Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

The Bayesian Foundations of solution concepts of games

We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors and so on.We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successfulIy eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively unàominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984». Moreover, sufficient condi tions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior. We also provide Aumann's (1985) results on correlated equilibria .

Jogo de empresas via internet

Jogos de Empresas constituem-se em uma ferramenta de real importância para o treinamento de executivos e estudantes, uma vez que simulam a realidade de um mercado. A proposta deste trabalho é desenvolver um jogo de empresas baseado na Internet, permitindo que diversas universidades participem simultaneamente. O jogo tem como ponto central a simulação da administração de uma empresa, envolvendo conceitos chaves de finanças, marketing, informática e planejamento estratégico. O desenvolvimento de um produto deste caráter mostra-se fundamental em um mundo globalizado, aonde a educação a distância e uma formação global são altamente valorizados.

Organizações culturais e (re)configuração do espaço: o caso do Istituto Europeo di Design, na cidade do Rio de Janeiro

O presente estudo tem como objetivo investigar de que maneira a possibilidade de instalação do Istituto Europeo di Design (IED) no bairro da Urca, na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, interfere na (re)configuração do espaço. Para o estudo desse processo adotou-se o conceito de espaço definido por Milton Santos, que o caracteriza como um conjunto indissociável de sistemas de objetos e ações, considerando necessária sua análise numa perspectiva histórica. Para ampliação das considerações sobre poder, identificação e caracterização dos atores sociais e das relações entre eles estabelecidas foram utilizados conceitos propostos por Carlos Matus para a análise da realidade social. A pesquisa de campo, de natureza qualitativa, coletou dados secundários a partir de notícias sobre o processo de revitalização do antigo Cassino da Urca e instalação do Istituto Europeo di Design no local, publicadas em jornais e revistas impressos, jornais on line e blogs, assim como dados primários, a partir de observação não estruturada das instalações ao redor do prédio do antigo Cassino da Urca, participação em reuniões da associação de bairro e entrevistas semi-estruturadas com representantes de organizações envolvidas no processo. Para o tratamento dos dados coletados, realizou-se análise argumentativa e interpretativa a partir da teoria utilizada. Com base nas notícias e documentos consultados, foi definido o período de análise, desde a cessão do prédio do antigo Cassino da Urca ao IED, em agosto de 2006, até o anúncio de parceria com outra organização, pelo instituto, em maio de 2012. O estudo permitiu identificar que a instalação do IED na Urca interferiu na configuração do espaço, principalmente no que se refere à formação e à atuação da associação de moradores do bairro, à instalação de novos empreendimentos comerciais no entorno do prédio já restaurado e, por consequência, na paisagem do bairro. Destaca-se também que a instalação do IED gerou mudanças que extrapolam os limites territoriais do bairro. Com base nos dados analisados, destaca-se que a relação de cooperação entre a Prefeitura Municipal do Rio de Janeiro e o IED foi estabelecida em torno da valorização por parte da Prefeitura do domínio de uma capacidade técnica pelo IED, nas áreas de atuação da organização, que são o ensino, pesquisa e consultoria nas áreas de arquitetura, design, moda e comunicação, o que reforça o argumento da valorização atual de organizações culturais no processo de (re)configuração do espaço urbano, quanto aos aspectos econômicos, simbólicos e sociais.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection

We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.

Reality check for volatility models

Asset allocation decisions and value at risk calculations rely strongly on volatility estimates. Volatility measures such as rolling window, EWMA, GARCH and stochastic volatility are used in practice. GARCH and EWMA type models that incorporate the dynamic structure of volatility and are capable of forecasting future behavior of risk should perform better than constant, rolling window volatility models. For the same asset the model that is the ‘best’ according to some criterion can change from period to period. We use the reality check test∗ to verify if one model out-performs others over a class of re-sampled time-series data. The test is based on re-sampling the data using stationary bootstrapping. For each re-sample we check the ‘best’ model according to two criteria and analyze the distribution of the performance statistics. We compare constant volatility, EWMA and GARCH models using a quadratic utility function and a risk management measurement as comparison criteria. No model consistently out-performs the benchmark.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.