Special interests and political business cycles

In this paper we bridge the gap between special interest politics and political business cycle literature. We build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our set up to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition, aggregate expenditures and real exchange rates.

Estimating sectoral cycles using cointegration and common features

This paper investigates the degree of short run and long run co-movement in U.S. sectoral output data by estimating sectoraI trends and cycles. A theoretical model based on Long and Plosser (1983) is used to derive a reduced form for sectoral output from first principles. Cointegration and common features (cycles) tests are performed; sectoral output data seem to share a relatively high number of common trends and a relatively low number of common cycles. A special trend-cycle decomposition of the data set is performed and the results indicate a very similar cyclical behavior across sectors and a very different behavior for trends. Indeed. sectors cyclical components appear as one. In a variance decomposition analysis, prominent sectors such as Manufacturing and Wholesale/Retail Trade exhibit relatively important transitory shocks.

Common cycles in macroeconomic aggregates (revised version)

Although there has been substantial research on long-run co-movement (common trends) in the empirical macroeconomics literature. little or no work has been done on short run co-movement (common cycles). Investigating common cycles is important on two grounds: first. their existence is an implication of most dynamic macroeconomic models. Second. they impose important restrictions on dynamic systems. Which can be used for efficient estimation and forecasting. In this paper. using a methodology that takes into account short- and long-run co-movement restrictions. we investigate their existence in a multivariate data set containing U.S. per-capita output. consumption. and investment. As predicted by theory. the data have common trends and common cycles. Based on the results of a post-sample forecasting comparison between restricted and unrestricted systems. we show that a non-trivial loss of efficiency results when common cycles are ignored. If permanent shocks are associated with changes in productivity. the latter fails to be an important source of variation for output and investment contradicting simple aggregate dynamic models. Nevertheless. these shocks play a very important role in explaining the variation of consumption. Showing evidence of smoothing. Furthermore. it seems that permanent shocks to output play a much more important role in explaining unemployment fluctuations than previously thought.

Common cycles in macroeconomic aggregates

Reduced form estimation of multivariate data sets currently takes into account long-run co-movement restrictions by using Vector Error Correction Models (VECM' s). However, short-run co-movement restrictions are completely ignored. This paper proposes a way of taking into account short-and long-run co-movement restrictions in multivariate data sets, leading to efficient estimation of VECM' s. It enables a more precise trend-cycle decomposition of the data which imposes no untested restrictions to recover these two components. The proposed methodology is applied to a multivariate data set containing U.S. per-capita output, consumption and investment Based on the results of a post-sample forecasting comparison between restricted and unrestricted VECM' s, we show that a non-trivial loss of efficiency results whenever short-run co-movement restrictions are ignored. While permanent shocks to consumption still play a very important role in explaining consumption’s variation, it seems that the improved estimates of trends and cycles of output, consumption, and investment show evidence of a more important role for transitory shocks than previously suspected. Furthermore, contrary to previous evidence, it seems that permanent shocks to output play a much more important role in explaining unemployment fluctuations.

Economic cycles and term structure: application to Brazil

The objective of this work is to describe the behavior of the economic cycle in Brazil through Markov processes which can jointly model the slope factor of the yield curve, obtained by the estimation of the Nelson-Siegel Dynamic Model by the Kalman filter and a proxy variable for economic performance, providing some forecasting measure for economic cycles

On the welfare costs of business cycles in the 20th century

Lucas (1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research, that the welfare cost of business cycles are relatively small. Using standard assumptions on preferences and a reasonable reduced form for consumption, we computed these welfare costs for the pre- and post-WWII era, using three alternative trend-cycle decomposition methods. The post-WWII period is very era this basic result is dramatically altered. For the Beveridge and Nelson decomposition, and reasonable preference parameter and discount values, we get a compensation of about 5% of consumption, which is by all means a sizable welfare cost (about US$ 1,000.00 a year).

