de reputação política sugere que o político que ocupa um cargo público e pretende mantê-lo através da reeleição tem incentivos para se alinhar às preferências do eleitorado, em detrimento de suas próprias. Partindo do pressuposto que gastos em saúde podem ser sensíveis ao eleitorado, testamos como eventuais incentivos reputacionais podem alterar o padrão de despesas em saúde nos municípios brasileiros. Utilizando uma amostra de 3004 municípios, o teste empírico indica que prefeitos que tentam reeleição aumentam o gasto em saúde no ano eleitoral, ao contrário de prefeitos em segundo mandato. Além disso, identificamos que prefeitos em primeiro mandato que não tentam a reeleição aumentam estes gastos quando sucedido por colega de mesmo partido.

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The increasing availability of social statistics in Latin America opens new possibilities in terms of accountability and incentive mechanisms for policy makers. This paper addresses these issues within the institutional context of the Brazilian educational system. We build a theoretical model based on the theory of incentives to analyze the role of the recently launched Basic Education Development Index (Ideb) in the provision of incentives at the sub-national level. The first result is to demonstrate that an education target system has the potential to improve the allocation of resources to education through conditional transfers to municipalities and schools. Second, we analyze the local government’s decision about how to allocate its education budget when seeking to accomplish the different objectives contemplated by the index, which involves the interaction between its two components, average proficiency and the passing rate. We discuss as well policy issues concerning the implementation of the synthetic education index in the light of this model arguing that there is room for improving the Ideb’s methodology itself. In addition, we analyze the desirable properties of an ideal education index and we argue in favor of an ex-post relative learning evaluation system for different municipalities (schools) based on the value added across different grades

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This paper will examine the effects of tax incentives for small businesses on employment level evaluating a program with this purpose implemented in Brazil in the 1990s. We first develop a theoretical framework which guides both the de nition of the parameters of interest and their identi cation. Selection problems both into the treatment group and into the data sample are tackled by combining fixed effects methods and regression discontinuity design on alternative sub-samples of a longitudinal database of manufacturing firms. The results show that on the one hand the size composition of the treated fi rms may be changed due to the survival of some smaller firms that would have exited had it not been eligible to the program. On the other hand, the treated firms who do not depend on the program to survive do employ more workers.

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Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.

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Top management from retail banks must delegate authority to lower-level managers to operate branches and service centers. Doing so, they must navigate through conflicts of interest, asymmetric information and limited monitoring in designing compensation plans for such agents. Pursuant to this delegation, the banks adopt a system of performance targets and incentives to align the interests of senior management and unit managers. This paper evaluates the causal relationship between performance-based salaries and managers’ effective performance. We use a fixed effects estimator to analyze an unbalanced panel of data from one of the largest Brazilian retail banks during the period from January 2007 to June 2009. The results indicate that agents with guaranteed variable salary contracts demonstrate inferior performance compared with agents who have performance-based compensation packages. We conclude that there is a moral hazard that can be observed in the behavior of agents who are subject to guaranteed variable salary contracts.

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This paper aims to evaluate the impact on employment growth of a tax incentive program targeting Brazilian manufacturing small businesses (SIMPLES). This evaluation is conducted for two distinct periods: for the year 1997, when the program was first implemented, and for the year 1999, when the eligibility rule was modified to allow the eligibility of a broader group of firms. The evaluation takes into account two distinct channels through which the charted effects operate. The first is the employment variation in the firms that became eligible for the incentives, and the second is the change in the survival probability experienced by the same group of firms. Moreover, each of these channels can be activated either by the tax reduction dimension of the program or by its dimension of red tape simplification. Our results identify positive effects on employment growth for the tax incentive program only in the dimension of red tape simplification and its effects on the 1997 sample.

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Esta tese é composta de três artigos. No primeiro artigo, "Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard", é considerado um problema de principal-agente sob a presença simultânea dos problemas de risco moral e seleção adversa, em que a dimensão de seleção adversa se dá sobre as distribuições de probabilidade condicionais as ações do agente. No segundo artigo, "Public-Private Partnerships in the Presence of Adverse Selection" é analisada a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas sob a presença de seleção adversa. No terceiro artigo, "Regulation Under Stock Market Information Disclosure", por sua vez, é considerado o problema da regulação de firmas de capital aberto, onde as firmas possuem incentivos para mandar sinais opostos para o regulador e o mercado.

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The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of fmns and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.