The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

Imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time-ependent pricing

The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how policymakers’ credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine how credibility affects the outcome of a disinflation in a model with endogenous timedependent pricing rules. Both the initial degree of price ridigity, calculated optimally, and, more notably, the changes in contract length during disinflation play an important role in the explanation of the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially evaluate the costs of disinflation in a setup where credibility is exogenous, and then allow agents to use Bayes rule to update beliefs about the “type” of monetary authority that they face. In both cases, the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation, but the pattern of the output path is more realistic in the case with learning.

Porte da auditoria e manipulação da informação contábil: uma revisão sistemática da literatura

Este estudo examina a relação entre o porte da empresa de auditoria e a manipulação da informação contábil. Consistente com a literatura, o porte de auditoria tem sido utilizado como proxy de qualidade do serviço, e classificado como auditoria Big 6 e não-Big 6, sendo quanto maior o porte, maior a qualidade. A pesquisa abrangeu os estudos que utilizam acumulações discricionárias na estimação da manipulação da informação contábil. Por meio de uma revisão sistemática da literária, foram selecionadas 14 pesquisas empíricas, abrangendo Estados Unidos, Europa e Ásia. Com base na análise dos seus aspectos substantivos e metodológicos, a conclusão é que a magnitude da manipulação da informação contábil não é uniforme nos países estudados sugerindo que os ambientes cultural, institucional e legal podem influenciar a capacidade da auditoria em mitigar a ação discricionária dos gestores.

Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias

Crises bancárias podem implicar uma alta redistribuição de recursos em uma sociedade. O interesse público em manter os bancos em funcionamento demanda o desenho de regimes eficazes de resolução, pois a falência desordenada desses intermediários pode ser uma fonte de risco sistêmico. O Banco Central, autoridade responsável por zelar pela higidez do sistema financeiro, pode se valer de diversos instrumentos para reestruturar ou liquidar um banco em dificuldade financeira. De modo a prevenir a propagação do risco sistêmico, as regras jurídicas conferem ao Banco Central uma ampla margem de discricionariedade no julgamento de quais bancos merecem receber assistência financeira e na escolha dos métodos de resolução bancária. O caráter globalizado das finanças exige uma maior coordenação entre autoridades domésticas na resolução de bancos que operam em múltiplas jurisdições. Algumas iniciativas de órgãos internacionais no período pós-crise de 2007-2008 têm buscado instituir, em nível global, um marco normativo para gerenciamento de crises bancárias, através da harmonização de regimes domésticos de resolução. O histórico de crises do sistema financeiro brasileiro levou ao desenvolvimento de uma rede de proteção bancária em momentos anteriores à crise financeira global de 2007-2008. Assim, o sistema financeiro brasileiro apresentou bom funcionamento mesmo nas fases mais agudas. Não tendo experimentado uma crise sistêmica no período recente, o Brasil não está passando por reformas profundas na estrutura institucional do seu sistema financeiro, a exemplo de países como Estados Unidos e Reino Unido. No entanto, desafios impostos pela crescente globalização das finanças e peculiaridades locais motivam reformas e mudanças discretas nos padrões de governança da rede de proteção brasileira. Através da reconstituição da atuação do Banco Central em três momentos de crise no Brasil, o presente trabalho busca analisar criticamente a rede de proteção bancária brasileira e os mecanismos jurídicos de accountability da autoridade financeira no exercício da supervisão e administração de crises bancárias.

