An ordering of measures of the welfare cost of inflation in economies with interest-bearing deposits

This paper builds on Lucas (2000) and on Cysne (2003) to derive and order six alternative measures of the welfare costs of inflation (five of which already existing in the literature) for any vector of opportunity costs. The ordering of the functions is carried out for economies with or without interestbearing deposits. We provide examples and closed-form solutions for the log-log money demand both in the unidimensional and in the multidimensional setting (when interest-bearing monies are present). An estimate of the maximum relative error a researcher can incur when using any particular measure is also provided.

Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

International integration and long- run persistence of the GNP distribution

We use the Ramsey model of g,Towth elaborated by Bliss [1995] and Ventlira [1997] to show how international integration results in long-nm persistellce Df GNPs distribution, while allowing, under certain conditions on parameters, for convergellce during the transition. First, we pi·ovide relationships which explicitly relate, in the neighborhood of the steady-state, the magnitude of conditional convergence or divergence to the fundamentaIs of the economies. Second, we present ali analysis of the Cobb Douglas case with a broad dass of utility functions and show that there is always transitional convergenee with this technology. Third, directions for testing the Illodel against the traditional dosed-ecollomy setting are proposed. These lead to adding specific and world-wide regTessors to traditional growth regressions.

Estimating economic interactions of financial suppliers in Thailand

This paper presents a methodology to estimate and identify different kinds of economic interaction, whenever these interactions can be established in the form of spatial dependence. First, we apply the semi-parametric approach of Chen and Conley (2001) to the estimation of reaction functions. Then, the methodology is applied to the analysis financial providers in Thailand. Based on a sample of financial institutions, we provide an economic framework to test if the actual spatial pattern is compatible with strategic competition (local interactions) or social planning (global interactions). Our estimates suggest that the provision of commercial banks and suppliers credit access is determined by spatial competition, while the Thai Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives is distributed as in a social planner problem.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Operational functions for innovative startups in France

Nessa tese, é buscado um maior entendimento sobre a importância das funções operacionais nas startups francesas. Uma grande flexibilidade das tarefas a ser coberta e uma gestão horizontal caracterizam as startups. Desse jeito, não é muito comum para as empresas recentemente criadas como as startups ter uma politica clara de recursos humanos. Na verdade, cada participante na start-up pode ser levado a pensar de forma diferente em termos de vendas desenvolvimento de negócios, comercialização, marketing, tecnologia ou desenvolvimento de produto. Essa tese não vai explorar cada uma dessas tarefas. Mas vai procurar para identifcar a percepção sobre a alocação ótima de recursos para cada função chave da nova empresa. Qualquer seja o setor de mercado em consideração ou o estágio de amadurecimento da startup, funções chaves que são percebidas como sendo a base para start-ups bem sucedidas são pesquisa & desenvolvimento e comercialização. Funções de liderança não são tão importantes. Somente a startup focada na tecnologia tem uma "função de chefe executivo" com maior importância do que as startups médias. Além disso, empreendedores em série, bem sucedidos ou não, focam predominantemente aspectos relacionados ao marketing e à captação de recursos em detrimento de aspectos ligados à gestão do negócio. No final, os empresários, muitas vezes tem um preconceito ao respeito da sua formação acadêmica porque ele sobrestimam funções que eles pensam poder fazer em comparação das funções que eles são capazes de fazer. Nessa tese, intent-se demonstrar a relação entre as funções ocupadas por um sócio e as ações que ele possui na startup. Essa relação depende do número de sócios (conhecido como acionistas), o tipo de sócios (acionistas principais ou acionistas segundarias) e o impacto na administração corporativa a respeito da distribuição do capital próprio.