Optimal exchange rate policy, optimal incomplete taxation and business cycles

Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recur- rent events. A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue Þscal and monetary policies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging. It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays a boom in periods of below average de- valuation and a recession in periods of above average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal policy answer to a recession (boom).

Common cycles in macroeconomic aggregates (revised version)

Although there has been substantial research on long-run co-movement (common trends) in the empirical macroeconomics literature. little or no work has been done on short run co-movement (common cycles). Investigating common cycles is important on two grounds: first. their existence is an implication of most dynamic macroeconomic models. Second. they impose important restrictions on dynamic systems. Which can be used for efficient estimation and forecasting. In this paper. using a methodology that takes into account short- and long-run co-movement restrictions. we investigate their existence in a multivariate data set containing U.S. per-capita output. consumption. and investment. As predicted by theory. the data have common trends and common cycles. Based on the results of a post-sample forecasting comparison between restricted and unrestricted systems. we show that a non-trivial loss of efficiency results when common cycles are ignored. If permanent shocks are associated with changes in productivity. the latter fails to be an important source of variation for output and investment contradicting simple aggregate dynamic models. Nevertheless. these shocks play a very important role in explaining the variation of consumption. Showing evidence of smoothing. Furthermore. it seems that permanent shocks to output play a much more important role in explaining unemployment fluctuations than previously thought.

Endogenous cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss economy

The literature on financiaI imperfections and business cycles has focused on propagation mechanisms. In this pape r we model apure reversion mechanism, such that the economy may converge to a two period equilibrium cycle. This mechanism confirms that financiaI imperfections may have a dramatic amplification effect. Unlike in some related models, contracts are complete. Indexation is not assumed away. The welfare properties of a possible stabilizing policy are analyzed. The model i tself is a dynamic extension of the well-known Stigli tz-Weiss model of lending under moral hazard. Although stylized the model still captures some important features of credit cycles.

Os ciclos de conferências da defensoria pública do Estado de São Paulo: controle e participação social

O objetivo desta dissertação é estudar os Ciclos de Conferências da Defensoria Pública do Estado de São Paulo para entender qual papel eles desempenham em relação a participação popular na gestão da Defensoria Pública. O problema de pesquisa consiste em verificar se e como elas contribuem para garantir a participação social dentro da gestão da Defensoria, levando em consideração o estudo sobre a implementação ou não das diretrizes elaboradas pela população durante a realização dos I, II e III Ciclos de Conferências e a compreensão das diferentes falas que os atores tem em relação aos Ciclos de Conferências. A conclusão é a de que os Ciclos de Conferências não foram absorvidos de forma homogênea pela instituição como um importante mecanismo orientador das prioridades institucionais, capaz de vocalizar os anseios da população, arejando a instituição, e colaborando com a construção de políticas públicas alinhadas às demandas da população. É necessário que seja pactuado e esclarecido o caráter das propostas elaboradas nas Conferências (caráter deliberativo ou consultivo) sob pena do mecanismo participativo em questão perder aderência popular.