Allocation of authority in franchise chains

This article investigates the level of delegation in franchise chains, distinguishing the two most relevant franchising models: Business Format Franchising and Learning Network Franchising. The two models basically differ on the level of real authority (effective control over decisions) exercised by the franchisors. Differences in business features, such as the required standardization, monitoring costs and consumer sensitivity to variations in product attributes (consumer measurement costs), explain the adoption of the different models of franchising. These variables affect the trade-off between the risk of brand name loss and the gains in knowledge sharing and learning within the network. The higher the need for standardization, the higher is the risk of brand name loss, and, consequently, the more likely the franchisor will adopt an organizational design that confers more control over franchisees’ decisions, such as business format franchising. This paper presents two case studies with Brazilian food franchise chains that illustrate the main argument and suggest additional propositions. Moreover, an empirical analysis of 223 franchise chains provides additional support to the hypothesis of a negative the effect of required standardization on the level of delegation.

Contracting with repeated moral hazard and private evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agent’s output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (δ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as δ → 1. The optimal contract when δ << 1 is partially characterized. Incentives are optimally provided with a combination of efficiency wages and the threat of termination, which will exhibit memory over the whole history of realizations. Finally, Tournaments are shown to provide an alternative solution to the problem.

Contratações Públicas no Setor de Resíduos Sólidos: Um estudo sobre as formas de contratação, delegação e gestão das atividades econômicas e serviços públicos relacionados ao setor de resíduos sólidos

Existem diversas formas no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro mediante as quais o poder público pode contratar, delegar ou gerir a prestação de serviços que envolvam entes privados. São elas os contratos de mera prestação de serviços regidos pela Lei 8.666/93 ou pela Lei 10.520/02; os convênios; as concessões comuns de serviço público regidas pela Lei nº 8.987/95; as parcerias público-privadas tuteladas pela Lei 11.079/04 e os consórcios públicos regidos pela Lei nº 11.107/05. O presente trabalho visa explorar como as contratações públicas ocorrem no setor de resíduos sólidos. Para isso, em um primeiro momento foi analisada a natureza jurídica dos serviços relacionados ao manejo de resíduos. Em um segundo momento, foi traçado um panorama sobre as modelagens contratuais disponíveis ao poder público para realizar essas contratações, bem como os possíveis problemas levantados pela doutrina no uso desses moldes. Por último, foram analisados casos concretos com o fim de averiguar se os referidos problemas são levados em consideração pelo Administrador Público ao elaborar os editais e contratos para prestação desses serviços pela iniciativa privada.