Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

Bubbles, collateral and monetary equilibrium

Consider an economy where infinite-lived agents trade assets collateralized by durable goods. We obtain results that rule out bubbles when the additional endowments of durable goods are uniformly bounded away from zero, regardless of whether the asset’s net supply is positive or zero. However, bubbles may occur, even for state-price processes that generate finite present value of aggregate wealth. First, under complete markets, if the net supply is being endogenously reduced to zero as a result of collateral repossession. Secondly, under incomplete markets, for a persistent positive net supply, under the general conditions guaranteeing existence of equilibrium. Examples of monetary equilibria are provided.

Endogenous collateral

We study an economy where there are two types of assets. Consumers’ promises are the primitive defaultable assets secured by collateral chosen by the consumers themselves. The purchase of these personalized assets by financial intermediaries is financed by selling back derivatives to consumers. We show that nonarbitrage prices of primitive assets are strict submartingales, whereas nonarbitrage prices of derivatives are supermartingales. Next we establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents.

Collateral avoids Ponzi schemes in incomplete markets

Without introducing neither debt constraints nor transversality conditions to avoid the possibility of Ponzi schemes, we show existence of equilibrium in an incomplete markets economy with a collateral structure.

Endogenous collateral: arbitrage and equilibrium without bounded short sales

We study the implications of the absence of arbitrage in an two period economy where default is allowed and assets are secured by collateral choosen by the borrowers. We show that non arbitrage sale prices of assets are submartingales, whereas non arbitrage purchase prices of the derivatives (secured by the pool of collaterals) are supermartingales. We use these non arbitrage conditions to establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents. Our results are particularly relevant for the collateralized mortgage obligations(CMO) markets.

The Eaton-Gersovitz-Arellano environment with collateral

Neste artigo eu introduzo colateralização no ambiente de dívida soberana de Eaton-Gersovitz-Arellano. Esta colateralização pode ser vista como Investimento Estrangeiro Direto. A entrada de recursos colateralizados serve como uma estratégia de comprometimento dos países. Ao abrir a economia para este tipo de aporte de recursos, meu modelo prescreve maior tomada de dívida em equilíbrio pelos países e menos uso de default como instrumento de suavização da trajetória de consumo. Além destas características, eu mostro que limitação de colateral pode gerar mais default em equilíbrio do que um modelo sem Investimento Estrangeiro Direto ou colateral.

Collateral, Intermediated Lending, and Aggregate Productivity

Neste trabalho busca-se compreender como que restrições a diferentes tipos de crédito - doméstico e internacional - afetam a dinâmica de uma economia, especialmente com relação a sua Produtividade Total dos Fatores (PTF). Para ajudar no entendimento dessa questão e assuntos relacionados, propomos um simples modelo de economia aberta. Nesse contexto, empreendedores domésticos possuem produtividades heterogêneas, o que implica que a distribuição de riqueza entre indivíduos é essencial para a determinação da produtividade agregada da economia. Além disso, o ambiente de comprometimento limitado obriga os tomadores de empréstimo a dispor de colateral para contrair dívidas. Por hipótese, dívida doméstica e externa requerem diferentes quantidades de colateral. O modelo gera uma dinâmica macroeconômica rica após mudanças na taxa de juros internacional e restrições a crédito. Mais especificamente, um alívio na restrição doméstica causa um aumento da PTF, enquanto a mesma variação na restrição internacional tem o efeito contrário.

Collateral or utility penalties ?

In a two-period economy with incomplete markets and possibility of default we consider the two classical ways to enforce the honor of financial commitments: by using utility penalties and by using collateral requirements that borrowers have to fulfill. Firstly, we prove that any equilibrium in an economy with collateral requirements is also equilibrium in a non-collateralized economy where each agent is penalized (rewarded) in his utility if his delivery rate is lower (greater) than the payment rate of the financial market. Secondly, we prove the converse: any equilibrium in an economy with utility penalties is also equilibrium in a collateralized economy. For this to be true the payoff function and initial endowments of the agents must be modified in a quite natural way. Finally, we prove that the equilibrium in the economy with collateral requirements attains the same welfare as in the new economy with utility penalties.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.

Experimentando microcrédito: uma análise do impacto do crediAMIGO sobre acesso a crédito

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo abordar o tema microcrédito e analisar sua experiência mais bem sucedida no Brasil, o CrediAMIGO, do Banco do Nordeste. Há uma descrição do programa e uma análise quantitativa de sua atuação, que será feita a partir de uma base de dados composta pelas pesquisas Ecinf de 1997 e 2003, utilizando regressões logísticas e o método de diferenças em diferenças. Em termos substantivos concluímos que há experiência de microcrédito na região mais pobre do Brasil, baseada em aval solidário, proporcionando aumento no acesso a crédito superior ao resto do país.

Competitive equilibria in infinite-horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araújo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) have shown that, without imposing either debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with default when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) subsequently show that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. They also claim that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured. The objective of this paper is two fold. First, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2008), we show that moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme. Second, we provide an alternative condition on default penalties that is sufficient to rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium.

On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraint, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with limited commitment when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples in which they argued that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. Moreover, they claimed that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is restored. This paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009). First, we show that it is not true that harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes in the examples they have proposed. A competitive equilibrium with no trade can be supported due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. We subsequently refine the equilibrium concept in the spirit of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) in order to rule out spurious inactivity on asset markets due to irrational expectations. Our second contribution is to provide a specific example of an economy with moderate default penalties in which Ponzi schemes reappear when overpessimistic beliefs on asset deliveries are ruled out. Our finding shows that, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009), moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Microcrédito, emprego e renda: uma pesquisa empírica na ICC-BLUSOL/SC

Esta pesquisa objetivou analisar o impacto do microcrédito junto aos microempreendedores beneficiados pela Instituição de Microcrédito ICC-Blusol de Blumenau, Santa Catarina. De um total de 5.451 clientes foram selecionados e analisados 94, os quais obtiveram microcrédito durante os 10 últimos anos. Para testar a veracidade da afirmação, utilizou-se modelo econométrico utilizando a técnica de dados em painel, através da estimação das variáveis no modelo de efeitos fixos e efeitos aleatórios. Como variável independente utilizou-se a premissa "Valor do Empréstimo" e como variáveis dependentes "Vendas", "Resultado Operacional", "Garantia Real", "Garantia Aval", "Recursos Humanos", "Custos Fixos" e "Custos Variáveis". Conclui -se que somente as variáveis "Vendas" e "Resultado Operacional" validam a afirmação de que o acesso ao microcrédito resulta em incremento de Faturamento e Renda. A criação e manutenção de empregos, embora não tenha sido comprovada na análise estatística, ficou evidente, pois a simples sobrevivência da empresa já pressupõe isto.