Forecasting accuracy and estimation uncertainty using VAR models with short- and long-term economic restrictions: a Monte-Carlo study

Using vector autoregressive (VAR) models and Monte-Carlo simulation methods we investigate the potential gains for forecasting accuracy and estimation uncertainty of two commonly used restrictions arising from economic relationships. The Örst reduces parameter space by imposing long-term restrictions on the behavior of economic variables as discussed by the literature on cointegration, and the second reduces parameter space by imposing short-term restrictions as discussed by the literature on serial-correlation common features (SCCF). Our simulations cover three important issues on model building, estimation, and forecasting. First, we examine the performance of standard and modiÖed information criteria in choosing lag length for cointegrated VARs with SCCF restrictions. Second, we provide a comparison of forecasting accuracy of Ötted VARs when only cointegration restrictions are imposed and when cointegration and SCCF restrictions are jointly imposed. Third, we propose a new estimation algorithm where short- and long-term restrictions interact to estimate the cointegrating and the cofeature spaces respectively. We have three basic results. First, ignoring SCCF restrictions has a high cost in terms of model selection, because standard information criteria chooses too frequently inconsistent models, with too small a lag length. Criteria selecting lag and rank simultaneously have a superior performance in this case. Second, this translates into a superior forecasting performance of the restricted VECM over the VECM, with important improvements in forecasting accuracy ñreaching more than 100% in extreme cases. Third, the new algorithm proposed here fares very well in terms of parameter estimation, even when we consider the estimation of long-term parameters, opening up the discussion of joint estimation of short- and long-term parameters in VAR models.

Identification and estimation of interventions using changes in inequality measures

This paper presents semiparametric estimators of changes in inequality measures of a dependent variable distribution taking into account the possible changes on the distributions of covariates. When we do not impose parametric assumptions on the conditional distribution of the dependent variable given covariates, this problem becomes equivalent to estimation of distributional impacts of interventions (treatment) when selection to the program is based on observable characteristics. The distributional impacts of a treatment will be calculated as differences in inequality measures of the potential outcomes of receiving and not receiving the treatment. These differences are called here Inequality Treatment Effects (ITE). The estimation procedure involves a first non-parametric step in which the probability of receiving treatment given covariates, the propensity-score, is estimated. Using the inverse probability weighting method to estimate parameters of the marginal distribution of potential outcomes, in the second step weighted sample versions of inequality measures are computed. Root-N consistency, asymptotic normality and semiparametric efficiency are shown for the semiparametric estimators proposed. A Monte Carlo exercise is performed to investigate the behavior in finite samples of the estimator derived in the paper. We also apply our method to the evaluation of a job training program.

Ownership, control and corporate valuation of Brazilian companies

We study the direct and indirect ownership structure of Brazilian corporations and their market value and risk by the end of 1996 and 1998. Ownership is quite concentrated with most companies being controlled by a single direct shareholder. We find evidence that indirect control structures may be used to concentrate control even more rather than to keep control of the company with a smaller share of total capital. The greater the concentration of voting rights then less the value of the fmn should be due to potential expropriation ofrninority shareholders. We fmd evidence that when there is a majority shareholder and when indirect ownership structures are used without the loss of control, corporate valuations are greater when control is dilluted through the indirect ownership structure. This evidence is consistent with the existence of private benefits of control that can be translated as potential minority shareholder expropriation.