On insurance markets with endogenous information acquisition: A robust mechanism design approach

Neste trabalho propomos a aplicação das noções de equilíbrio da recente literatura de desenho de mecanismo robusto com aquisição de informação endógena a um problema de divisão de risco entre dois agentes. Através deste exemplo somos capazes de motivar o uso desta noção de equilíbrio, assim como discutir os efeitos da introdu ção de uma restrição de participação que seja dependente da informação. A simplicidade do modelo nos permite caracterizar a possibilidade de implementar a alocação Pareto efiente em termos do custo de aquisição da informação. Além disso, mostramos que a precisão da informação pode ter um efeito negativo sobre a implementação da alocação efi ciente. Ao final, sao dados dois exemplos específicos de situações nas quais este modelo se aplica.

Mid-auction information acquisition

This paper studies a model of a sequential auction where bidders are allowed to acquire further information about their valuations of the object in the middle of the auction. It is shown that, in any equilibrium where the distribution of the final price is atornless, a bidder's best response has a simple characterization. In particular, the optimal information acquisition point is the same, regardless of the other bidders' actions. This makes it natural to focus on symmetric, undominated equilibria, as in the Vickrey auction. An existence theorem for such a class of equilibria is presented. The paper also presents some results and numerical simulations that compare this sequential auction with the one-shot auction. 8equential auctions typically yield more expected revenue for the seller than their one-shot counterparts. 80 the possibility of mid-auction information acquisition can provide an explanation for why sequential procedures are more often adopted.

Start-up acquisition: motivations, difficulties and lesson learned

Em um esforço continuo de sobrevivência, corporações buscam meios para expandir seus negócios, seja dentro de seus mercados atuantes, ou na exploração de novos mercados. Para alcançar esse objetivo, inovações são realizadas pelos funcionários que, por meio de suas iniciativas, praticam o empreendedorismo coorporativo. São diversas formas em que o empreendedorismo corporativo se manifesta, dentre elas por meio de aquisições. Ao comprar uma outra empresa, a empresa compradora tem como motivação a busca de alguns atributos que complementem seus objetivos iniciais. Após a compra, o processo de integração entre as duas empresas é, por muitas vezes, complicado e penoso. O objetivo desse estudo é o de identificar quais são essas motivações de compra, os problemas enfrentados durante a integração entre as duas empresas, e quais são as lições aprendidas por grandes/médias corporações quando adquirem Start-ups. Muitos estudos atualmente tratam de temas relacionados à aquisição de empresas, porém, quando se trata de Start-ups, pouca literatura é encontrada. Os resultados dessa pesquisa são fruto de entrevistas com os gestores e empreendedores que participaram do processo de aquisição da SAMURAI pela Momentum e da Save-me pela Buscapé – empresas brasileiras. Os resultados são seis sugestões que devem ser consideradas por grandes/medias corporações antes e durante o processo de aquisição de uma strat-up: (i) A base de clientes da empresa comprada deve ser cuidadosamente considerada; (ii) um contato muito próximo entre os gestores das duas empresas é crucial antes da realização da aquisição; (iii) a contratação de uma empresa de consultoria em aquisições pode ser primordial durante o processo de integração; (iv) o empreendedor tem um papel de central importância para o future da nova empresa formada após a aquisição; (v) a forma como a integração entre as duas empresas ocorrerá após a compra deve ser cuidadosamente escolhida e (iv) a criação de uma corporate venture deve ser levada em consideração.

Assessment of value creation in private equity: the acquisition of Burger King by 3G Capital

This thesis elaborates the creation of value in private equity and in particular analyzes value creation in 3G Capital’s acquisition of Burger King. In this sense, a specific model is applied that composes value creation into several drivers, in order to answer the question of how value creation can be addressed in private equity investments. Although previous research by Achleitner et al. (2010) introduced a specific model that addresses value creation in private equity, the respective model was neither applied to an individual company, nor linked to indirect drivers that explain the dynamics and rationales for the creation of value. In turn this paper applies the quantitative model to an ongoing private equity investment and thereby provides different extensions to turn the model into a better forecasting model for ongoing investments, instead of only analyzing a deal that has already been divested from an ex post perspective. The chosen research approach is a case study about the Burger King buyout that first includes an extensive review about the current status of academic literature, second a quantitative calculation and qualitative interpretation of different direct value drivers, third a qualitative breakdown of indirect drivers, and lastly a recapitulating discussion about value creation and value drivers. Presenting a very successful private equity investment and elaborately demonstrating the dynamics and mechanisms that drive value creation in this case, provides important implications for other private equity firms as well as public firms in order to develop their proprietary approach towards value creation.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.