Speculative bubbles and contagion: analysis of volatility's clusters during the DotCom bubble based on the dynamic conditional correlation model

Reviewing the de nition and measurement of speculative bubbles in context of contagion, this paper analyses the DotCom bubble in American and European equity markets using the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model proposed by (Engle and Sheppard 2001) as on one hand as an econometrics explanation and on the other hand the behavioral nance as an psychological explanation. Contagion is de ned in this context as the statistical break in the computed DCCs as measured by the shifts in their means and medians. Even it is astonishing, that the contagion is lower during price bubbles, the main nding indicates the presence of contagion in the di¤erent indices among those two continents and proves the presence of structural changes during nancial crisis

Speculative bubbles and contagion: analysis of volatility’s clusters during the DotCom bubble based on the dynamic conditional correlation model

Revendo a definição e determinação de bolhas especulativas no contexto de contágio, este estudo analisa a bolha do DotCom nos mercados acionistas americanos e europeus usando o modelo de correlação condicional dinâmica (DCC) proposto por Engle e Sheppard (2001) como uma explicação econométrica e, por outro lado, as finanças comportamentais como uma explicação psicológica. Contágio é definido, neste contexto, como a quebra estatística nos DCC’s estimados, medidos através das alterações das suas médias e medianas. Surpreendentemente, o contágio é menor durante bolhas de preços, sendo que o resultado principal indica a presença de contágio entre os diferentes índices dos dois continentes e demonstra a presença de alterações estruturais durante a crise financeira.

Asset float and speculative bubbles

We model the relationship between ftoat (the tradeable shares of an asset) and stock price bubbles. Investors trade a stock that initiaUy has a limited ftoat because of insider lock-up restrictions but the tradeable shares of which increase over time as these restrictions expire. A speculative bubble arises because investors, with heterogeneous beliefs due to overconfidence and facing short-sales constraints, anticipate the option to reseU the stock to buyers with even higher valuations. With limited risk absorption capacity, this resale option depends on ftoat as investors anticipate the change in asset supply over time and speculate over the degree of insider selling. Our model yields implications consistent with the behavior of internet stock prices during the late nineties, such as the bubble, share turnover and volatility decreasing with ftoat and stock prices tending to drop on the lock-up expiration date though it is known to aU in advance.

Financial distress as a collapse of incentive scheme

This paper explaina why workers lack motivation near bankruptcy, why they tend to leave companies in financiai distreas, and why thoae who remam require higher compensation. Theae indirect costa of financiai diatresa adie becauae the optimal combination of debt and incentive achem.ea, deaigned to minimize agency costa, ends up underpaying managers when there ia a bankruptcy threat. The paper a1so providea new empirica1 implications on the intera.ction between financiai reatructuring and changea in managerial compensation. Theae predictions are supported by the findings of Gilson and Vetsuypens (1992).

A study of behavioral finance: background, theories and application

Behavioral finance, or behavioral economics, consists of a theoretical field of research stating that consequent psychological and behavioral variables are involved in financial activities such as corporate finance and investment decisions (i.e. asset allocation, portfolio management and so on). This field has known an increasing interest from scholar and financial professionals since episodes of multiple speculative bubbles and financial crises. Indeed, practical incoherencies between economic events and traditional neoclassical financial theories had pushed more and more researchers to look for new and broader models and theories. The purpose of this work is to present the field of research, still ill-known by a vast majority. This work is thus a survey that introduces its origins and its main theories, while contrasting them with traditional finance theories still predominant nowadays. The main question guiding this work would be to see if this area of inquiry is able to provide better explanations for real life market phenomenon. For that purpose, the study will present some market anomalies unsolved by traditional theories, which have been recently addressed by behavioral finance researchers. In addition, it presents a practical application of portfolio management, comparing asset allocation under the traditional Markowitz’s approach to the Black-Litterman model, which incorporates some features of behavioral finance.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

Balance of payment crises and capital flows : the role of liquidity

A model of externaI CrISIS is deveIoped focusing on the interaction between Iiquidity creation by financiaI intermediaries and foreign exchange collapses. The intermediaries' role of transforming maturities is shown to result in larger movements of capital and a higher probability of crisis. This resembles the observed cycle in capital fiows: large infiows, crisis and abrupt outfiows. The mo deI highlights how adverse productivity and international interest rate shocks can be magnified by the behavior of individual foreign investors linked together through their deposits in the intermediaries. An eventual collapse of the exchange rate can link investors' behavior even further. The basic model is then extended, quite naturally, to study the effects of capital fiow contagion between countries.

Especulative (sic) attack on exchange rate target zone regime : the uncertainty case

We present a continuous time target zone model of speculative attacks. Contrary to most of the literature that considers the certainty case, i.e., agents know for sure the Central Bank behavior in the future, we build uncertainty into the madel in two different ways. First, we consider the case in whicb the leveI of reserves at which the central bank lets the regime collapse is uncertain. Alternatively, we ana1ize the case in which, with some probability, the government may cbange its policy reducing the initially positive trend in domestic credito In both cases, contrary to the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, speculators face a cost of launching a tentative attack that may not succeed. Such cost induces a delay and may even prevent its occurrence. At the time of the tentative attack, the exchange rate moves either discretely up, if the attack succeeds, or down, if it fails. The remlts are consistent with the fact that, typically, an attack involves substantial profits and losses for the speculators. In particular, if agents believed that the government will control fiscal imbalances in the future, or alternatively, if they believe the trend in domestic credit to be temporary, the attack is postponed even in the presence of a signal of an imminent collapse. Finally, we aIso show that the timing of a speculative attack increases with the width of the target zone.

The development of the private equity industry since the 2008 financial crisis

The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.

