Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Aggregate uncertainty, disappointment aversion and the business cycle

We investigate the eff ect of aggregate uncertainty shocks on real variables. More speci fically, we introduce a shock in the volatility of productivity in an RBC model with long-run volatility risk and preferences that exhibit generalised disappointment aversion. We find that, when combined with a negative productivity shock, a volatility shock leads to further decline in real variables, such as output, consumption, hours worked and investment. For instance, out of the 2% decrease in output as a result of both shocks, we attribute 0.25% to the e ffect of an increase in volatility. We also fi nd that this e ffect is the same as the one obtained in a model with Epstein-Zin- Weil preferences, but higher than that of a model with expected utility. Moreover, GDA preferences yield superior asset pricing results, when compared to both Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences and expected utility.

Investment coordination failures and the confidence channel of fiscal policy

Este trabalho desenvolve um novo "canal de Confiança" da política fiscal e caracteriza a política ótima quando esse canal é levado em consideração. Para esse objetivo, utilizamos um modelo estático com (i) concorrência monopolística, (ii) custos de ajustamento fixos para investir, (iii) complementaridade estratégica devido a informação imperfeita com respeito a produtividade agregada, e (iv) bens privados como substitutos imperfeitos de bens privados. Este arcabouço acomoda a possibilidade de falhas de coordenação nos investimentos, mas apresenta um equilíbrio único. Mostramos que a política fiscal tem efeitos importantes na coordenação. Um aumento dos gastos do governo leva a uma maior demanda por bens privados. Mais importante, este também afeta as expectativas de ordem superior com relação a demanda das demais firmas, que amplifica os efeitos do aumento inicial da demanda devido a complementaridade estratégica nas decisões de investimento. Como as demais firmas estão se deparam com uma demanda maior, espera-se que estas invistam mais, que por sua vez, aumenta a demanda individual de cada firma, que aumenta os incentivos a investir. Denominamos isto como o "canal de confiança" da política fiscal. Sob a ameaça de falhas de coordenação, a política fiscal ótima prescreve produzir além do ponto em que o benefício marginal resultante do consumo de bens públicos é igual ao custo marginal desses bens. Este benefício adicional vem do fato de que a política fiscal pode ampliar a coordenação dos investimentos.

Distortions in the investment goods sector and productivity decline

We study the impact of distortions in the investment goods sector on aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We develop a two-sector neo-classical growth model in which TFP in the capital goods sector relative to TFP in the consumption sector is inversely related to the price of investment relative to consumption, so that we use relative prices to measure TFP in the investment goods sector. The model is calibrated to Brazil and we nd that distortions in the investment goods sector may explain most of the decline in Brazilian TFP relative to the United States since the mid-1970s.

Insider trading, investment, and liquidity: a welfare analysis

We compare competitive equilibrium outcomes with and without trading by a privately infonned "monopolistic" insider, in a model with real investment portfolio choices ex ante, and noise trading generated by aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare implications of insider trading for the ex ante expected utilities of outsiders are analyzed. The role of interim infonnation revelation due to insider trading, in improving the risk-sharing among outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, is examined in detaiL

Investment-specific technological change and the Brazilian macroeconomy

We studied the effects of changes in banking spreads on distributions of income, wealth and consumption as well as the welfare of the economy. This analysis was based on a model of heterogeneous agents with incomplete markets and occupational choice, in which the informality of firms and workers is a relevant transmission channel. The main finding is that reductions in spreads for firms increase the proportion of entrepreneurs and formal workers in the economy, thereby decreasing the size of the informal sector. The effects on inequality, however, are ambiguous and depend on wage dynamics and government transfers. Reductions in spreads for individuals lead to a reduction in inequality indicators at the expense of consumption and aggregate welfare. By calibrating the model to Brazil for the 2003-2012 period, it is possible to find results in line with the recent drop in informality and the wage gap between formal and informal workers.