State–society cycles and political pacts in a national–dependent society: Brazil

The history of independent Brazil may be divided into three major state–society cycles, and, after 1930, five political pacts or class coalitions can be identified. These pacts were nationalist; only in the 1990s did the Brazilian elites surrender to the neoliberal hegemony. Yet, since the mid-2000s they have been rediscovering the idea of the nation. The main claim of the essay is that Brazilian elites and Brazilian society are “national–dependent”, that is, they are ambivalent and contradictory, requiring an oxymoron to define them. They are dependent because they often see themselves as “European” and the mass of the people as inferior. But Brazil is big enough, and there are enough common interests around its domestic market, to make the Brazilian nation less ambivalent. Today Brazil is seeking a synthesis between the last two political cycles – between social justice and economic development in the framework of democracy.

Endogenous cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss economy

The literature on financiaI imperfections and business cycles has focused on propagation mechanisms. In this pape r we model apure reversion mechanism, such that the economy may converge to a two period equilibrium cycle. This mechanism confirms that financiaI imperfections may have a dramatic amplification effect. Unlike in some related models, contracts are complete. Indexation is not assumed away. The welfare properties of a possible stabilizing policy are analyzed. The model i tself is a dynamic extension of the well-known Stigli tz-Weiss model of lending under moral hazard. Although stylized the model still captures some important features of credit cycles.

Political budget cycles in a fiscal federation : the effect of partisan voluntary transfers

This article first presents an econometric study suggesting that intergovernmental transfers to Brazilian municipalities are strongly partisan motivated. In light of that stylized fact, it develops an extension to Rogoff (1990)’s model to analyze the effect of partisan motivated transfers into sub-national electoral and fiscal equilibria. The main finding is that important partisan transfers may undo the positive selection aspect of political budget cycles. Indeed, partisan transfers may, on one hand, eliminate the political budget cycle, solving a moral hazard problem, but, on the other hand, they may retain an incompetent incumbent in office, bringing about an adverse selection problem.

Optimal exchange rate policy, optimal incomplete taxation and business cycles

Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recur- rent events. A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue Þscal and monetary policies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging. It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays a boom in periods of below average de- valuation and a recession in periods of above average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal policy answer to a recession (boom).

Business cycles in emerging economies : the role of interest rates

This paper documents the empirical relation between the interest rates that emerging economies face in international capital markets and their business cycles. It shows that the patterns observed in the data can be interpreted as the equilibrium of a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small open economy, in which (i) firms have to pay for a fraction of the input bill before production takes place, and (ii) preferences generate a labor supply that is independent of the interest rate. In our sample, interest rates are strongly countercyclical, strongly positively correlated with net exports, and they lead the cycle. Output is very volatile and consumption is more volatile than output. The sample includes data for Argentina during 1983-2000 and for four other large emerging economies, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Philippines, during 1994-2000. The model is calibrated to Argentina’s economy for the period 1983-1999. When the model is fed with actual US interest rates and the actual default spreads of Argentine sovereign interest rates, interest rates alone can explain forty percent of output fluctuations. When simulated technology shocks are added to the model, it can account for the main empirical regularities of Argentina’s economy during the period. A 1% increase in country risk causes a contemporaneous fall in output of 0.5 ’subsequent recovery. An increase in US rates causes output to fall by the same on impact and by almost 2% two years after the shock. The asymetry in the effect of shocks to US rates and country risk is due to the fact that US interest rates are more persistent than country risk and that there is a significant spillover effect from US interest rates to country risk.

Signaling in political budget cycles: How far are you willing to go?

This paper analyzes how heterogeneity in two dimensions, competency and character, a¤ects political budget cycles. Competency is the e¢ciency in running the government. Character is the degree of opportunism. In this expanded space, previous results in the literature on the separating nature of the signaling equilibrium hold if heterogeneity in opportunism is low. With high heterogeneity in opportunism, no separating equilibrium exists. Rather, the equilibrium is partially pooling: only extreme types can be distinguished.