Testes de validade do capital asset pricing model no mercado acionário de São Paulo : um estudo indicativo do poder de teste da metodologia de Fama e Macbeth

Utiliza a técnica de simulação para estimar a "eficiência" de se testar o modelo Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) num mercado com características do mercado acionário paulista, marcado por elevado retorno e alta volatilidade.

O modelo de avaliação de ativos: (Capital asset pricing model)

Examina o modelo de seleção de portfólios desenvolvido por Markowitz, principalmente no que concerne: as suas relações com a teoria da utilidade de Von Neumann-Morgenstern; aos algo ritmos de solução do problema de Programação Quadrática paramétrica dele decorrente; a simplificação proporcionada pelo Modelo Diagonal de Sharpe. Mostra que a existência de um título sem risco permite a especificação do Teorema da Separação e a simplificação do problema de seleção de portfólios. Analisa o modelo denominado por CAPM, de equilíbrio no Mercado de Capitais sob condições de incerteza, comparando os processos dedutivos empregados por Lintner e Mossin. Examina as implicações decorrentes do relaxamento dos pressupostos subjacentes ã esse modelo de equilíbrio geral, principalmente a teoria do portfólio Zero-Beta desenvolvida por Black.

CAPM "Capital Asset Pricing Model": o modelo de avaliação de ativos: uma revisão da literatura e dos testes empíricos

Levantamento bibliográfico abrangendo os principais trabalhos relativos ao "CAPM - Capital Asset Pricing Model" que se acham esparsos em vasta literatura. Aborda desde a teoria de seleção de carteira, o desenvolvimento e testes do modelo, suas implicações para a teoria financeira. Inclui também considerações sobre o relaxamento dos pressupostos básicos e "sobre a influência do fator inflacionário na forma e validade do modelo.

Optimal performance fee and flow of funds in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.

Can a habit formation model really explain the Forward Premium Anomaly?

Verdelhan (2009) mostra que desejando-se explicar o comporta- mento do prêmio de risco nos mercados de títulos estrangeiros usando- se o modelo de formação externa de hábitos proposto por Campbell e Cochrane (1999) será necessário especi car o retorno livre de risco de equilíbrio de maneira pró-cíclica. Mostramos que esta especi cação só é possível sobre parâmetros de calibração implausíveis. Ainda no processo de calibração, para a maioria dos parâmetros razoáveis, a razão preço-consumo diverge. Entretanto, adotando a sugestão pro- posta por Verdelhan (2009) - de xar a função sensibilidade (st) no seu valor de steady-state durante a calibração e liberá-la apenas du- rante a simulação dos dados para se garantir taxas livre de risco pró- cíclicas - conseguimos encontrar um valor nito e bem comportado para a razão preço-consumo de equilíbrio e replicar o foward premium anom- aly. Desconsiderando possíveis inconsistências deste procedimento, so- bre retornos livres de risco pró-cíclicos, conforme sugerido por Wachter (2006), o modelo utilizado gera curvas de yields reais decrescentes na maturidade, independentemente do estado da economia - resultado que se opõe à literatura subjacente e aos dados reais sobre yields.

The Aiyagari model with liquidity shoch

Neste trabalho é desenvolvida uma versão do modelo de Aiyagari (1994) com choque de liquidez. Este modelo tem Huggett (1993) e Aiyagari (1994) como casos particulares, mas esta generalização permite dois ativos distintos na economia, um líquido e outro ilíquido. Usar dois ativos diferentes implica em dois retornos afetando o "market clearing", logo, a estratégia computacional usada por Aiyagari e Hugget não funciona. Consequentemente, a triangulação de Scarf substitui o algoritmo. Este experimento computacional mostra que o retorno em equilíbrio do ativo líquido é menor do que o retorno do ilíquido. Além disso, pessoas pobres carregam relativamente mais o ativo líquido, e essa desigualdade não aparece no modelo de Aiyagari.

Can a habit formation model really explain the forward premium anomaly?

