The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.

Uma análise endógena do sistema de defesa civil do estado do Rio de Janeiro no bilênio 2012-2014 sobre a ótica das relações político administrativo

The increase in the number of natural disasters, as well as their social and economic effects, in recent years, has raised a larger collection, by the media, population and control organs, in the members of the Civil Defense system on the reduction of their effects on society, given that the same has been increasingly overwhelming. To this end, the research analyzes the screen because of the Civil Defense system, historically, have focused their actions, programs and public policies on disaster management, i.e. in the response and recovery at the expense of disaster risk management, i.e. on prevention, preparedness and mitigation of the same, given that the same cannot be avoided, but its effects Yes decreased.This arrangement is studied from the literature review, interviews and field visits. Thus, it was found that the resposabilização ratio and Reduction of risk of disasters that the higher the enforcement and accountability greater and consistent are the number of actions, programmes and public policies aimed at prevention, preparedness and mitigation, i.e. for disaster risk reduction management.

The risk premium on brazilian government debt, 1996-2002

The goal of this paper is to identify the determinants of the risk premium on Brazilian government debt. As the risk premium is a component of the interest rate set by the Brazilian central bank, its reduction would make it possible for the central bank to cut interest rates to levels compatible with a higher economic growth environment. The empirical evidence presented in this paper does not reject the hypotheses that fiscal solvency and the size of the public debt affect the risk premium as measured by the spread over treasury bills of the Brazilian C-bond.