Two essays on education and governament policies

Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open ques- tion from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness on this type of invest- ment. We slightly deviate from the rest of the literature by allowing for non-linear income taxes in a two period model. This enables us to derive prescriptions that are robust to the risk characteristics of human capital: savings should be discouraged, human capital investments encouraged and both types of investment driven to an e¢ cient level from an aggregate perspective. These prescriptions are also robust to what choices are observed, even though the policy instruments used to implement them are not.

Investment in human capital in a macrodynamic framework: redistributive taxation, public debt and welfare

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The implications of embodiment and Putty-Clay to economic development

In this paper we construct and analyze a growth model with the following three ingredients. (i) Technological progress is embodied. (ii) The production function of a firm is such that the firm makes both technology upgrade as well as capital and labor decisions. (iii) The firm’s production technology is putty-clay. We assume that there are disincentives to the accumulation of capital, resulting in a divergence between the social and the private cost of investment. We solve a single firm’s problem in this environment. Then we determine general equilibrium prices of capital goods of different vintages. Using these prices we aggregate firms’ decisions and construct the theoretical analogues of National Income statistics. This generates a relationship between disincentives and per capita incomes. We analyze this relationship and show the quantitative and qualitative roles of embodiment and putty-clay. We also show how the model is taken to data, quantified and used to determine to what extent income gaps across countries can be attributed to disincentives.

Foreign direct investment spillovers in Portugal: additional lessons from a country study

This paper investigates the impact of FDI on the productivity of Portuguese manufacturing sectors. Model specification is improved by considering the choice of the most appropriate interval of the technological gap for spillovers diffusion. We also allow for sectoral variation in the coefficients of the spillover effect; idiosyncratic sectoral factors are identified by means of a fixed effects model. Inter-sectoral positive spillover effects are examined. Significant spillovers require a proper technological differential between foreign and domestic producers and favourable sectoral characteristics. They may occur in modern industries in which the foreign firms have a clear, but not too sharp, edge on the domestic ones. Agglomeration effects are also one pertinent specific influence.

The risk-properties of human capital and the design of government policies

Whether human capital increases or decreases wage uncertainty is an open question from an empirical standpoint. Yet, most policy prescriptions regarding human capital formation are based on models that impose riskiness on this type of investment. In a two period and finite type optimal income taxation problem we derive prescriptions that are robust to the risk characteristics of human capital: savings should be discouraged, human capital investments encouraged and both types of investment driven to an efficient level from an aggregate perspective. These prescriptions are also robust to the assumptions regarding what choices are observed, despite policy instruments being not.

On the economic and fiscal effects of infrastructure investment in Brazil

This article studies the productive impact of infrastructure investment in Brazil. Public-capital expenditures in the country have decreased continuously over the last two decades, and this paper shows the significant impact this has had on infrastructure stocks. Cointegration analysis is used to investigate the long-run association between output and infrastructure, the results being then used to study the short-run dynamic of these variables. Whether in the short or long run, the productive impact of infrastructure was found to be relevant. Other group of simulations studies the impact of expanding capital expenditures through debt finance on debt to GDP ratio as well as on public cash áow and net worth.

The effects of longevity and distortions on education and retirement

This article studies the impact of longevity and taxation on life-cycle decisions and long-run income. Individuals allocate optimally their total lifetime between education, working and retirement. They also decide at each moment how much to save or consume out of their income, and after entering the labor market how to divide their time between labor and leisure. The model incorporates experience-earnings profiles and the return-to-education function that follows evidence from the labor literature. In this setup, increases in longevity raises the investment in education - time in school - and retirement. The model is calibrated to the U.S. and is able to reproduce observed schooling levels and the increase in retirement, as the evidence shows. Simulations show that a country equal to the U.S. but with 20% smaller longevity will be 25% poorer. In this economy, labor taxes have a strong impact on the per capita income, as it decreases labor effort, time at school and retirement age, in addition to the general equilibrium impact on physical capital. We conclude that life-cycle effects are relevant in analyzing the aggregate outcome of taxation.