2 resultados para deterrence

em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV


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Settlements are an important part of a program of cartel deterrence, particularly when the likelihood of conviction and the litigation costs are higher. This type of negotiated procedure to reach finality is in essence complementary to the fully adversarial procedures associated to the trial by the administrative or judicial courts, and to other investigative instruments, such as the leniency agreement. The Brazilian experience provides some insights about the different models of direct settlement in cartel cases and the complex interaction among settlements, leniency agreements, and trial outcome. First, there is leeway for the complementary models of settlements, the first oriented mainly to increasing the likelihood of detection, and the second oriented to saving social costs of litigation. Second, the concern with the preservation of the demand for leniency agreements led the competition authority to restrict the use of settlements, which are effectively designed for the defendants that are likely guilty and give higher value to finality. The recent experience illustrates that the current settlement policy has not caused any adverse effect on leniency agreements, while reducing litigation costs and granting finality in some cases.

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An important challenge in the crime literature is to isolate causal effects of police on crime. Following a terrorist attack on the main Jewish center in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, in July 1994, all Jewish institutions (including schools, synagogues, and clubs) were given 24-hour police protection. Thus, this hideous event induced a geographical allocation of police forces that can be presumed to be exogenous in a crime regression. Using data on the location of car thefts before and after the terrorist attack, we find a large deterrent effect of observable police presence on crime. The effect is local, with little or no appreciable impact outside the narrow area in which the police are deployed.