Venda door-to-door na L'Oréal Brasil: por que a maior empresa de cosméticos do mundo não entra no canal da maior empresa de cosméticos no Brasil?

Por que a maior empresa de cosmético do mundo não entra no canal de vendas da maior empresa de cosméticos do Brasil? O trabalho a seguir tem o objetivo de analisar a L’Oréal Brasil e entender os motivos de ela não atuar no canal de vendas door-to-door, principal canal de vendas da Natura, a maior empresa de cosméticos do Brasil. Com base no método do Estudo do Caso, foram feitas 23 entrevistas tendo como amostra o corpo executivo da L’Oréal Brasil, bem como seu CEO. O estudo abrangeu diversas áreas da organização: marketing, suprimentos, fabricação, recursos humanos, vendas e logística. Com base na teoria da Lógica Dominante, notou-se que apesar de o canal de vendas door-to-door ser atrativo, existem diversas razões estratégicas/crenças que impedem que a L’Oréal entre no canal, são elas: a desconfiança no futuro do canal, a operação logística e o paradigma histórico da L’Oréal.

Inflation targeting, credibility and coordination aspects

There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal dominance, for inflation targeting framework be implemented in successful (credible) way. Essays on how public targets could be used in the absence of such requirements are unusual. In this papel' we appraise how central banks could use inflation targeting before soundness economic fundamentaIs have been achieved. First, based on concise framework, where confidence crises and imperfect information are neglected, we conclude that less ambitious (greater) target for inflation increases the credibility in the precommitment. Optimal target is higher than the one obtained using the Cukierman-Liviatan [7] model, where increasing credibility effect is not considered. Second, extending the model to make confidence crises possible, multiple equilibria solutions becomes possible too. In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crises and reduce the policymaker credibility. On the other hand, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. The optimal target depends on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Finally, when perturbing common knowledge uniqueness is restored even considering confidence crises, as in Morris-Shin[ 14]. The first result, i.e. less ambitious target for inflation increases credibility in precommitment, is also recovered. Adding a precise public signal, cOOl'dinated self-fulfilling actions and equilibrium multiplicity may still exist for some lack of common knowledge (as in Angeleto and Weming[l]). In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crisis again, reducing the policymaker credibility. From another aspect, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. Optimal policy prescriptions depend on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Results also indicate that more precise public information may open the door for bad equilibrium, contrary to the conventional wisdom that more central oank transparency is always good when considering inflation targeting framework.