How does corruption hurt growth? Evidences about the effects of corruption on factors productivity and per capita income

Corruption is a phenomenon that plagues many countries and, mostly, walks hand in hand with inefficient institutional structures, which reduce the effectiveness of public and private investment. In countries with widespread corruption, for each monetary unit invested, a sizable share is wasted, implying less investment. Corruption can also be a burden on a nation’s wealth and economic growth, by driving away new investment and creating uncertainties regarding private and social rights. Thus, corruption can affect not only factors productivity, but also their accumulation, with detrimental consequences on a society’s social development. This article aims to analyze and measure the influence of corruption on a country’s wealth. It is implicitly admitted that the degree of institutional development has an adverse effect on the productivity of production factors, which implies in reduced per capita income. It is assumed that the level of wealth and economic growth depends on domestic savings, foster technological progress and a proper educational system. Corruption, within this framework, is not unlike an additional cost, which stifles the “effectiveness” of the investment. This article first discusses the key theories evaluating corruption’s economic consequences. Later, it analyzes the relation between institutional development, factor productivity and per capita income, based on the neoclassical approach to economic growth. Finally, it brings some empirical evidence regarding the effects of corruption on factor productivity, in a sample of 81 countries studied in 1998. The chief conclusion is that corruption negatively affects the wealth of a nation by reducing capital productivity, or its effectiveness.

Dynamics of micro-entrepeneurial activities

This paper generates and organizes stylized facts related to the dynamics of selfemployment activities in Brazil. The final purpose is to help the design of policies to assist micro-entrepreneurial units. The 'first part of the paper uses as a main tool of analysis transitional data constructed from household surveys. The longitudinal information used covers three transition horizons: 1-month, 12-month and 5-year periods. Quantitative flows analysis assesses the main origins, destinies and various types of risks assumed by microentrepreneurial activities. Complementarily, logistic regressions provides evidence on the main characteristics and resources of micro-entrepreneurial units. In particular, we use the movements from self-employment to employer activities as measures of entrepreneurial success. We also use these transitions as measures of employment creation intensity within the self-employed segment.The second part of the paper explores various data sources. First, we attempt to analyze the life-cycle trajectories and determinants of self-employment. We use cohort data constructed from PME and qualitative data on financial and work history factors related to the opening of small bussiness from the informal firms survey implemented during 1994. Second, we apply a standart Mincerian wage equation approach to self-employment profits. This exerci se attempts to capture the correlation patterns between micro-entrepreneurial performance and a variety of firms leveI variables present in the 1994 Informal Survey. Finally, we use a a survey on the poor enterpreneurs of Rocinha favela as a laboratory to study poor entrepreneurs resources and behavior.In sum, the main questions pursued in the paper are: i) who are the Brazilian selfemployed?; ii) in particular: what is relative importance among the self-employed of subsistence activities versus those activities with growth and capital accumulation potential?; iii) what are the main static and dynamic determinants ofmicro-entrepreneurial success?; iv) what is the degree ofrisk associated with micro-entrepreneurial activities in Brazil?; v) What is the life-cycle profile of self-employment?; vi) what are the main constraints on poor entrepreneurs activities?.

Wealth composition, endogenous fertility and the dynamics of income inequality

This paper analyzes how differences in the composition of wealth between human and physical capital among families affect fertility choices. These in tum influence the dynamics of wealth and income inequality across generations through a tradeoffbetween quantity and quality of children. Wealth composition affects fertility because physical capital has only a wealth effect on number of children, whereas human capital increases the time cost of child-rearing in addition to the wealth effect. I construct a model combining endogenous fertility with borrowing constraints in human capital investments, in which weaIth composition is determined endogenously. The model is calibrated to the PNAD, a Brazilian household survey, and the main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, the model implies that the crosssection relationship between fertility and wealth typically displays a U-shaped pattem, reflecting differences in wealth composition between poor and rich families. Also, the quantity-quality tradeoff implies a concave cross-section relationship between investments per child and wealth. Second, as the economy develops and families overcome their bOlTowing constraints, the negative effect of weaIth on fertility becomes smaller, and persistence of inequality declines accordingly. The empirical evidence presented in this paper is consistent with both implications .

The impact of corruption on the performance of state-owned companies: case of Petrobras Brasil

As empresas estatais são freqüentemente consideradas como componentes cruciais da economia de um país. Eles são responsáveis pela criação de vários postos de trabalho e proveem serviços essenciais que exigem um grande investimento de capital. Porém, em países com instituições fracas, onde a responsabilidade dos políticos é limitada e a gestão dos recursos financeiros das empresas estatais sofre pouco controle, os funcionários são muitas vezes tentados pela corrupção. Enormes quantidades de fundos públicos são facilmente desviados, e dinheiro que deveria ter sido investido nas despesas de capital, no pagamento de dívida da empresa ou no aumento do retorno para os acionistas, é usado para aumentar a riqueza privada de indivíduos ou para financiar ilegalmente partidos políticos. O desempenho da empresa sofre com essas alienações visto que parte dos lucros da empresa não são reinvestidos na empresa e dado que incentivos dos gestores estão desalinhados com os interesses dos acionistas. Petrobras, a maior empresa da América Latina em termos de ativos e receitas anuais, sofreu em 2014 e 2015 um escândalo de corrupção imenso, cujo impacto económico foi considerável, levando ao enfraquecimento da confiança de muitos investidores no Brasil após o evento. O escândalo expôs um extenso esquema de corrupção através do qual os contratantes foram conspirando para aumentar os preços de contratos de construção, com a aprovação da administração da Petrobras que pediu em troca ganhos pessoais ou fundos para o Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). A exposição do escândalo na imprensa brasileira teve um grande impacto sobre a credibilidade da Petrobras: as contas da empresa estavam escondendo imensas irregularidades dado que a empresa tinha pago demais para os contratos de construção que não foram precificados no valor do mercado. Ao longo deste estudo, usamos o exemplo da Petrobras para ilustrar como a corrupção dentro empresas estatais prejudica o desempenho da empresa e como ela afeta as várias partes interessadas da empresa.