Repensando o recrutamento e a seleção de profissionais através da internet: o caso CEG-RJ

The Internet recruiting has been announced in the job market as a modern tool to attract the best and brightest professionals to the companies. The main objective of the present study is to analyze the Internet resources applied to the Recruitment and Selection process, so as to understand how can these tools make easier recruitment, in which concerns to cost efficiency, time spent and adequacy of the candidates selected to fill the job vacancies. It is also studied the role of the intermediates in the job market, specifically the recruitment consultants for executive search, considering the intensive use of the Internet tools for companies that, in this new way, get in touch directly with a major group of possible candidates. It is also investigated how these new resources to develop in-house capabilities to manage on-line recruiting, will bring savings, better process times and superior qualities of candidates. The study has an empirical section based on a case study of the Companhia Distribuidora de Gás do Rio de Janeiro - CEG, in which the new method with the Internet tools is compared vis-à-vis the traditional one. The study analyses the new method¿s impact on the main variables present in the process.Keywords: Labor Market, Recruitment and Selection, On-line Recruitment, Human Resource Management, Internet

Sequential cost-reimbursement rules

This paper studies cost-sharing rules under dynamic adverse selection. We present a typical principal-agent model with two periods, set up in Laffont and Tirole's (1986) canonical regulation environment. At first, when the contract is signed, the firm has prior uncertainty about its efficiency parameter. In the second period, the firm learns its efficiency and chooses the level of cost-reducing effort. The optimal mechanism sequentially screens the firm's types and achieves a higher level of welfare than its static counterpart. The contract is indirectly implemented by a sequence of transfers, consisting of a fixed advance payment based on the reported cost estimate, and an ex-post compensation linear in cost performance.

Three applications of the marginal cost of public funds concept

This paper illustrates the use of the marginal cost of public funds concept in three contexts. First, we extend Parry’s (2003) analysis of the efficiency effects excise taxes in the U.K., primarily by incorporating the distortion caused by imperfect competition in the cigarette market and distinguishing between the MCFs for per unit and ad valorem taxes on cigarettes. Our computations show, contrary to the standard result in the literature, that the per unit tax on cigarettes has a slightly lower MCF than the ad valorem tax on cigarettes. Second, we calculate the MCF for a payroll tax in a labour market with involuntary unemployment, using the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model as our framework. Our computations, based on Canadian labour market data, indicate that incorporating the distortion caused by involuntary unemployment raises the MCF by 25 to 50 percent. Third, we derive expressions for the distributionally-weighted MCFs for the exemption level and the marginal tax rate for a “flat tax”, such as the one that has been adopted by the province of Alberta. This allows us to develop a restricted, but tractable, version of the optimal income tax problem. Computations indicate that the optimal marginal tax rate may be quite high, even with relatively modest pro-poor distributional preferences.