Bens credenciais e poder de mercado : um estudo econométrico da indústria farmacêutica brasileira

The Brazilian pharmaceutical industry has always been targeted by the society, due to the ethical drugs’ high weight in the families’ consumption budgets (especially within the poorer ones) and price raises traditionally above inflation (when the government does not run a price control). The present article aims to organize the debate on regulation for this industry. We review the literature on market failures and regulation solutions adopted for this industry worldwide and try to relate empirically drug prices to some explaining variables, based on original microdata. We find that, similarly to previous U.S. estimations, Brazilian leading brand name drugs – before a 1999 law, which created officially the generic drug defined by its bioequivalence to the reference drug, and a massive advertisement campaign for spreading use of generic drugs, run by the Ministry of Health – accommodated entry and share growth of the followers by raising their prices and catering to a more inelastic market segment. As opposed, the followers reduce relative prices when they lose market. Therefore, a fall of the concentration index in a particular segment has ambiguous effects: if it is due to reduced leader power, the followers raise their relative prices; if it is due to a tougher competition within the fringe, relative prices tend to go down.

Generic-branded drug competition and the price for pharmaceuticals in procurement auctions

This paper studies the effects of generic drug’s entry on bidding behavior of drug suppliers in procurement auctions for pharmaceuticals, and the consequences on procurer’s price paid for drugs. Using an unique data set on procurement auctions for off-patent drugs organized by Brazilian public bodies, we surprisingly find no statistically difference between bids and prices paid for generic and branded drugs. On the other hand, some branded drug suppliers leave auctions in which there exists a supplier of generics, whereas the remaining ones lower their bidding price. These findings explain why we find that the presence of any supplier of generic drugs in a procurement auction reduces the price paid for pharmaceuticals by 7 percent. To overcome potential estimation bias due to generic’s entry endogeneity, we exploit variation in the number of days between drug’s patent expiration date and the tendering session. The two-stage estimations document the same pattern as the generalized least square estimations find. This evidence indicates that generic competition affects branded supplier’s behavior in public procurement auctions differently from other markets.