Fatores antecedentes da satisfação do aluno e do uso de sistemas virtuais de aprendizagem

A educação a distância tem passado por grandes transformações, principalmente após o advento da internet e das tecnologias de informação e comunicação (TICs). Inúmeras perguntas sobre qualidade e resultados de aprendizagem em ambientes virtuais foram geradas com o crescimento da modalidade. Pesquisadores têm investigado métodos de avaliação dos benefícios promovidos pelo e-learning sob um número diversificado de perspectivas. O objetivo desta pesquisa é avaliar o impacto dos construtos qualidade do sistema, qualidade da informação e qualidade do serviço na satisfação do aluno e no uso de Sistemas Virtuais de Aprendizagem em ambientes de e-learning, utilizando como base teórica o modelo de Sucesso de e-learning, adaptado do modelo de Delone e McLean por Holsapple e Lee-Post. A metodologia de pesquisa tipo survey foi administrada por meio de um curso on-line ofertado a 291 estudantes de instituições públicas e privadas de todas as regiões do Brasil. Para o tratamento e análise dos dados, utilizaram-se técnicas de modelagem de equações estruturais e análise fatorial confirmatória. Os resultados demonstram que o uso do sistema é impactado pela variação dos construtos qualidade do sistema, qualidade da informação e qualidade dos serviços, já a satisfação do aluno é antecedida pela qualidade percebida da informação e do serviço. Muitos dos benefícios gerados pela educação a distância são causados pela satisfação do aluno e pela intensidade com que este utiliza o sistema de aprendizagem. Ao identificar os indicadores que antecedem estas variáveis, os gestores educacionais podem planejar seus investimentos visando atender às demandas mais importantes, além de utilizar a informação para lidar com um dos maiores problemas em EaD: a evasão.

Learning-by-employing: the value of commitment

We analyze a dynamic principal–agent model where an infinitely-lived principal faces a sequence of finitely-lived agents who differ in their ability to produce output. The ability of an agent is initially unknown to both him and the principal. An agent’s effort affects the information on ability that is conveyed by performance. We characterize the equilibrium contracts and show that they display short–term commitment to employment when the impact of effort on output is persistent but delayed. By providing insurance against early termination, commitment encourages agents to exert effort, and thus improves on the principal’s ability to identify their talent. We argue that this helps explain the use of probationary appointments in environments in which there exists uncertainty about individual ability.

Learning in peer-to-peer markets: evidence from Airbnb

Peer-to-peer markets are highly uncertain environments due to the constant presence of shocks. As a consequence, sellers have to constantly adjust to these shocks. Dynamic Pricing is hard, especially for non-professional sellers. We study it in an accommodation rental marketplace, Airbnb. With scraped data from its website, we: 1) describe pricing patterns consistent with learning; 2) estimate a demand model and use it to simulate a dynamic pricing model. We simulate it under three scenarios: a) with learning; b) without learning; c) with full information. We have found that information is an important feature concerning rental markets. Furthermore, we have found that learning is important for hosts to improve their profits.

Monetary equilibrium with decentralized trade and learning

This paper analyzes the stability of monetary regimes in an economy where fiat money is endogenously created by the government, information about its value is imperfect, and learning is decentralized. We show that monetary stability depends crucially on the speed of information transmission in the economy. Our model generates a dynamic on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual collapse of overissued paper money. It also provides an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is only a recent development.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.