The risk-properties of human capital and the design of government policies

Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open question from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness on this type of investment. In a two period and finite type optimal income taxation problem we derive prescriptions that are robust to the risk characteristics of human capital: savings should be discouraged, human capital investments encouraged and both types of investment driven to an efficient level from an aggregate perspective. These prescriptions are also robust to the assumptions regarding what choices are observed, despite policy instruments being not.

The impact of public capital and public investment on economic growth: an empirical investigation

in this anicle we measure the impact of public sector capital and investment on economic growth. Initially, traditional growth accounting regressions are run for a cross-country data set. A simple endogenous growth model is then constructed in order to take into account the determinants of labor, private capital and public capital. In both cases, public capital is a separate argument of the production function. An additional data-set constructed with quarterly American data was used in the estimations of the growth mode!. The results indicate lhat public capital and public investment play a significant role in determining growth rates and have a significant impact on capital and labor returns. Furthermore, the impact of public investment on productivity growth was found to be positive and always significant for bolh samples. Hence. in a fully optimizing modelo we confmn previous results in the literature that lhe failure of public investment to keep pace with output growlh during the Seventies and Eighties may have played a major role in the slowdown of lhe productivity growth in the period. Anolher main outcome concems the output elasticity wilh respect to public capital. The coefficiem estimates are always positive and significant but magnitudes depend on each of lhe two data set used.

Human capital and innovation: evidence from panel cointegration tests

Panel cointegration techniques applied to pooled data for 27 economies for the period 1960-2000 indicate that: i) government spending in education and innovation indicators are cointegrated; ii) education hierarchy is relevant when explaining innovation; and iii) the relation between education and innovation can be obtained after an accommodation of a level structural break.

Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor: a panel data approach

This paper estimates the elasticity of substitution of an aggregate production function. The estimating equation is derived from the steady state of a neoclassical growth model. The data comes from the PWT in which different countries face different relative prices of the investment good and exhibit different investment-output ratios. Then, using this variation we estimate the elasticity of substitution. The novelty of our approach is that we use dynamic panel data techniques, which allow us to distinguish between the short and the long run elasticity and handle a host of econometric and substantive issues. In particular we accommodate the possibility that different countries have different total factor productivities and other country specific effects and that such effects are correlated with the regressors. We also accommodate the possibility that the regressors are correlated with the error terms and that shocks to regressors are manifested in future periods. Taking all this into account our estimation resuIts suggest that the Iong run eIasticity of substitution is 0.7, which is Iower than the eIasticity that had been used in previous macro-deveIopment exercises. We show that this lower eIasticity reinforces the power of the neoclassical mo deI to expIain income differences across countries as coming from differential distortions.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of firms and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Pré-ipo capital infusion and underwriting in Brazil: a study on conflicts of interests in the universal banking system

Mercados financeiros e finanças corporativas

Assessing Dodd Frank Effects on banking capital structure and Banker´s Pay structure

The systemic financial crisis that started in 2008 in the United States had some severe effects in the economic activity and required the bailout of financial institutions with the use of taxpayer’s money. It also originated claims for stronger regulatory framework in order to avoid another threat in the financial market. The Dodd Frank Act was proposed and approved in the United States in the aftermath of the crisis and brought, among many other features, the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council and the tougher inspection of financial institutions with asset above 50 billion dollars. The objective of this work is to study the causal effect of the Dodd Frank Act on the behavior of the treatment group subject to monitoring by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (financial institutions with assets above 50 billion dollars) regarding capital and compensation structure in comparison to the group that was not treated. We use data from Compustat and our empirical strategy is the Regression Discontinuity Design, not usually applied to the banking literature, but very useful for the present work since it allows us to compare the treatment group and the non-treatment group in the year of the enactment of the law (2010). No change of behavior was observed for the Capital Structure. In the Compensation Schemes, however, a decrease was found in the item other compensation for CEOs and CFOs. We also performed a robustness check by running a placebo test on the variables in the year before the law was enacted. No significance was found, which supports the conclusion that our main results were caused by the enactment of the DFA.

