How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Desafios que enfrenta a ANP para regular a indústria de petróleo no Brasil depois da quebra do monopólio em 1997 ate o ano de 2005

This work is analyzing the challenges which the National Petrol Agency is facing to regulate the Petrol industry in Brazil after the Monopoly crash in the period between 1997 until 2005. Due to the necessities of adaptation of its political strategies to the rules which determine the international economic flows, Brazil was forced to use the Economic Regulation in order to control the market. The regulation established in Brazil is not indifferent to imperfect markets. Thus can be find a conflict of interests among companies, the government and consumers within this process of regulation. The established agency does not have enough autonomy for administrating a regulation. The State with its paternalism power does not allow the agency to fulfill its function for which it was established, even though its function was established by law. A regulating policy which is clearly defined will establish a strong and independent agency with a clear limitation of its competences, avoiding divergent interpretation which prioritizes investments and promotes economic development. The agency will have the challenge to regulate the companies that enter the sector, allowing the opening of the market for new initiatives of investments which contribute to the welfare of the country and breaking at the same time the monopoly that is lead by Petrobras since 1953. Combining a stable set of rules with agility in order to adapt to changes will provide the regulator with a great decision-making power. The flexibility in the regulation will improve the correcting of the rules that were set in the beginning, being more efficient, which are based on acquired experience and achieved results. The structure of the agency and the flexibility of the regulation should be orientated on the promotion of competition in order to achieve economic and social development.

The global financial crisis and after: a new capitalism?

The 2008 global financial crisis was the consequence of the process of financialization, or the creation of massive fictitious financial wealth, that began in the 1980s, and of the hegemony of a reactionary ideology, namely, neoliberalism, based on selfregulated and efficient markets. Although capitalism is intrinsically unstable, the lessons from the stock-market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s were transformed into theories and institutions or regulations that led to the “30 glorious years of capitalism” (1948–77) and that could have avoided a financial crisis as profound as the present one. It did not because a coalition of rentiers and “financists” achieved hegemony and, while deregulating the existing financial operations, refused to regulate the financial innovations that made these markets even more risky. Neoclassical economics played the role of a meta-ideology as it legitimized, mathematically and “scientifically”, neoliberal ideology and deregulation. From this crisis a new capitalism will emerge, though its character is difficult to predict. It will not be financialized but the tendencies present in the 30 glorious years toward global and knowledge-based capitalism, where professionals will have more say than rentier capitalists, as well as the tendency to improve democracy by making it more social and participative, will be resumed.

Crisis communication: organization's reactions to unexpected events

A reputação é considerada o ativo mais importante das empresas. Ela permite o estabelecimento de relações comerciais e garante um bom funcionamento da organização. Quando um evento inesperado surge, a reputação pode ser ameaçada. Os gerentes, líderes da organização, têm então que demonstrar reatividade e capacidade em responder as necessidades dos stakeholders, e capacidade de detectar e consertar as falhas dentro da organização através de um processo de aprendizagem, para evitar conseqüências negativas que poderiam danificar a reputação e impactar o desenvolvimento operacional da empresa. Através da comunicação de crise, observamos que depois da queda do avião AF 447, a companhia Air France adotou diferentes posturas adaptadas ao pedido dos stakeholders e ao grau de ameaça sofrido. Logo depois do acidente, a empresa decidiu adotar a estratégia do reconhecimento, assumindo uma responsabilidade simbólica e comunicando prioritariamente para as famílias das vitimas e para a mídia. Nas seguintes semanas ela utilizou a estratégia do silêncio que consiste em não comunicar diretamente a mídia. Finalmente, ela usou a estratégia do “bode expiatório” quando ela foi sujeita a ataques diretos. As reações da empresa somadas ao avanço das investigações judiciais revelaram falhas organizacionais “históricas” dentro da própria empresa, como por exemplo, a falta de comunicação entre pilotos e gerentes ou uma falha de sensibilidade técnica e operacional da parte dos gerentes. Apesar de problemas interno e externo, a Air France demonstrou que uma comunicação de crise bem gerenciada limita os impactos financeiros e de reputação. As conseqüências negativas sofridas pela companhia Air France foram limitadas.

A formação de rede para o atendimento de desastres de massa: o caso do acidente aéreo do voo 447 da Air France

Este estudo teve por objetivo verificar como as características do modelo de rede se manifestam em resposta a desastres de massa, por meio de um estudo de caso. O objeto dessa pesquisa foi o acidente aéreo do voo 447 da Air France, que aconteceu em meados de 2009, no Oceano Atlântico em área próxima ao arquipélago de São Pedro e São Paulo, circunscrição do estado de Pernambuco. A rede formada para a resposta a esse acidente foi composta pela Aeronáutica, Marinha, Polícia Federal, Secretaria de Defesa Social de Pernambuco, INTERPOL e Secretaria de Estado da Segurança e da Defesa Social da Paraíba, tendo ainda a participação de outras instituições, que forneceram suporte logístico de pessoas e recursos em geral para a missão. As atividades desenvolvidas durante o evento compreenderam busca e resgate dos corpos, sob a coordenação da Aeronáutica e da Marinha, pré-identificação dos corpos, sob a coordenação da Polícia Federal e da Secretaria de Defesa Social de Pernambuco, necrópsia dos corpos e coleta de material postmortem, sob a coordenação da Secretaria de Defesa Social de Pernambuco e da Secretaria de Estado da Segurança e da Defesa Social da Paraíba, coleta de material antemortem, sob a coordenação da INTERPOL e da Polícia Federal, e identificação dos corpos, que teve como coordenadores a Polícia Federal e a Secretaria de Defesa Social de Pernambuco. A pesquisa realizada compreendeu três momentos distintos: a) montagem da estrutura da rede, b) análise das etapas de gerenciamento e, c) identificação das características da rede. A montagem da estrutura da rede permitiu conhecer em detalhes a rede formada, seus integrantes, objetivos e funcionamento, e subsidiar as etapas seguintes. Com isso foi possível fazer uma análise das etapas de gerenciamento da rede, a ativação, o enquadramento, a mobilização e a síntese, e como cada uma delas aconteceu na rede de atendimento do voo 447 da Air France. Por fim, foi possível identificar as principais características do modelo de rede, a pluralidade, a horizontalidade, a capilaridade, a interdependência, a flexibilidade e a dinâmica do estado, e verificar como elas se manifestaram na missão de resposta ao acidente aéreo do voo 447 da Air France.

The impact of the 2008 economic recession on three residential property type investments: a case study of five diverse zip codes in Washington DC, USA

There has been 47 recessions in the United States of America (US) since 1790. US recessions have increasingly affected economies of other countries in the world as nations become more and more interdependent on each other. The worst economic recession so far was the “Great Depression” – an economic recession that was caused by the 1929 crash of the stock market in the US. The 2008 economic recession in the US was a result of the burst of the “housing bubble” created by predatory lending. The economic recession resulted in increased unemployment (according to NBER 8.7 million jobs were lost from Feb. 2008 to Feb. 2010); decrease in GDP by 5.1%; increase in poverty level from 12.1% (2007) to 16.0% (2008) (NBER) This dissertation is an attempt to research the impact of the 2008 economic recession on different types of residential investments: a case study of five (5) diverse neighborhoods/zip codes in Washington DC, USA The main findings were that the effect of the 2008 economic depression on the different types of residential properties was dependent on the location of the property and the demographics/socio-economic factors associated with that location.