A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

A model is presented in which banks accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. Alt though theories about the coexistence of money and credit are inherently difficult, the model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are well monitored, and can credibly allow fiat-money withdraws to whom needs its, thus qualifying to become safe brokers of idle capital. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

Historically, payment systems and capital intermediation interact. Friedman (1959), and many observers of bank instabilities, have ad- vocated separating depositary from credit institutions. His proposal meets today an ever-increasing provision of inside money, and a short- age of monetary models of bank intermediation. In this paper, we eval- uate the proposal from a new angle, with a model in which isolating a safe payments system from commercial intermediation undermines information complementarities in banking activities. Some features of the environment resemble the models in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).