On endogenous cost of altruism

The paper extends the cost of altruism model, analyzed in Lisboa (1999). There are three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, have to choose a non-observable leveI of effort, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides suflicient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows the optimal contract induces providers to care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature, which in Lisboa (1999) was stated as altruism assumption. Equilibrium is inefficient in comparison with the standard moral hazard outcome whenever high leveIs of effort is chosen precisely due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment for some signals. We show, however that an equilibrium is always constrained optimal.

Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

A influência do capital social e do comportamento de cidadania organizacional na satisfação de vida e desempenho no trabalho: um estudo comparativo entre Brasil e Portugal

Desde à muito, os temas, capital social e comportamento de cidadania organizacional (CCO) têm sido extensivamente pesquisado e estudados nos EUA, no entanto estes têm recebido pouca relevância a nível de outros contextos internacionais. Se por um lado, a sua importância e inferência na performance dentro do contexto empresarial têm sido crescente, caracterizando a necessidade de um entendimento cada vez maior por parte das empresas, por outro, o investimento das corporações de grande porte, caminham cada vez mais em direção dos países com crescimento exponencial sustentado, como são o BRIC, o que cna uma necessidade fomentada de pesquisa nesta área de pesquisa para estas regiões. Este estudo pretendeu investigar, avaliar e mapear a influência do capital e do CCO na satisfação de vida e desempenho no trabalho do funcionário de nível superior, no contexto empresarial brasileiro e português, com o objetivo de identificar quais as diferenças existentes nestes duas realidade, devido ao investimento crescente do segundo para com o primeiro. Genericamente, encontramos clara influência das dimensões do CCO tanto para o desempenho no trabalho como para a satisfação de vida do trabalhador, assim como presença também marcada das duas dimensões do capital Social. Mais especificamente, foi entendido pelo nosso estudo que a realidade empresarial brasileira necessita que as empresas criem mecanismos que fomentem os laços entre colegas, a conscienciosidade, altruísmo e virtude cívica dos seus funcionários, pois assim aumentará o desempenho. Já para o contexto português, apenas a conscienciosidade e a virtude apresentaram significativa relação. Desta forma, conclui-se que para o investimento das empresas português no Brasil, estas precisam ter atenção à dimensão estrutural - relação com colegas - promovendo-a e à necessidade patente que os brasileiros têm de ajudar os seus colegas - comportamento altruísta - para aumentar o desempenho no trabalho. No que se refere a satisfação de vida, que se mostrou estreitamente relacionada com o desempenho, o brasileiro apenas precisa notar confiança nos colegas, senti-se altruísta e consciencioso, ao passo que o português necessita criar fortes laços com os colegas, mas não fomentar o comportamento altruístico. Desta forma as empresas investidoras apenas precisam ter atenção mais uma vez a necessidade de prestar ajuda especifica que o brasileiro sente, promovendo workshops com os próprios funcionários, por forma a estes passarem o seu conhecimento, monitorias, estágios, entre outros. Estes resultados demonstraram que cada continente, país (possuidor ou não da mesma língua) e/ou cultura comporta diferenças significativas no contexto empresarial, assim tornase difícil implementar técnicas e comportamentos internacionais e esperar que os resultados sejam exatamente iguais. Este estudo espera dar alguns instrumentos de comparação para que as empresas portuguesas entendam, a este nível, a realidade brasileira.

