7 resultados para behind-the-counter-lääkkeet
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
This paper aims to describe the chief alterations proposed by the Dodd Frank Act to the American over-the-counter derivatives market and, at the same time, understand the extraterritorial reach of this law compared to the regulatory framework of the Brazilian derivative market. In order to do so, I will study the extraterritorial effects of the law, particularly in reference to the international nature of Title II of the Dodd Frank, which deals with the over-the-counter derivatives, in order to evaluate its reach to foreign markets, especially the Brazilian market.
Resumo:
We review the LDC debt crisis since 1982, by means of game theory. New insights are obtained into the reasons behind the formation of the creditors' carte1 and the nature of the difficu1ties invo1ved in the formation of the debtors' carte1. The standard view that Rubinstein's barganing mode1s are appropriate for dea1ing with debt re1ief is shown to be faulty, un1ess the debtor buys out the debt.
Resumo:
This paper reviews part of the political economy literature on exchange rate policy relevant to understanding the political motivations behind the Brazilian exchange rate policy. We shall first examine the distributive role of the exchange rate, and the way it unfolds in terms of the desired political goals. We will follow by analyzing exchange policy as indicative of government effciency prior to elections. Finally, we discuss fiscal policy from the point of view of political economy, in which the exchange rate results from the macroeconomic equilibrium. Over this review, the Brazilian exchange rate policy is discussed in light of the theories presented.
Resumo:
O Brasil sempre foi um lugar conveniente para se visitar em termos de cultura, diversão e entretenimento. No entanto, este estudo visa o lado educacional do país, particularmente, os estudantes estrangeiros que escolhem o Brasil para programas de intercâmbio. Fins e razões por trás das escolhas dos estudantes foram identificados através de pesquisas quantitativas e qualitativas, juntamente com a revisão da literatura já existente. A pesquisa primária foi feita por meio de entrevistas com estudantes de intercâmbio já no Brasil. Os dados coletados foram analisados e são apresentados de forma estatística, juntamente com a representação gráfica. O seguinte estudo apontou que os denominados “turistas” e, assim chamados, “money seekers”, serem os principais fatores por trás da escolha de estudantes. A pesquisa também mostra que os alunos mais satisfeitos foram os que escolheram o Brasil por causa da qualidade da universidade sede, assim como para explorar as perspectivas de emprego, juntamente com iniciar uma carreira no Brasil.
Resumo:
We examine the drivers behind the establishment mode choice of German multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the sectors of Automotive, Chemicals and Mechanical Engineering in Brazil for the years 1993-2013 using a novel sample of primary data obtained directly from German MNEs. Based on prevalent theories found in the literature, we test the most common hypotheses on our sample. Firms with high R&D activities and firms with prior market knowledge in Brazil in from of previous sales offices are more likely to enter Brazil by a Greenfield investment. We also show that it is the specific private ownership of the German so-called hidden champions that drive those specific SMEs to enter Brazil by Greenfield, a sneaking suspicion that has been made before. Finally, we show that the establishment mode choice between Brazil and the USA only deviates to a low extent, with German MNEs preferring to enter Brazil by Greenfield and the USA by M&A. Thereby, we provide valuable insights for future research in this field.
Resumo:
This paper demonstrates that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct are not identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. In such a setting, the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique of relying on exogenous demand perturbations to empirically distinguish between alternative hypotheses of conduct is shown to fail. The Brazilian cement industry, where the threat of imports restrains market outcomes, provides an empirical illustration. In particular, pricecost margins estimated using this established technique are considerably biased downward, underestimating the degree of market power. A test of conduct is proposed, adapted to this constrained setting, which suggests that outcomes in the industry are collusive and characterised by market division.
Resumo:
The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.