Verdelhan (2009) shows that if one is to explain the foreign exchange forward premium behavior using Campbell and Cochrane (1999)’s habit formation model one must specify it in such a way to generate pro-cyclical short term risk free rates. At the calibration procedure, we show that this is only possible in Campbell and Cochrane’s framework under implausible parameters specifications given that the price-consumption ratio diverges in almost all parameters sets. We, then, adopt Verdelhan’s shortcut of fixing the sensivity function λ(st) at its steady state level to attain a finite value for the price-consumption ratio and release it in the simulation stage to ensure pro-cyclical risk free rates. Beyond the potential inconsistencies that such procedure may generate, as suggested by Wachter (2006), with procyclical risk free rates the model generates a downward sloped real yield curve, which is at odds with the data.

Exact arbitrage, well-diversified portfolios and asset pricing in large markets

: In a model of a nancial market with an atomless continuum of assets, we give a precise and rigorous meaning to the intuitive idea of a \well-diversi ed" portfolio and to a notion of \exact arbitrage". We show this notion to be necessary and su cient for an APT pricing formula to hold, to be strictly weaker than the more conventional notion of \asymptotic arbitrage", and to have novel implications for the continuity of the cost functional as well as for various versions of APT asset pricing. We further justify the idealized measure-theoretic setting in terms of a pricing formula based on \essential" risk, one of the three components of a tri-variate decomposition of an asset's rate of return, and based on a speci c index portfolio constructed from endogenously extracted factors and factor loadings. Our choice of factors is also shown to satisfy an optimality property that the rst m factors always provide the best approximation. We illustrate how the concepts and results translate to markets with a large but nite number of assets, and relate to previous work.

Asset float and speculative bubbles

We model the relationship between ftoat (the tradeable shares of an asset) and stock price bubbles. Investors trade a stock that initiaUy has a limited ftoat because of insider lock-up restrictions but the tradeable shares of which increase over time as these restrictions expire. A speculative bubble arises because investors, with heterogeneous beliefs due to overconfidence and facing short-sales constraints, anticipate the option to reseU the stock to buyers with even higher valuations. With limited risk absorption capacity, this resale option depends on ftoat as investors anticipate the change in asset supply over time and speculate over the degree of insider selling. Our model yields implications consistent with the behavior of internet stock prices during the late nineties, such as the bubble, share turnover and volatility decreasing with ftoat and stock prices tending to drop on the lock-up expiration date though it is known to aU in advance.

Moral hazard and nonlinear pricing in a general equilibrium model

The paper analyzes a two period general equilibrium model with individual risk and moral hazard. Each household faces two individual states of nature in the second period. These states solely differ in the household's vector of initial endowments, which is strictly larger in the first state (good state) than in the second state (bad state). In the first period households choose a non-observable action. Higher leveis of action give higher probability of the good state of nature to occur, but lower leveIs of utility. Households have access to an insurance market that allows transfer of income across states of oature. I consider two models of financiaI markets, the price-taking behavior model and the nonlínear pricing modelo In the price-taking behavior model suppliers of insurance have a belief about each household's actíon and take asset prices as given. A variation of standard arguments shows the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium. For a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constraíned sub-optímal: there are commodity prices and a reallocation of financiaI assets satisfying the first period budget constraint such that, at each household's optimal choice given those prices and asset reallocation, markets clear and every household's welfare improves. In the nonlinear pricing model suppliers of insurance behave strategically offering nonlinear pricing contracts to the households. I provide sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and investigate the optimality properties of the modeI. If there is a single commodity then every equilibrium is constrained optimaI. Ir there is more than one commodity, then for a generic set of economies every equilibrium is constrained sub-optimaI.

General equilibrium model with restricted participation in financial markets

The paper analyses a general equilibrium model with financiaI markets in which households may face restrictions in trading financiaI assets such as borrowing constraints and collateral (restricted participation model). However, markets are not assumed to be incomplete. We consider a standard general equilibrium model with H > 1 households, 2 periods and S states of nature in the second period. We show that generically the set of equilibrium allocations ia indeterminate, provided the existence of at least one nominal asset and one household for who some restriction is binding. Suppose there are C > 1 commodities in each state of nature and assets pays in units of some commodity. In this case for each household with binding restrictions it is possible to reduce the set of feasible assets trading and obtain a new equilibrium that utility improve alI those households. There is however an upper bound on the number of households to be improved related to the number of states of nature and the number of commodities. In particular, if the number of households ia smaller than the number of states of nature it is possible to Pareto improve any equilibrium by reducing the feasible choice set for each household.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.