Solving the non-convexity problem in some shopping-time and human-capital models

Several works in the shopping-time and in the human-capital literature, due to the nonconcavity of the underlying Hamiltonian, use Örst-order conditions in dynamic optimization to characterize necessity, but not su¢ ciency, in intertemporal problems. In this work I choose one paper in each one of these two areas and show that optimality can be characterized by means of a simple aplication of Arrowís (1968) su¢ ciency theorem.

Performance contrasts during the financial crisis between publicly traded family and non-family firms in Europe

Neste estudo, analiso o desempenho de empresas familiares e não-familiares na Europa, entre 2001 e 2013, com uma especial atenção ao período da crise financeira de 2008 e 2009. Doze anos de dados foram recolhidos e analisadosusando dois modelos: o modelo de ajustamento do mercado e uma técnica de estimativa de painéis. Ao contrário das expectativas, os resultados mostram que as empresas familiares não têm resultados significativamente superiores às empresas não familiares durante o período em análise, inclusive antes, durante, e depois da crise. No entanto, considerando o valor do beta, existem diferenças significativas. É possível concluir que as empresas familiares são, em geral, menos voláteis e que durante a crise apresentaram uma volatilidade extremamente baixa comparativamente com o mercado.JEL

From commitment to non-commitment: allowing type dynamic in Laffont and Tirole's regulation model

This paper investigates the introduction of type dynamic in the La ont and Tirole's regulation model. The regulator and the rm are engaged in a two period relationship governed by short-term contracts, where, the regulator observes cost but cannot distinguish how much of the cost is due to e ort on cost reduction or e ciency of rm's technology, named type. There is asymmetric information about the rm's type. Our model is developed in a framework in which the regulator learns with rm's choice in the rst period and uses that information to design the best second period incentive scheme. The regulator is aware of the possibility of changes in types and takes that into account. We show how type dynamic builds a bridge between com- mitment and non-commitment situations. In particular, the possibility of changing types mitigates the \ratchet e ect". We show that for small degree of type dynamic the equilibrium shows separation and the welfare achived is close to his upper bound (given by the commitment allocation).