Inflation targeting, credibility and confidence crises

We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and the ination target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self conrmed type of equilibrium may arise. In this case, an over-the-target ination becomes more likely. The central bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid condence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected ination. Moreover, even after ruling out the possibility of condence crises, less ambitious goals may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be fullled in many states of nature.

Endogenous time-dependent rules and the costs of disinflation with imperfect credibility

This paper examines the output effects of monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules and imperfect credibility of the disinflation policy. We find that these features interact to generate an additional effect on top f the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent rules (Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation. This results in higher output costs of monetary disinflation.

The effect of using claim confirming product cues on the product claim credibility: is seeing believing?

The Cue Utilization Theory establishes that all products are made of multiples cues that may be seen as surrogates for the intangible attributes that make up any given product. However, the results of many years of research have yet yielded little consensus as to the impact generated by the use of such cues. This research aims to contribute to the discussion about the importance of intrinsic cues by investigating the effects that the use of product cues that confirm the product claim may have on Claim Credibility (measured through Ad Credibility), and also on consumers’ Purchase Intention and Perceived Risk toward the product. An experiment was designed to test such effects and the results suggest the effects of the use of Claim Confirming Product Cues depend on consumer’s level of awareness about such cue, and that when consumers are aware of it, Ad Credibility and Purchase Intention increase, as Perceived Risk decreases. Such results may have implications to academicians and practitioners, as well as may provide insights for future research.

Optimal-state-dependent rules, credibility, and inflationary inertia

This paper examines the output losses caused by disinflation and the role of credibility in a model where pricing mIes are optimal and individual prices are rigid. Individual nominal rigidity is modeled as resulting from menu costs. The interaction between optimal pricing mIes and credibility is essential in determining the inflationary inertia. A continued period of high inflation generates an asymmetric distribution of price deviations, with more prices that are substantially lower than their desired leveIs than prices that are substantially higher than the optimal ones. When disinflation is not credible, inflationary inertia is engendered by this asymmetry: idiosyncratic shocks trigger more upward than downward adjustments. A perfect1y credible disinflation causes an immediate change of pricing rules which, by rendering the price deviation distribution less asymmetric, practically annihilates inflationary inertia. An implication of our model is that stabilization may be sucessful even when credibility is low, provided that it is preceded by a mechanism of price alignment. We also develop an analytical framework for analyzing imperfect credibility cases.

The effects of government deficit on equilibrium real exchange rates and stock prices

This paper studies the effect of government deficits on equilibrium real exchange rates and stock prices. The theoretical part modifies a two-country cash-in-advance model like used in Lucas(1982) and Sargent(1987) in order to accommodate an exchange rate market and a government that pursues fiscal and monetary policy targets. The implied result is that unanticipated shocks in government deficits raise expectations of both taxes and inflation and, therefore, are associated with real exchange rate devaluations and lower stock prices. This finding is strongly supported by empirical evidence for a group of 19 countries, representing 76% of world production

Inglorious revolution : sovereign debt, tropical credibility, and financial underdevelopment in imperial Brazil

In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.

Inflation targeting, credibility and coordination aspects

There are plenty of economic studies pointing out some requirements, like the inexistence of fiscal dominance, for inflation targeting framework be implemented in successful (credible) way. Essays on how public targets could be used in the absence of such requirements are unusual. In this papel' we appraise how central banks could use inflation targeting before soundness economic fundamentaIs have been achieved. First, based on concise framework, where confidence crises and imperfect information are neglected, we conclude that less ambitious (greater) target for inflation increases the credibility in the precommitment. Optimal target is higher than the one obtained using the Cukierman-Liviatan [7] model, where increasing credibility effect is not considered. Second, extending the model to make confidence crises possible, multiple equilibria solutions becomes possible too. In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crises and reduce the policymaker credibility. On the other hand, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. The optimal target depends on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Finally, when perturbing common knowledge uniqueness is restored even considering confidence crises, as in Morris-Shin[ 14]. The first result, i.e. less ambitious target for inflation increases credibility in precommitment, is also recovered. Adding a precise public signal, cOOl'dinated self-fulfilling actions and equilibrium multiplicity may still exist for some lack of common knowledge (as in Angeleto and Weming[l]). In this case, to set greater targets for inflation may stimulate confidence crisis again, reducing the policymaker credibility. From another aspect, multiple (bad) equilibria may be avoided. Optimal policy prescriptions depend on the likelihood of each equilibrium be selected. Results also indicate that more precise public information may open the door for bad equilibrium, contrary to the conventional wisdom that more central oank transparency is always good when considering inflation targeting framework.