Competitive equilibria in infinite-horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araújo, Páscoa and Torres-Martinez (2002) have shown that, without imposing either debt constraints or transversality conditions, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with default when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) subsequently show that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. They also claim that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is ensured. The objective of this paper is two fold. First, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2008), we show that moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme. Second, we provide an alternative condition on default penalties that is sufficient to rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium.

On Ponzi schemes in infinite horizon collateralized economies with default penalties

Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) showed that, without imposing any debt constraint, Ponzi schemes are ruled out in infinite horizon economies with limited commitment when collateral is the only mechanism that partially secures loans. Páscoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples in which they argued that Ponzi schemes may reappear if, additionally to the seizure of the collateral, there are sufficiently harsh default penalties assessed (directly in terms of utility) against the defaulters. Moreover, they claimed that if default penalties are moderate then Ponzi schemes are ruled out and existence of a competitive equilibrium is restored. This paper questions the validity of the claims made in Páscoa and Seghir (2009). First, we show that it is not true that harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes in the examples they have proposed. A competitive equilibrium with no trade can be supported due to unduly pessimistic expectations on asset deliveries. We subsequently refine the equilibrium concept in the spirit of Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005) in order to rule out spurious inactivity on asset markets due to irrational expectations. Our second contribution is to provide a specific example of an economy with moderate default penalties in which Ponzi schemes reappear when overpessimistic beliefs on asset deliveries are ruled out. Our finding shows that, contrary to what is claimed by Páscoa and Seghir (2009), moderate default penalties do not always prevent agents to run a Ponzi scheme.

Forecasting Brazilian inflation by its aggregate and disaggregated data: a test of predictive power by forecast horizon

This work aims to compare the forecast efficiency of different types of methodologies applied to Brazilian Consumer inflation (IPCA). We will compare forecasting models using disaggregated and aggregated data over twelve months ahead. The disaggregated models were estimated by SARIMA and will have different levels of disaggregation. Aggregated models will be estimated by time series techniques such as SARIMA, state-space structural models and Markov-switching. The forecasting accuracy comparison will be made by the selection model procedure known as Model Confidence Set and by Diebold-Mariano procedure. We were able to find evidence of forecast accuracy gains in models using more disaggregated data

Avaliação de riscos em estratégias de investimentos de longo prazo: aplicação prática em um fundo de pensão

O tema central deste trabalho é a avaliação de riscos em estratégias de investimentos de longo prazo, onde a necessidade de um exemplo prático direcionou à aplicação de Asset Liability Models em fundos de pensão, mais especificamente, a planos de benefício definido. Com os instrumentos de análise apresentados, acreditamos que o investidor com um horizonte de retorno de longo prazo tenha uma percepção mais acurada dos riscos de mercado a que está exposto, permitindo uma seleção de carteiras mais adequada aos objetivos de gestão. Para tanto, a inclusão de variáveis de decisão que procuram quantificar os objetivos de gestão - indo além do modelo simplificado de média-variância - exerce papel de fundamental importância.

Collateral, default penalties and almost finite-time solvency

We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available plans through finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996), to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost finite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost finite-time solvent. We define the notion of equilibrium with almost finite-time solvency and look on sufficient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost finite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our existence result.

A new perspective on the PPP hypothesis

This paper the stastistical properties of the real exchange rates of G-5 countries for the Bretton-Woods peiod, and draw implications on the purchasing power parity (PPP) hypothesis. In contrast to most previous studies that consider only unit root and stationary process to describe the real exchange tae, this paper also considers two in-between processes, the locally persistent process ans the fractionally integrated process, to complement past studies. Seeking to be consistent with tha ample evidence of near unit in the real exchange rate movements very well. This finding implies that: 1) the real exchange movement is more persistent than the stationary case but less persistent than the unit root case; 2) the real exchange rate is non-stationary but the PPP reversion occurs and the PPP holds in the long run; 3) the real exchange rate does not exhibit the secular dependence of the fractional integration; 4) the real exchange rate evolves over time in a way that there is persistence over a range of time, but the effect of shocks will eventually disappear over time horizon longer than order O (nd), that is, at finite time horizon; 5) shocks dissipation is fasters than predicted by the fractional integracion, and the total sum of the effects of a unit innovation is finite, implying that a full PPP reversion occurs at finite horizons. These results may explain why pasrt empirical estudies could not provide a clear- conclusion on the real exchange rate processes and the PPP hypothesis.

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

What happens after the central bank of Brazil increases the target interbank rate by 1%?

I start presenting an explicit solution to Taylorís (2001) model, in order to illustrate the link between the target interest rate and the overnight interest rate prevailing in the economy. Next, I use Vector Auto Regressions to shed some light on the evolution of key macroeconomic variables after the Central Bank of Brazil increases the target interest rate by 1%. Point estimates show a four-year accumulated output loss ranging from 0:04% (whole sample, 1980 : 1-2004 : 2; quarterly data) to 0:25% (Post-Real data only) with a Örst-year peak output response between 0:04% and 1:0%; respectively. Prices decline between 2% and 4% in a 4-year horizon. The accumulated output response is found to be between 3:5 and 6 times higher after the Real Plan than when the whole sample is considered. The 95% confidence bands obtained using bias-corrected bootstrap always include the null output response when the whole sample is used, but not when the data is restricted to the Post-Real period. Innovations to interest rates explain between 4:9% (whole sample) and 9:2% (post-Real sample) of the forecast error of GDP.

Investimento em ações no Brasil: curto prazo versus longo prazo

Este documento relata os resultados de pesquisa que objetivou testar se o investimento de longo prazo em ações no Brasil propicia a obtenção de maiores retornos e menores riscos, conforme sugerido por recomendações da imprensa financeira brasileira. Foram estudados os retornos mensais do Ibovespa, excedentes em relação à caderneta de poupança, no período de janeiro de 1969 a dezembro de 1998, contra vários horizontes de investimento. A evidência empírica constatada indica que "sabedoria convencional" tem algum suporte no que se refere a que o risco se reduz à medida que aumenta o horizonte do investimento, mas que o retorno não aumenta com o horizonte do investimento. No geral, os resultados não parecem ser sensíveis à consideração de que os investimentos se encerram em período de baixa ou de alta do mercado.

Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.