Speculative attacks on debts, dollarization and optimum currency areas

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the discussion of the financial aspects of dollarization and optimum currency areas. Based on the model of self-fulfilling debt crisis developed by Cole and Kehoe [4], it is possible to evaluate the comparative welfare of economies, which either keep their local currency and an independent monetary policy, join a monetary union or adopt dollarization. In the two former monetary regimes, governments can issue debt denominated, respectively, in local and common currencies, which is completely purchased by national consumers. Given this ability, governments may decide to impose an inflation tax on these assets and use the revenues so collected to avoid an external debt crises. While the country that issues its own currency takes this decision independently, a country belonging to a monetary union depends on the joint decision of all member countries about the common monetary policy. In this way, an external debt crises may be avoided under the local and common currency regimes, if, respectively, the national and the union central banks have the ability to do monetary policy, represented by the reduction in the real return on the bonds denominated in these currencies. This resource is not available under dollarization. In a dollarized economy, the loss of control over national monetary policy does not allow adjustments for exogenous shocks that asymmetrically affect the client and the anchor countries, but credibility is strengthened. On the other hand, given the ability to inflate the local currency, the central bank may be subject to the political influence of a government not so strongly concerned with fiscal discipline, which reduces the welfare of the economy. In a similar fashion, under a common currency regime, the union central bank may also be under the influence of a group of countries to inflate the common currency, even though they do not face external restrictions. Therefore, the local and common currencies could be viewed as a way to provide welfare enhancing bankruptcy, if it is not abused. With these peculiarities of monetary regimes in mind, we simulate the levels of economic welfare for each, employing recent data for the Brazilian economy.

Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default

This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.

Speculative attacks, openness and crises

In this paper we propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to evaluate financial adjustments that some emerging market economies went through to overcome external crises during the latest decades, such as default and local currency devaluation. We assume that real devaluation can be used to avoid external debt default, to improve trade balance and to reduce the real public debt level denominated in local currency. Such effects increase the government ability to deal with external crisis, but also have costs in terms of welfare, related to expected inflation, reductions in private investments and higher interest to be paid over the public debt. We conclude that openness improves expected welfare as it allows for a better devaluation-response technology against crises. We also present results for 32 middle-income countries, verifying that the proposed model can indicate, in a stylized way, the preferences for default-devaluation options and the magnitude of the currency depreciation required to overcome 48 external crises occurred as from 1971. Finally, as we construct our model based on the Cole-Kehoe self-fulfilling debt crisis model ([7]), adding local debt and trade, it is important to say that their policy alternatives to leave the crisis zone remains in our extended model, namely, to reduce the external debt level and to lengthen its maturity.

Crises financeira nos anos 1990 e poupança externa

Ao contrário do que afirma a análise econômica convencional, a causa das crises financeiras dos anos 1990 no México, Ásia, Brasil e Argentina não foi principalmente fiscal, mas sim a decisão dos governos de crescerem com poupança externa, isto é, com déficits em conta corrente. Essas foram crises de balanço de pagamento geradas pela sobreapreciação da moeda local e pelo alto nível de dívida externa e/ou rápido crescimento de déficit de conta corrente. Assim, repentinamente os credores externos se convenceram de que o país não enfrenta apenas um problema de liquidez, mas de solvência, e para de rolar a dívida. Um teste econométrico demonstra essas afirmações

Informational spillovers in the pre-1914 London sovereign debt market

We document a novel type of international financial contagion whose driving force is shared financial intermediation. In the London peripheral sovereign debt market during pre-1914 period financial intermediation played a major informational role to investors, most likely because of the absence of international monitoring agencies and the substantial agency costs. Using two events of financial distress – the Brazilian Funding Loan of 1898 and the Greek Funding Loan of 1893 – as quasi-natural experiments, we document that, following the crises, the bond prices of countries with no meaningful economic links to the distressed countries, but shared the same financial intermediary, suffered a reduction relative to the rest of the market. This result is true for the mean, median and the whole distribution of bond prices, and robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis. We interpret it as evidence that the identity of the financial intermediary was informative, i.e, investors extracted information about the soundness of a debtor based on the existence of financial relationships. This spillover, informational in essence, arises as the flip-side of the relational lending coin: contagion arises for the same reason why relational finance, in this case, underwriting, helps alleviate informational and incentive problems.