Audiência única e a duração razoável do processo nos juizados especiais cíveis

Esta dissertação pretende demonstrar que os Juizados Especiais Cíveis Estaduais, regulados pela Lei n° 9.099/95, orientados pelos princípios da oralidade, simplicidade, informalidade, economia processual e celeridade, que foram criados em decorrência da necessidade de viabilizar um maior acesso à justiça, principalmente da população mais carente, com redução de custos e simplificação de procedimentos que possibilitassem os julgamentos dentro de um prazo razoável, na realidade da práxis forense, estão sendo desvirtuado dos seus objetivos. Neste sentido, o estudo apresenta números comprovando que os Juizados Especiais cumpriram seu desiderato de proporcionar o acesso ao judiciário, mas que passaram a padecer do mesmo problema da justiça comum: a morosidade na entrega da prestação jurisdicional. Além da incompatibilidade de estrutura com a atual demanda que obviamente vai ensejar lentidão nos Juizados, o estudo apresenta como motivo para esse quadro a conduta dos juizes, responsáveis pela administração do processo, que reproduzem nos Juizados o fomlalismo e a burocracia inerente ao processo civil comum, ao instituir, em evidente descompasso com a lei e seus princípios, um procedimento com duas audiências, sendo uma para conciliação e outra, nos casos em que não é obtido acordo, para instrução e julgamento, em dias distintos, aumentando o tempo de duração dos processos. O estudo conclui que a utilização de audiência única, além de ser uma detenninação legal e estar em sintonia com seus princípios, proporciona celeridade nos julgamentos. diminuindo o custo e o tempo de espera dos litigantes, obstáculos do acesso à justiça que a Lei n° 9.099/95 procurou remover.

Imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time-dependent pricing

The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how policymakers’ credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine how the policymaker’s credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules. Both the initial degree of price ridigity, calculated optimally, and, more notably, the changes in contract length during disinflation play an important role in the explanation of the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially evalute the costs of disinflation in a setup where credibility is exogenous, and then allow agents to update beliefs about the “type” of monetary authority that they face. We show that, in both cases, the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation.

Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility

We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.

Brazil: the pressure points in labor legislation

Brazil’s experience shows that the economic and political history of a country is a critical determinant of which labor laws influence wages and employment, and which are not binding. Long periods of high inflation, illiteracy of the workforce, and biases in the design and enforcement of labor legislation bred by the country’s socioeconomic history are all important in determining the reach of labor laws. Defying conventional wisdom, these factors are shown to affect labor market outcomes even in the sector of employment regarded as unregulated. Following accepted practice in Brazil, we distinguish regulated from unregulated employment by determining whether or not the contract has been ratified by the Ministry of Labor, viz., groups of workers with and without signed work booklet. We then examine the degree of adherence to labor laws in the formal and informal sectors, and finds “pressure points” – viz., evidence of the law on minimum wage, work-hours, and payment timing being binding on outcomes – in both the formal and informal sectors of the Brazilian labor market. The findings of the paper imply that in terms of the design of legislation, informality in Brazil is mainly a fiscal, and not a legal phenomenon. But the manner in which these laws have been enforced is also critical determinant of informality in Brazil: poor record-keeping has strengthened the incentives to stay informal that are already built into the design of the main social security programs, and ambiguities in the design of labor legislation combined with slanted enforcement by labor courts have led to workers effectively being accorded the same labor rights whether or not they have ratified contracts. The incentives to stay informal are naturally higher for workers who are assured of protection under labor legislation regardless of the nature of their contract, which only alters their financial relationship with the government. The paper concludes that informality in Brazil will remain high as long as labor laws remain ambiguous and enforced with a clear pro-labor bias, and social security programs lack tight benefitcontribution linkages and strong enforcement mechanisms.

Essays on infrastructure in Brazil

A presente tese engloba cinco trabalhos sobre dois setores brasileiros de infraestrutura: setor de energia e de transportes. No primeiro trabalho, modela-se o lance dos leilões de linhas de transmissão de energia, buscando compreender porque os lances ganhadores têm se situado em níveis abaixo do que se espera. No segundo paper, estima-se a demanda de energia do Brasil e as elasticidades preço e renda que os consumidores apresentem em relação a essa demanda, usando uma técnica ainda não aplicada na literatura e incluindo o período da Crise do Racionamento – a qual pode ter mudado o padrão de consumo dos agentes. No terceiro trabalho, estuda-se a evolução do mercado de gás natural liquefeito (GNL) ao redor do mundo. O GNL pode ser o link que faltava entre os mercados de gás natural e essa hipótese é testada por meio de análises de séries de tempo e de cópulas. O quarto paper discute a entrada do GNL no sistema energético brasileiro e suas eventuais consequências. Por fim, o quinto paper analisa a experiência de leilões de rodovias no Brasil. O trabalho levanta relevantes insights a respeito do modelo de leilão utilizado e dos detalhes contratuais dessas licitações.

