A note on Chambers's "long memory and aggregation in macroeconomic time series"

Chambers (1998) explores the interaction between long memory and aggregation. For continuous-time processes, he takes the aliasing effect into account when studying temporal aggregation. For discrete-time processes, however, he seems to fail to do so. This note gives the spectral density function of temporally aggregated long memory discrete-time processes in light of the aliasing effect. The results are different from those in Chambers (1998) and are supported by a small simulation exercise. As a result, the order of aggregation may not be invariant to temporal aggregation, specifically if d is negative and the aggregation is of the stock type.

Endogenous wage compression and aggregation boundaries in a model of hierarchical human capital

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Temporal aggregation and bandwidth selection in estimating long memory

This paper reinterprets results of Ohanissian et al (2003) to show the asymptotic equivalence of temporally aggregating series and using less bandwidth in estimating long memory by Geweke and Porter-Hudak’s (1983) estimator, provided that the same number of periodogram ordinates is used in both cases. This equivalence is in the sense that their joint distribution is asymptotically normal with common mean and variance and unity correlation. Furthermore, I prove that the same applies to the estimator of Robinson (1995). Monte Carlo simulations show that this asymptotic equivalence is a good approximation in finite samples. Moreover, a real example with the daily US Dollar/French Franc exchange rate series is provided.

Demand aggregation and credit risk effects in pooled procurement: evidence from the Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies

Pooled procurement has an important role in reducing acquisition prices of goods. A pool of buyers, which aggregates demand for its members, increases bargaining power and allows suppliers to achieve economies of scale and scope in the production. Such aggregation demand e ect lowers prices paid for buyers. However, when a buyer with a good reputation for paying suppliers in a timely manner is joined in the pool by a buyer with bad reputation may have its price paid increased due to the credit risk e ect on prices. This will happen because prices paid in a pooled procurement should refect the (higher) average buyers' credit risk. Using a data set on Brazilian public purchases of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, we nd evidence supporting both e ects. We show that the prices paid by public bodies in Brazil are lower when they buy through pooled procurement than individually. On the other hand, federal agencies (i.e. good buyers) pay higher prices for products when they are joined by state agencies (i.e. bad buyers) in a pool. Such evidence suggests that pooled procurement should be carefully designed to avoid that prices paid increase for its members.