Mandatory profit sharing, entrepreneurial incentives and capital accumulation

The impact of a mandatory tax on profits which is transferred to workers is analyzed in a general equilibrium entrepreneurial model. In the short run, this distortion reduces the number of fmns and the aggregate output. In the long run, if capital and labor are bad substitutes, it fosters capital accumulation and increases the aggregate output. In a small open economy with free movement of capital, it improves the welfare of the economy's average individual. One concludes that the benefits of sharing schemes may go beyond the short run employment-stabilization goal focused by the profit sharing literature.

Health and development with imperfect capital markets

This paper investigates the interaction between investment in education and in life-expanding investments, in a simple two-period model in which individuaIs are liquidity constrained in the first period. We show that under low leveIs of health and capital, investments in human capital and in health are complement: since the probability of survival is small, there is littIe incentive to invest in human capital; therefore the return on health investment is also low. This reinforcing effect does not hold for higher leveIs of health or capital, and the two investments become substitute. This property has many consequences. First, subsidizing health care may have dramatically different effects on private investment in human capital, depending on the initial leveI of health and capital. Second, the assumption that mortality is endogenous induces an increase in inequality of income: since health investment is a normal good, the return on education is also lower for poor individuaIs. Third,in a non-overlapping generation madel with non-altruistic agents, the hea1th leveI of the population has strong consequences on growth. For a very low leveI of hea1th, mortality is too high for the investment on education to be profitable. For a higher, but still low, levei of hea1th the economy grows on1y if the initial stock of capital is high enough; bad health and low capital create a poverty trapo Fourth, we compare redistributive income policies versus public hea1th measures. Redistributing income reduces both static and dynamic inequality, but slows growth. In contrast, a paternalistic health policy that forces the poor to invest in hea1th reduces dynamic inequality and may foster growth.

Balance of payment crises and capital flows : the role of liquidity

A model of externaI CrISIS is deveIoped focusing on the interaction between Iiquidity creation by financiaI intermediaries and foreign exchange collapses. The intermediaries' role of transforming maturities is shown to result in larger movements of capital and a higher probability of crisis. This resembles the observed cycle in capital fiows: large infiows, crisis and abrupt outfiows. The mo deI highlights how adverse productivity and international interest rate shocks can be magnified by the behavior of individual foreign investors linked together through their deposits in the intermediaries. An eventual collapse of the exchange rate can link investors' behavior even further. The basic model is then extended, quite naturally, to study the effects of capital fiow contagion between countries.

The implications of embodiment and Putty-Clay to economic development

In this paper we construct and analyze a growth model with the following three ingredients. (i) Technological progress is embodied. (ii) The production function of a firm is such that the firm makes both technology upgrade as well as capital and labor decisions. (iii) The firm’s production technology is putty-clay. We assume that there are disincentives to the accumulation of capital, resulting in a divergence between the social and the private cost of investment. We solve a single firm’s problem in this environment. Then we determine general equilibrium prices of capital goods of different vintages. Using these prices we aggregate firms’ decisions and construct the theoretical analogues of National Income statistics. This generates a relationship between disincentives and per capita incomes. We analyze this relationship and show the quantitative and qualitative roles of embodiment and putty-clay. We also show how the model is taken to data, quantified and used to determine to what extent income gaps across countries can be attributed to disincentives.

A note on growth and inflation

A simple exercise on growth and inflationary financing of public expenditures is presented in this note. In a parameterized overlapping generations mode1 where government expenses positivc1y affects the growth rate of human capital, steady state capital and output increase with inflation, reproducing the so called Tobin effect. For large inflation rates, however, government authorities cannot affect real variables and there are only nominal effects. It is also shown that the optimal policy implies some inflation but not growth maximization.

Crime and punishment with habit formation

Moral concepts affect crime supply. This idea is modelled assuming that illegal activities is habit forming. We introduce habits in a intertemporal general equilibrium framework to illegal activities and compare its outcomes with a model without habit formation. The findings are that habit and crime presents a non linear relationship that hinges upon the level of capital and habit formation. It is possible to show that while the effect of habit on crime is negative for low levels o habit formation it becomes positive as habits goes up. Secondly habit reduces the marginal effect of illegal activities return on crime. Finally, the effect of habit on crime depends positively on the amount of capital. This could explain the relationship between size of cities and illegal activity.