Three essays on local demand for public services

Local provision of public services has the positive effect of increasing the efficiency because each locality has its idiosyncrasies that determine a particular demand for public services. This dissertation addresses different aspects of the local demand for public goods and services and their relationship with political incentives. The text is divided in three essays. The first essay aims to test the existence of yardstick competition in education spending using panel data from Brazilian municipalities. The essay estimates two-regime spatial Durbin models with time and spatial fixed effects using maximum likelihood, where the regimes represent different electoral and educational accountability institutional settings. First, it is investigated whether the lame duck incumbents tend to engage in less strategic interaction as a result of the impossibility of reelection, which lowers the incentives for them to signal their type (good or bad) to the voters by mimicking their neighbors’ expenditures. Additionally, it is evaluated whether the lack of electorate support faced by the minority governments causes the incumbents to mimic the neighbors’ spending to a greater extent to increase their odds of reelection. Next, the essay estimates the effects of the institutional change introduced by the disclosure on April 2007 of the Basic Education Development Index (known as IDEB) and its goals on the strategic interaction at the municipality level. This institutional change potentially increased the incentives for incumbents to follow the national best practices in an attempt to signal their type to voters, thus reducing the importance of local information spillover. The same model is also tested using school inputs that are believed to improve students’ performance in place of education spending. The results show evidence for yardstick competition in education spending. Spatial auto-correlation is lower among the lame ducks and higher among the incumbents with minority support (a smaller vote margin). In addition, the institutional change introduced by the IDEB reduced the spatial interaction in education spending and input-setting, thus diminishing the importance of local information spillover. The second essay investigates the role played by the geographic distance between the poor and non-poor in the local demand for income redistribution. In particular, the study provides an empirical test of the geographically limited altruism model proposed in Pauly (1973), incorporating the possibility of participation costs associated with the provision of transfers (Van de Wale, 1998). First, the discussion is motivated by allowing for an “iceberg cost” of participation in the programs for the poor individuals in Pauly’s original model. Next, using data from the 2000 Brazilian Census and a panel of municipalities based on the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD) from 2001 to 2007, all the distance-related explanatory variables indicate that an increased proximity between poor and non-poor is associated with better targeting of the programs (demand for redistribution). For instance, a 1-hour increase in the time spent commuting by the poor reduces the targeting by 3.158 percentage points. This result is similar to that of Ashworth, Heyndels and Smolders (2002) but is definitely not due to the program leakages. To empirically disentangle participation costs and spatially restricted altruism effects, an additional test is conducted using unique panel data based on the 2004 and 2006 PNAD, which assess the number of benefits and the average benefit value received by beneficiaries. The estimates suggest that both cost and altruism play important roles in targeting determination in Brazil, and thus, in the determination of the demand for redistribution. Lastly, the results indicate that ‘size matters’; i.e., the budget for redistribution has a positive impact on targeting. The third essay aims to empirically test the validity of the median voter model for the Brazilian case. Information on municipalities are obtained from the Population Census and the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court for the year 2000. First, the median voter demand for local public services is estimated. The bundles of services offered by reelection candidates are identified as the expenditures realized during incumbents’ first term in office. The assumption of perfect information of candidates concerning the median demand is relaxed and a weaker hypothesis, of rational expectation, is imposed. Thus, incumbents make mistakes about the median demand that are referred to as misperception errors. Thus, at a given point in time, incumbents can provide a bundle (given by the amount of expenditures per capita) that differs from median voter’s demand for public services by a multiplicative error term, which is included in the residuals of the demand equation. Next, it is estimated the impact of the module of this misperception error on the electoral performance of incumbents using a selection models. The result suggests that the median voter model is valid for the case of Brazilian municipalities.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Fertility and the value of Life

The value of life methodology has been recently applied to a wide range of contexts as a means to evaluate welfare gains attributable to mortality reductions and health improvements. Yet, it suffers from an important methodological drawback: it does not incorporate into the analysis child mortality, individuals’ decisions regarding fertility, and their altruism towards offspring. Two interrelated dimensions of fertility choice are potentially essential in evaluating life expectancy and health related gains. First, child mortality rates can be very important in determining welfare in a context where individuals choose the number of children they have. Second, if altruism motivates fertility, life expectancy gains at any point in life have a twofold effect: they directly increase utility via increased survival probabilities, and they increase utility via increased welfare of the offspring. We develop a manageable way to deal with value of life valuations when fertility choices are endogenous and individuals are altruistic towards their offspring. We use the methodology developed in the paper to value the reductions in mortality rates experienced by the US between 1965 and 1995. The calculations show that, with a very conservative set of parameters, altruism and fertility can easily double the value of mortality reductions for a young adult, when compared to results obtained using the traditional value of life methodology.

The spenders-hoarders theory of capital accumulations, wealth distribution and fiscal policy

This paper proposes a simple OLG model which is consistent with the essential facts about consumer behavior, capital accumulation and wealth distribution, and yields some new and surprising conclusions about fiscal policy. By considering a society in which individuais are distinguished according to two characteristics, altruism and wealth preference, we show that those who in the long run hold the bulk of private capital are not so rnuch motivated by dynastic altruism as by preference for wealth. Two types of social segmentation can result with different wcalth distribution. To a large extcnt our results seem to fit reality better than those obtained with standard optimal growth models in which dynastic altruism ( or r ate o f impatience) is the only source of heterogeneity: overaccumulation can appear, public debt and unfunded pensions are not neutra!, estate taxation can improve the welfare of the top wealthy.