A note on convergence of Peck-Shell and Green-Lin mechanisms in the Diamond-Dybvig model

We study the effects of population size in the Peck-Shell analysis of bank runs. We find that a contract featuring equal-treatment for almost all depositors of the same type approximates the optimum. Because the approximation also satisfies Green-Lin incentive constraints, when the planner discloses positions in the queue, welfare in these alternative specifications are sandwiched. Disclosure, however, it is not needed since our approximating contract is not subject to runs.

The effects of trust in Brazilian PNPs: interpersonal and interorganizational trust in the cultural sector social organizations in São Paulo, Brazil

This study seeks to evaluate how enterorganizational and interpersonal trust affects the degree of State interference in the operations of public-nonprofit partnerships (PNPs). We conducted a qualitative case study in two Brazilian PNPs, Projeto Guri and Orquestra Sinfônica do Estado de São Paulo, through documental analysis and semi-structured interviews. Content analysis of the data yielded a trust framework that begins to explain how a variety of factors, including the protective qualities of the management contract and the strength of the board, moderate the relationship between interpersonal and interorganizational trust in PNPs. The study reveals that unlike Zaheer et al (1998), interpersonal trust had a unique and prominent effect on State interference and types of collaboration in PNPs. Parting from the suggestions by previous authors to contextualize PNP literature findings, the framework takes into account the highly personalistic qualities of Brazilian culture as well as historical and institutional context while highlighting the crucial role of interpersonal trust in Brazilian PNPs.

Estimating the effect of discretionary spending on corruption: evidence from Brazilian municipalities

O presente artigo estuda a relação entre corrupção e discricionariedade do gasto público ao responder a seguinte pergunta: regras de licitação mais rígidas, uma proxy para discricionariedade, resultam em menor prevalência de corrupção nos municípios brasileiros? A estratégia empírica é uma aproximação de regressões em dois estágios (2SLS) estimadas localmente em cada transição de regras de licitação, cuja fonte de dados de corrupção é o Programa de Fiscalização por Sorteio da CGU e os dados sobre discricionariedade são derivados da Lei 8.666/93, responsável por regular os processos de compras e construção civil em todas as esferas de governo. Os resultados mostram, entretanto, que menor discricionariedade está relacionada com maior corrupção para quase todos os cortes impostos pela lei de licitações.

Credit borrowing constraints in a DSGE framework: income vs. housing

Credit market in Brazil distinguishes from advanced economies in many aspects. One of them is related to collaterals for households borrowing. This work proposes a DSGE framework, based on Gerali et al.(2010), to analyse one pecularity of Brazillian credit market: payroll-deducted personal loans. To original model, we added the possibility to households contract long term debt and compare to differents types of credit constrains: one based on housing and other based on future income. We callibrate and estimate the model to Brazil, using Bayesian technique. Results show that, in a economy where credit constraints are based on income, responses to shocks appear to be stronger, at first, but dissipate faster. This occurs because income responds quickly to shock than housing prices, so does amount available to loans. In order to smooth consumption, agents compensate lower income and borrowing by increasing working hours, restoring loans and debt in a shorter time.

The Market for borrowing securities in Brazil

We report the results of an exploratory data analysis of the Brazilian securities lending market. The analysis is performed over the full historical data set of each individual loan offer and loan contract negotiated between January 2007 and August 2013. We give a quantitative description of volume and loan fee trends and fee dependence on asset characteristics. We also unveil new stylized facts specific to the Brazilian market on market access asymmetries between different types of investors. The emerging picture is that the Brazilian securities lending market is a complex environment with specific frictions and strong asymmetries among players. In particular, we describe a tax arbitrage operation performed by domestic mutual funds which generates a significant distortion in the data. In one such event, we estimate additional aggregate profits of 24.25 million Reais (around 10 million Dollars).

Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts.