Testing the externalities hypothesis of endogenous growth using cointegration

The initial endogenous growth models emphasized the importance of externaI effects in explaining sustainable growth across time. Empirically, this hypothesis can be confirmed if the coefficient of physical capital per hour is unity in the aggregate production function. Although cross-section results concur with theory, previous estimates using time series data rejected this hypothesis, showing a small coefficient far from unity. It seems that the problem lies not with the theory but with the techniques employed, which are unable to capture low frequency movements in high frequency data. This paper uses cointegration - a technique designed to capture the existence of long-run relationships in multivariate time series - to test the externalities hypothesis of endogenous growth. The results confirm the theory' and conform to previous cross-section estimates. We show that there is long-run proportionality between output per hour and a measure of capital per hour. U sing this result, we confmn the hypothesis that the implied Solow residual can be explained by government expenditures on infra-structure, which suggests a supply side role for government affecting productivity and a decrease on the extent that the Solow residual explains the variation of output.

Growth, increasing returns, and public infrastructure : time series evidence

Initial endogenous growth models emphasized the importance of external effects and increasing retums in explaining growth. Empirically, this hypothesis can be confumed if the coefficient of physical capital per hour is unity in the aggregate production function. Previous estimates using time series data rejected this hypothesis, although cross-country estimates did nol The problem lies with the techniques employed, which are unable to capture low-frequency movements of high-frequency data. Using cointegration, new time series evidence confum the theory and conform to cross-country evidence. The implied Solow residual, which takes into account externaI effects to aggregate capital, has its behavior analyzed. The hypothesis that it is explained by government expenditures on infrasttucture is confIrmed. This suggests a supply-side role for government affecting productivity.

Testing production functions used in empirical growth studies

We estimate and test two alternative functional forms, which have been used in the growth literature, representing the aggregate production function for a panel of countries: the model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992), and a mincerian formulation of schooling-returns to skills. Estimation is performed using instrumental-variable techniques, and both functional forms are confronted using a Box-Cox test, since human capital inputs enter in levels in the mincerian specification and in logs in the extended neoclassical growth model.

Testing production functions used in empirical growth studies

We estimate and test two alternative functional forms representing the aggregate production function for a panel of countries: the extended neoclassical growth model, and a mincerian formulation of schooling-returns to skills. Estimation is performed using instrumentalvariable techniques, and both functional forms are confronted using a Box-Cox test, since human capital inputs enter in levels in the mincerian specification and in logs in the extended neoclassical growth model. Our evidence rejects the extended neoclassical growth model in favor of the mincerian specification, with an estimated capital share of about 42%, a marginal return to education of about 7.5% per year, and an estimated productivity growth of about 1.4% per year. Differences in productivity cannot be disregarded as an explanation of why output per worker varies so much across countries: a variance decomposition exercise shows that productivity alone explains 54% of the variation in output per worker across countries.

Strenghthening long-term growth in Brazil

This paper is devoted to an examination of the main issues identified with Brazil’s barriers to growth in the long term. It begins with a decomposition of per capita and total GDP long term growth to identify the main proximate sources of Brazil’s growth deceleration. Most of the analysis in this part concentrates on factors affecting aggregate supply. The reason for this approach is that, within certain limits past experience reveals that it is easy to stimulate aggregate demand via fiscal and monetary stimuli in Brazil. The risk is on bumping into production capacity barriers, i.e., supply constraints. Five substantially diversified but interconnected issues have been raised in the literature as supply constraints, many of which associated to a rate of savings lower than deemed necessary for sustaining faster growth: the tax burden, institutional factors, infrastructure, finance and education. Accordingly, the paper also deals with the issues of a high an increasing tax burden, institutional shortcomings and policy settings, insufficient investment in infrastructure, insufficient long term financing, and educational shortcomings, as growth impediments. A survey of policies aimed at removing the barriers to growth thus identified is presented next. The paper concludes by bringing again to the fore the need to increase savings and investment for growth resumption and by speculating on the growth potential of Brazil, conditional on productivity and investment growth.

A monthly indicator of Brazilian GDP. The Brazilian business cycle and growth cycle

This paper constructs an indicator of Brazilian GDP at the monthly ftequency. The peculiar instability and abrupt changes of regimes in the dynamic behavior of the Brazilian business cycle were explicitly modeled within nonlinear ftameworks. In particular, a Markov switching dynarnic factor model was used to combine several macroeconomic variables that display simultaneous comovements with aggregate economic activity. The model generates as output a monthly indicator of the Brazilian GDP and real time probabilities of the current phase of the Brazilian business cycle. The monthly indicator shows a remarkable historical conformity with cyclical movements of GDP. In addition, the estimated filtered probabilities predict ali recessions in sample and out-of-sample. The ability of the indicator in linear forecasting growth rates of GDP is also examined. The estimated indicator displays a better in-sample and out-of-sample predictive performance in forecasting growth rates of real GDP, compared to a linear autoregressive model for GDP. These results suggest that the estimated monthly indicator can be used to forecast GDP and to monitor the state of the Brazilian economy in real time.

