Current account and capital mobility hypothesis: Evidence from the G-7

This paper investigates an intertemporal optimization model in order to analyze the current account of the G-7 countries, measured as the present value of the future changes in net output. The study compares observed and forecasted series, generated by the model, using Campbell & Shiller’s (1987) methodology. In the estimation process, the countries are considered separately (with OLS technique) as well as jointly (SURE approach), to capture contemporaneous correlations of the shocks in net output. The paper also proposes a note on Granger causality and its implications to the optimal current account. The empirical results are sensitive to the technique adopted in the estimation process and suggest a rejection of the model in the G-7 countries, except for the USA and Japan, according to some papers presented in the literature.

As contas públicas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro face à legislação de responsabilidade fiscal e previdenciária: 2000 a 2007

Com o advento do Plano Real, que procedeu à estabilização da moeda em meados da década de noventa, ficou patente a gravidade da situação fiscal das unidades subnacionais. De um lado figuravam as dificuldades na condução da gestão financeira por meio da ausência do processo inflacionário que anteriormente possibilitava a indexação das receitas tributárias enquanto as despesas correntes tinham a sua liquidação e pagamento postergados. Por outro lado, a dívida consolidada, majoritariamente mobiliária, disparava em função da política monetária restritiva. Esta situação financeira precária tornou urgente a realização do ajuste fiscal dos estados que teve como condutor a União que instituiu medidas primordiais para atingir este fim, destacando-se três leis federais: a Lei de Renegociação das Dívidas Estaduais, a Lei de Responsabilidade Previdenciária e a Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal. O trabalho em tela estuda a condução das contas públicas do Estado do Rio de Janeiro no período de 2000 a 2007, objetivando verificar a existência de esforços de ajuste fiscal e em que medida estes esforços trouxeram resultados satisfatórios, demonstrando a eficácia do arcabouço legal instituído pela União. Conclui-se neste trabalho que, no período de 2000 a 2006, não ocorreu avanço significativo em direção da melhoria das contas públicas estaduais e que os superávits primários alcançados no período foram impulsionados pelo aumento de receitas de caráter instável, extraordinário e finito. Destacou-se quanto aos riscos inerentes à excessiva e crescente dependência que as finanças estaduais apresentam, relativamente às receitas supracitadas, tendo em vista que estas têm sido utilizadas para pagamento de despesas públicas correntes de caráter continuado. O presente trabalho conclui também que, a partir do ano de 2007, foi dado o pontapé inicial para o alcance do ajuste fiscal, tendo em vista a mudança de patamar do superávit primário, com ênfase na redução das despesas primárias e não no aumento das receitas extraordinárias.

A nova administração pública e a gestão do Instituto de Criminalística: um estudo de caso

O objetivo deste estudo foi analisar em que medida o Instituto de Criminalística, órgão da administração pública direta de Minas Gerais, alinhou a sua gestão administrativa e de pessoal às diretrizes do Choque de Gestão. Decorridos oito anos desde o início da implantação dessa política pública, a questão cabe averiguação a fim de se saber o quanto dos novos ideais foram disseminados e assimilados em uma das instituições a qual essa política se comprometera a modernizar. Ao abordar a medida da relação existente entre o Choque de Gestão e o Instituto de Criminalística, este estudo visou compreender quantos velhos paradigmas foram quebrados e quantos novos conceitos foram assimilados para fazer a administração pública voltar-se para quem de fato foi criada e a quem deve servir: o povo. Para subsidiar as pesquisas, este estudo abrangeu uma análise dos referenciais teóricos que faceiam as questões relevantes à Nova Administração Pública e impactaram diretamente a concepção do Choque de Gestão, mas levando em conta os referenciais próprios dessa política. A pesquisa de campo consistiu de uma abordagem do fenômeno em seu palco de acontecimento, feita por meio de observação-participante, de entrevistas e questionários junto aos principais atores do cenário pesquisado: servidores e gestores de linha e clientes. Os resultados mostraram que, inobstante, o Choque de Gestão apresentar-se como um plano estruturado e bem intencionado, a sua proposta de transformação ainda não causou ressonância naquela ponta do serviço público, posto que diversos conceitos propalados por essa política confrontam-se com antigos valores, derivados de práticas anteriores. Sendo assim, acredita-se que a efetivação das diretrizes do Choque de Gestão está condicionada à adesão dos gestores e servidores de linha a essas propostas e, para tanto, as instâncias superiores de governo deverão agir para garantir essa adesão.

Energy subsidies and WTO dispute settlement: why only renewable energy subsidies are challenged?

Over the past few years, renewable energy subsidies have become one of the main sources of trade disputes in the WTO. A total of six cases have been initiated against renewable energy subsidy programs since the first of such disputes was brought by Japan against Canada’s Feed in Tariff (FIT) program in 2010. Yet not even a single case has so far been initiated against the much larger and environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies. The main objective of this paper is to examine what makes renewable energy subsidies vulnerable to WTO dispute, as compared fossil fuel subsidies.

Some notes about the determination of current account equilibrium real exchange rate and the relation between real exchange rate and productive specialization

The objective of these notes is to present a simple mathematical model of the determination of current account real exchange rate as defined by Bresser-Pereira (2010); i.e. the real exchange rate that guarantees the inter temporal equilibrium of balance of payments and to show the relation between Real Exchange rate and Productive Specialization at theoretical and empirical level.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.