Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Legal enforcement, collateral and heterogeneity of project financing contracts

This paper employs mechanism design to study the effects of imperfect legal enforcement on optimal scale of projects, borrowing interest rates and the probability of default. The analysis departs from an environment that combines asymmetric information about cash flows and limited commitment by borrowers. Incentive for repayment comes from the possibility of liquidation of projects by a court, but courts are costly and may fail to liquidate. The value of liquidated assets can be used as collateral: it is transferred to the lender when courts liquidate. Examples reveal that costly use of courts may be optimal, which contrasts with results from most limited commitment models, where punishments are just threats, never applied in optimal arrangements. I show that when voluntary liquidation is allowed, both asymmetric information and uncertainty about courts are necessary conditions for legal punishments ever to be applied. Numerical solutions for several parametric specifications are presented, allowing for heterogeneity on initial wealth and variability of project returns. In all such solutions, wealthier individuals borrow with lower interest rates and run higher scale enterprises, which is consistent with stylized facts. The reliability of courts has a consistently positive effect on the scale of projects. However its effect on interest rates is subtler and depends essentially on the degree of curvature of the production function. Numerical results also show that the possibility of collateral seizing allows comovements of the interest rates and the probability of repayment.

Compliance to law and effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil

The goal of this paper is to debate the degree of effectiveness of the rule of law in Brazil, through a survey measuring perceptions, attitudes and habits of Brazilians in regard to compliance to law. The survey conducted in Brazil is based on the study conducted by Tom R. Tyler in the United States, entitled Why People Obey the Law? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). The main argument of Tyler´s study is that people obey the law when they believe it’s legitimate, and not because they fear punishment. We test the same argument in Brazil, relying on five indicators: (i) behavior, which depicts the frequency with which respondents declared to have engaged in conducts in disobedience to the law; (ii) instrumentality, measuring perception of losses associated with the violation of the law, specially fear of punishment; (iii) morality, measuring perception of how much is right or wrong to engage in certain conducts in violation of the law; (iv) social control, which measures perception of social disapproval of certain types of behavior in violation of the law, and (v) legitimacy, which measures the perception of respect to the law and to some authorities. Results indicate that fear of sanctions is not the strongest drive in compliance to law, but more than legitimacy, indicators of morality and social control are the strongest in explaining why people obey the law in Brazil.

Performance of incentive contracts in highway PPP projects in Brazil

Private-Public Partnerships (P.P.P.) is a new contractual model institutionalized in 2004 that could be used to remedy to the infrastructure deficit in Brazil. In a context of a principal and agent relation, the public partner goal is to give incentives to the private partner in the contract so that their interests are aligned. This qualitative research presents the findings of an empirical study examining the performance of incentive PPP contracts in Brazil in the highway sector. The goal is to explain how the contracting parties can align their interests in an environment of asymmetric information. Literature identified the factors that can influence PPP design and efficient incentive contracts. The study assesses the contribution of these factors in the building of PPP contracts by focusing on the case of the first and only PPP signed in the highway sector in Brazil which is the MG-050. The first step is to describe the condition of the highway network and the level of compliance of the private partner with the contract PPP MG-050. The second step is to explain the performance of the private partner and conclude if the interests of both partners were aligned in contractual aspects. On the basis of these findings and the analysis of the contract, the study formulates suggestions to improve the draft of PPP contracts from the perspective of the incentive theory of contracts.

Evidence on the incentive optimality of share contracts

Ever since Adam Smith, economists have argued that share contracts do not provide proper incentives. This paper uses tenancy data from India to assess the existence of missing incentives in this classical example of moral hazard. Sharecroppers are found to be less productive than owners, but as productive as fixed-rent tenants. Also, the productivity gap between owners and both types of tenants is driven by sample-selection issues. An endogenous selection rule matches tenancy contracts with less-skilled farmers and lower-quality lands. Due to complementarity, such a matching affects tenants’ input choices. Controlling for that, the contract form has no effect on the expected output. Next, I explicitly model farmer’s optimal decisions to test the existence of non-contractible inputs being misused. No evidence of missing incentives is found.

Franchisor-franchisee relationship and performance: influence of personality traits, entrepreneurial drive, and time of relationship

A literatura em franchising tem virtualmente ignorado o papel de aspectos psicologicos nos resultados interorganizacionais das empresas, a despeito de sua influencia nos resultados das organizações e da qualidade de relacionamento. Este estudo, portanto, tem por objetivo analisar a influência da personalidade e do potencial empreendedor na qualidade de relacionamento e desempenho financeiro na relação franqueador-franqueado, ao longo do tempo, sob a perspectiva dos franqueados. Este estudo analisa também o papel do tempo de relacionamento sobre a qualidade de relacionamento e o desempenho financeiro. Foi utilizado neste estudo um questionário de auto-preenchimento, enviado por e-mail, com o objetivo de recolher dados de uma amostra de 342 franqueados de 3 redes de franquias. A personalidade foi mensurada por meio dos “Cinco Grandes” traços de personalidade (escalas IPIP-B5): extroversão, agradabilidade, consciencia, estabilidade emocional e imaginação. O potencial empreendedor foi mensurado por meio do índice CEI (Carland Entrepreneurship Index). A qualidade do relacionamento foi estruturada como um constructo de segunda ordem, composto por 23 itens (incorporando confiança, comprometimento e satisfação com o relacionamento), e o desempenho financeiro foi representado por meio de uma escala de mensuração de crescimento de vendas e de rentabilidade. O tempo de relacionamento foi medido por meio dos meses de relacionamento entre franqueado e franqueador. As hipoteses foram testadas por meio de modelagem por equações estruturais, com a utilização do método de mínimos quadrados parciais (PLS), análise de regressão e análise de médias. Três das cinco dimensões da personalidade apresentaram o efeito previsto sobre as variáveis qualidade do relacionamento – agradabilidade (positivamente), estabilidade emocional (positivamente), e imaginação (positivamente). O desempenho financeiro foi influenciado, como previsto por consciência (positivamente), estabilidade emocional (positivamente), e imaginação (positivamente). Como esperado, a qualidade do relacionamento apresentou efeito positivo e significativo em relação ao desempenho financeiro. O potencial empreendedor apresentou o efeito positivo previsto apenas sobre desempenho. O tempo de relacionamento teve o efeito positivo esperado sobre o relacionamento franqueador-franqueado, em relação à qualidade do relacionamento e o desempenho financeiro, mas as diferenças entre as fases de relacionamento propostas foram apenas parcialmente confirmadas, uma vez que em somente duas fases (rotina e estabilização) a análise de médias mostrou diferenças significativas. Os resultados indicam que a personalidade influencia a qualidade de relacionamento e o desempenho, mas a meneira pela qual isso ocorre é diferente no contexto brasileiro, onde esta pesquisa foi realizada, dos achados da pesquisa conduzida na Austrália, sugerindo que fatores como cultura e estabilidade de mercado podem ter influencia sobre a relação entre traços de personalidade e qualidade de relacionamento, e traços de personalidade e desempenho financeiro. O potencial empreendedor parece influenciar positivamente o desempenho do franqueado, mas a sua influência não foi significativa em relação à qualidade do relacionamento. Os resultados também indicam a importância do tempo no desenvolvimento da qualidade de relacionamento e desempenho. Além disso, os relacionamentos de longo prazo estão relacionados a melhores avaliações de qualidade de relacionamento e desempenho financeiros por parte dos franqueados. As limitações do trabalho e sugestões para estudos futuros também são discutidos.