The asymmetric behavior of the U.S public debt

Our main goal in this paper was to measure how e¢ cient is risk sharing between countries. In order to do so, we have used a international risk sharIn this paper we re-analyze the question of the U.S. public debt sustainability by using a quantile autoregression model. This modeling allows for testing whether the behavior of U.S. public debt is asymmetric or not. Our results provide evidence of a band of sustainability. Outside this band, the U.S. public debt is unsustainable. We also nd scal policy to be adequate in the sense that occasional episodes in which the public debt moves out of the band do not pose a threat to long run sustainability.

Investment in human capital in a macrodynamic framework: redistributive taxation, public debt and welfare

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Public debt indexation and denomination, the case of Brazil: a comment

In this work I analyze the model proposed by Goldfajn (2000) to study the choice of the denomination of the public debt. The main purpose of the analysis is pointing out possible reasons why new empirical evidence provided by Bevilaqua, Garcia and Nechio (2004), regarding a more recent time period, Önds a lower empirical support to the model. I also provide a measure of the overestimation of the welfare gains of hedging the debt led by the simpliÖed time frame of the model. Assuming a time-preference parameter of 0.9, for instance, welfare gains associated with a hedge to the debt that reduces to a half a once-for-all 20%-of-GDP shock to government spending run around 1.43% of GDP under the no-tax-smoothing structure of the model. Under a Ramsey allocation, though, welfare gains amount to just around 0.05% of GDP.

Inflation targeting, credibility and confidence crises

We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and the ination target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self conrmed type of equilibrium may arise. In this case, an over-the-target ination becomes more likely. The central bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid condence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected ination. Moreover, even after ruling out the possibility of condence crises, less ambitious goals may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be fullled in many states of nature.

Debt composition and exchange rate balance sheet effects in Brazil: A firm level analysis

In this paper we study the interaction between macroeconomic environment and firms’ balance sheet effects in Brazil during the 1990’s. We start by assessing the influence of macroeconomic conditions on firms’ debt composition in Brazil. We found that larger firms tend to change debt currency composition more in response to a change in the exchange rate risk than small firms. We then proceed to investigate if and how exchange rate balance sheet effects affected the firms’ investment decisions. We test directly the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment. Contrary to earlier findings (Bleakley and Cowan, 2002), we found that firms more indebted in foreign currency tend to invest less when there is an exchange rate devaluation. We tried different controls for the competitiveness effect. First, we control directly for the effect of the exchange rate on exports and imported inputs. We then pursue an alternative investigation strategy, inspired by the credit channel literature. According to this perspective, Tobin’s q can provide an adequate control for the competitiveness effect on investment. Our results provide supporting evidence for imperfect capital markets, and for a negative exchange rate balance sheet effect in Brazil. The results concerning the exchange rate balance sheet effect on investment are statistically significant and robust across the different specifications. We tested the results across different periods, classified according to the macroeconomic environment. Our findings suggest that the negative exchange rate balance sheet effect we found in the whole sample is due to the floating exchange rate period. We also found that exchange rate devaluations have important negative impact on both cash flows and sales of indebted firms. Furthermore, the impact of exchange rate variations is asymmetric, and the significant effect detected when no asymmetry is imposed is engendered by exchange rate devaluations.

The contagion effect of public debt on monetary policy: the brazilian experience

This paper attempts to explain why the Brazilian inter-bank interest rate is so high compared with rates practiced by other emerging economies. The interplay between the markets for bank reserves and government securities feeds into the inter-bank rate the risk premium of the Brazilian public debt.

Public debt sustainability and endogenous seignorage in Brazil: time-series evidence from 1947-92

Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditure GDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine two central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after hocks to either revenues or expenditures? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not;(ii) a rational Brazilian consumer can have a behavior consistent with Ricardian Equivalence (iii) seignorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.

The LDC debt problem: a game-theoretical analisys

We review the LDC debt crisis since 1982, by means of game theory. New insights are obtained into the reasons behind the formation of the creditors' carte1 and the nature of the difficu1ties invo1ved in the formation of the debtors' carte1. The standard view that Rubinstein's barganing mode1s are appropriate for dea1ing with debt re1ief is shown to be faulty, un1ess the debtor buys out the debt.