Ataques especulativos sobre dívidas e regimes monetários

A tese pretende conhecer de forma profunda a metodologia de ataques especulativos sobre dívidas, desenvolvida por Cole e Kehoe (1996), e tem três objetivos principais: (i) aplicá-la a outros países, além do México, que é feito na versão original; (ii) entender a opção de um país dolarizar, em relação à alternativa de manter sua moeda local, quando a economia depende da entrada de capitais financeiros internacionais; e (iii) estudar a união monetária como uma terceira alternativa de regime monetário, em comparação com a dolarização e o regime de moeda local. O modelo de crises da dívida de Cole-Kehoe é aplicado às economias da Coréia, da Rússia e do Brasil. Modifica-se este modelo para incluir dívida denominada em moeda local, que é totalmente adquirida pelos consumidores nacionais e que dá ao governo a possibilidade de obter receitas por meio da cobrança de um imposto inflacionário sobre estes ativos. As receitas obtidas desta forma podem ser utilizadas para pagar os banqueiros internacionais e evitar uma crise da dívida externa, que ocorreria, em caso contrário. Considera-se também, neste caso, que o banco central possa estar sujeito a pressões de seu governo para gerar estas receitas. Analogamente, para representar um país pertencente a uma união monetária, inclui-se dívida denominada em moeda comum e um governo central no modelo original. A política monetária da união está subordinada à decisão conjunta de todos os países membros. Supõe-se também que o banco central da união possa sofrer pressões políticas de alguns governos nacionais sem disciplina fiscal e dispostos a obter receitas de imposto inflacionário sobre a dívida. Na dolarização, a política monetária está submetida a do banco central do país âncora e, portanto, não há possibilidade de o governo gerar receitas extraordinárias sobre a dívida, a menos que haja forte simetria dos choques que atingem a economia dolarizada e o país âncora. Considerando estas peculiaridades dos três regimes monetários, os níveis de bem-estar são caracterizados e avaliados numericamente para o Brasil. Além disso, obtém-se a política ótima do governo para a dívida em dólar, segundo os três regimes.

A gestão do processo de negociação complexa: uma avaliação da 5ª Conferência Ministerial da Organização Mundial do Comércio - OMC, em Cancun, México

Pretende-se no presente trabalho avaliar a gestão do processo de negociação complexa da 5ª Conferência Ministerial da Organização Mundial do Comércio em Cancún, ocorrida entre os dias 10 e 14 de setembro de 2003, no México, apontando os problemas e questões que resultaram no colapso de um possível acordo. O futuro da OMC é incerto e mudanças traumáticas sofridas por muitos países que vivem sob as regras da OMC indicam que alguma coisa na OMC terá que mudar, principalmente nos processos de negociação complexa, de forma que a integridade da organização não seja comprometida. Buscou-se respostas na análise e avaliação da gestão do processo de negociação, estudando e pesquisando os conceitos de barganha posicional, detalhando o processo de negociação baseado em princípios, explorando em profundidade o estado da arte para gestão de conversas difíceis. Dissecando a questão dos conflitos e das coalizões, mostrando a dificuldade existente na resolução de disputas públicas e no uso de instrumentos para quebrar o impasse nas negociações buscou-se estabelecer o instrumental teórico que possibilitasse aprofundar o diagnóstico da situação atual na OMC. Como recomendação explorou-se a avaliação de conflitos, com base na eficiência - teoria dos jogos-, justiça e na eqüidade, a melhor forma de negociação baseada em princípios, de gestão de público demandante, no diálogo dos multistakeholders, a importância das conversas informais paralelas, o ambiente da complexidade e a visão ampla que proporciona o enfoque do funcionamento de sistemas decisórios autopoiéticos.

Monetary equilibrium with decentralized trade and learning

This paper analyzes the stability of monetary regimes in an economy where fiat money is endogenously created by the government, information about its value is imperfect, and learning is decentralized. We show that monetary stability depends crucially on the speed of information transmission in the economy. Our model generates a dynamic on the acceptability of fiat money that resembles historical accounts of the rise and eventual collapse of overissued paper money. It also provides an explanation of the fact that, despite its obvious advantages, the widespread use of fiat money is only a recent development.

Optimal exchange rate policy, optimal incomplete taxation and business cycles

Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recur- rent events. A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue Þscal and monetary policies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging. It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays a boom in periods of below average de- valuation and a recession in periods of above average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal policy answer to a recession (boom).

A crise financeira e a política monetária no Brasil

A crise financeira iniciada em 2007 gerou uma grande recessão nos Estados Unidos e abalou a economia global com consequências nefastas para o crescimento e a taxa de desemprego em vários países. Os principais Bancos Centrais do mundo passaram a dar maior importância para políticas que garantam a estabilidade financeira. É consensual a necessidade de avanços regulatórios e de medidas prudenciais capazes de reduzir os riscos financeiros, mas existem divergências quanto ao uso da taxa básica de juros, não só como um instrumento necessário para garantir a estabilidade de preços, como também para garantir a estabilidade financeira e evitar a formação de bolhas. O Brasil viveu nos últimos vinte anos um período de grande expansão do mercado de crédito, fruto das estabilidades econômica e financeira. O Banco Central do Brasil teve atuação exitosa durante a crise e demonstrou habilidade em utilizar instrumentos de política monetária e medidas macroprudenciais de forma complementar. Nos últimos quatro anos, as condições macroeconômicas se deterioraram e o Brasil atravessou um período de crescimento baixo, inflação próxima ao teto da meta e aumento do endividamento. Enquanto as políticas macroprudenciais foram capazes de evitar a formação de bolhas, as políticas fiscal e monetária foram demasiadamente expansionistas. Neste período houve um enfraquecimento na função-reação do Banco Central, que deixou de respeitar o princípio de Taylor.