Essays on economic growth

A fundamental question in development economics is why some economies are rich and others poor. To illustrate the income per capita gap across economies consider that the average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the richest 10 percent of economies in the year 2010 was a factor of 40-fold that of the poorest 10 percent of economies. In other words, the average person in a rich economy produces in just over 9 days what the average person in a poor economy produces in an entire year. What are the factors that can explain this difference in standard of living across the world today? With this in view, this dissertation is a conjunction of three essays on the economic growth field which we seek a possible responses to this question. The first essay investigates the existence of resource misallocation in the Brazilian manufacturing sector and measures possible distortions in it. Using a similar method of measurement to the one developed by Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and firm-level data for 1996-2011 we find evidence of misallocation in the manufacturing sector during the observed period. Moreover, our results show that misallocation has been growing since 2005, and it presents a non-smooth dynamic. Significantly, we find that the Brazilian manufacturing sector operates at about 50% of its efficient product. With this, if capital and labor were optimally reallocated between firms and sectors we would obtain an aggregate output growth of approximately 110-180% depending on the mode in which the capital share is measured. We also find that the economic crisis did not have a substantial effect on the total productivity factor or on the sector's misallocation. However, small firms in particular seem to be strongly affected in a global crisis. Furthermore, the effects described would be attenuated if we consider linkages and complementarity effects among sectors. Despite Brazil's well-known high tax burden, there is not evidence that this is the main source of resource misallocation. Moreover, there is a distinct pattern of structural change between the manufacturing sectors in industrialized countries and those in developing countries. Therefore, the second essay demonstrate that this pattern differs because there are some factors that distort the relative prices and also affect the output productivity. For this, we present a multi-sector model of economic growth, where distortions affect the relative prices and the allocation of inputs. This phenomenon imply that change of the production structure or perpetuation of the harmful structures to the growth rate of aggregate output. We also demonstrate that in an environment with majority decision, this distortion can be enhanced and depends on the initial distribution of firms. Furthermore, distortions in relative prices would lead to increases in the degree of misallocation of resources, and that imply that there are distinct patterns of structural changes between economies. Finally, the calibrated results of the framework developed here converge with the structural change observed in the firm-level data of the Brazilian manufacturing sector. Thereafter, using a cross-industry cross-country approach, the third essay investigates the existence of an optimal level of competition to enhance economic growth. With that in mind, we try to show that this optimal level is different from industrialized and under development economies due to the technology frontier distance, the terms of trade, and each economy's idiosyncratic characteristics. Therefore, the difference in competition industry-country level is a channel to explain the output for worker gap between countries. The theoretical and empirical results imply the existence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and growth: starting for an initially low level of competition, higher competition stimulates innovation and output growth; starting from a high initial level of competition, higher competition has a negative effect on innovation and output growth. Given on average industries in industrialized economies present higher competition level. With that if we control for the terms of trade and the industry-country fixed effect, if the industries of the developing economy operated under the same competition levels as of the industrialized ones, there is a potential increase of output of 0.2-1.0% per year. This effect on the output growth rate depends on the competition measurement used.

The BRICS: some historical experiences, growth challenges and opportunities

The acronym BRICS was a fad among the media and global investors. Now, the acronym sounds passé. However, the group of countries remains important, from both political and economic reasons. They have a large aggregate size, 28% of the global GDP and 42% of the world’s population, high growth potential due to the current significant misallocation of resources and relatively low stock of human capital, structural transformation is in progress and one of them, China, is taking steps to become a global power and a challenger to the US dominance. This paper provides a brief overview of the five economies, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. We focus on some aspects of their history, the Chinese initiatives in international finance and geopolitical strategic moves, their growth experience and structural transformation over the last 35 years, trade and investment integration into the global economy and among themselves, the growth challenges faced by their economies and the potential gains to the Brazilian economy from a stronger integration with the other BRICS. In association with its efforts to be a global power, China aims to become a major player in global finance and to achieve the status of global currency for the renminbi, which would be the first currency of an emerging economy to attain such position. Despite the similarities, the BRICS encompass very diverse economies. In the recent decades, China and India showed stellar growth rates. On the other hand, Brazil, Russia and South Africa have expanded just in line with global output growth with the Russian economy exhibiting high volatility. China is by far the largest economy, and South Africa the smallest, the only BRICS economy with a GDP lower than US$ 1 trillion. Russia abandoned communism almost 25 years ago, but reversed many of the privatizations of 90’s. China is still ruled by communism, but has a vibrant private sector and recently has officially declared market forces to play a dominant role in its economy. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are global natural resources powerhouses and commodity exporters while China and India are large commodity importers. Brazil is relatively closed to international trade of goods and services, in marked contrast to the other four economies. Brazil, India and South Africa are dependent on external capital flows whereas China and Russia are capital exporters. India and South Africa have younger populations and a large portion living below the poverty line. Despite its extraordinary growth experience that lifted many millions from poverty, China still has 28% of its population classified as poor. Russia and China have much older populations and one of their challenges is to deal with the effects of a declining labor force in the near future. India, China and South Africa face a long way to urbanization, while Brazil and Russia are already urbanized countries. China is an industrial economy but its primary sector still absorbs a large pool of workers. India is not, but the primary sector employs also a large share of the labor force. China’s aggregate demand structure is biased towards investment that has been driving its expansion. Brazil and South Africa have an aggregate demand structure similar to the developed economies, with private consumption accounting for approximately 70%. The same similarity applies to the supply side, as in both economies the share of services nears 70%. The development problem is a productivity problem, so microeconomic reforms are badly needed to foster long-term growth of the BRICS economies since they have lost steam due a variety of factors, but fundamentally due to slower total factor productivity growth. China and India are implementing ambitious reform programs, while Brazil is dealing with macroeconomic disequilibria. Russia and South Africa remain mute about structural reforms. There are some potential benefits to Brazil to be extracted from a greater economic integration with the BRICS, particularly in natural resources intensive industries and services. Necessary conditions to the materialization of those gains are the removal of the several sources of resource misallocation and strong investment in human capital.