Sovereign wealth funds: a comparative analysis

Num contexto de mudanças no cenário econômico mundial, novas formas de investimento emergem, delineando o papel do Estado nas relações internacionais. Atores políticos que não tinham histórico como investidores passam a ganhar relevância no mercado financeiro mundial. A ambiguidade sobre o volume de recursos e intenções de investimento dos fundos da riqueza soberana de algumas nações, especialmente de países em desenvolvimento, tem causado desconforto junto às autoridades monetárias dos países ricos. Tal preocupação com o fluxo de capital e possível transferência de poder às economias antes periféricas suscitou uma onda de neonacionalismo. Para se esclarecer o entendimento sobre Fundos Soberanos, este trabalho organiza sua definição e principais características, uma vez que esta discussão é ainda midiática e controversa, dada a novidade do tema no meio acadêmico de pesquisa. Além disso, este estudo compara dados macroeconômicos de alguns poucos países, cujos governos detêm fundos já bem estabelecidos. Esta informação é essencial para a compreensão sobre o que justifica a efetividade na criação de um fundo deste tipo. Enfim, quer-se, também, à luz da análise qualitativa de diferentes tipos de fundos, discutir a configuração do Fundo Soberano do Brasil.

Economic development and growth in West Africa: a multiple case study analysis of sovereign wealth funds’ investments and performance

Durante a recente crise da dívida soberana europeia, os fundos soberanos demonstraram seu peso na esfera financeira global. Contribuíram para salvar o sistema financeiro dos países desenvolvidos, distribuindo créditos que as entidades financeiras tradicionais do Norte não podiam mais providenciar. Em 2012, os ativos totais desses fundos atingiram USD 4.620 bilhões, comparado aos USD 3.355 bilhões de antes da crise, no final de 2007 (Preqin, 2012). Sendo quase todos criados por economias em desenvolvimento ou subdesenvolvidas, os fundos soberanos podem então ser vistos como o símbolo de um recente reequilíbrio do poder a favor desses países (Santiso, 2008). Além disso, em um futuro próximo, espera-se que os fundos soberanos afastem-se dos países desenvolvidos para investir mais em países em desenvolvimento. Nesse contexto, os países africanos estão cada vez mais alvos de investimentos dos fundos (Triki & Faye, 2011). O estudo subjacente analisa dois fundos, o IFC ALAC e o Mubadala Development Company, para entender como, de acordo com as percepções dos seus gestores, os fundos soberanos podem ajudar no desenvolvimento dos países beneficiários. Mais precisamente, trata-se definir, através de um estudo de casos múltiplos, quais são os mecanismos pelos quais os fundos soberanos podem impactar o desenvolvimento da África ocidental. Os resultados sugerem que, segundo os gestores, os fundos soberanos podem desempenhar um papel significativo no desenvolvimento dos países beneficiários. Eles investem em alguns setores-chave da economia (bancos, infraestruturas etc.), criando condições favoráveis ao desenvolvimento local. Além disso, através de um efeito multiplicador, os investimentos dos fundos soberanos alavancam novos investimentos do setor privado local ou global, fortalecendo o tecido industrial e produtivo do país beneficiário. Porém, parece que as empresas beneficiárias não ajudam nas transferências de conhecimento e de tecnologia, embora sejam essenciais para o desenvolvimento econômico, e se limitam a programas de treinamento específico e de RSE. Além disso, apesar dos investimentos de fundos soberanos impulsionarem o crescimento da região, eles também podem agravar a dependência dessas economias à exportação de commodities. Finalmente, os impactos positivos dos fundos soberanos sobre a economia regional são muitas vezes reduzidos devido a conflitos políticos e barreiras estruturais exigindo reformas profundas e de longo prazo.

Robust monetary policy with the consumption - wealth channel

Robust Monetary Policy with the Consumption - Wealth Channel

Wealth composition, endogenous fertility and the dynamics of income inequality

This paper analyzes how differences in the composition of wealth between human and physical capital among families affect fertility choices. These in tum influence the dynamics of wealth and income inequality across generations through a tradeoffbetween quantity and quality of children. Wealth composition affects fertility because physical capital has only a wealth effect on number of children, whereas human capital increases the time cost of child-rearing in addition to the wealth effect. I construct a model combining endogenous fertility with borrowing constraints in human capital investments, in which weaIth composition is determined endogenously. The model is calibrated to the PNAD, a Brazilian household survey, and the main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, the model implies that the crosssection relationship between fertility and wealth typically displays a U-shaped pattem, reflecting differences in wealth composition between poor and rich families. Also, the quantity-quality tradeoff implies a concave cross-section relationship between investments per child and wealth. Second, as the economy develops and families overcome their bOlTowing constraints, the negative effect of weaIth on fertility becomes smaller, and persistence of inequality declines accordingly. The empirical evidence presented in this paper is consistent with both implications .

Consumption-wealth ratio and expected stock returns: evidence from panel data

This paper investigates the role of consumption-wealth ratio on predicting future stock returns through a panel approach. We follow the theoretical framework proposed by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), in which a model derived from a nonlinear consumer’s budget constraint is used to settle the link between consumption-wealth ratio and stock returns. Using G7’s quarterly aggregate and financial data ranging from the first quarter of 1981 to the first quarter of 2014, we set an unbalanced panel that we use for both estimating the parameters of the cointegrating residual from the shared trend among consumption, asset wealth and labor income, cay, and performing in and out-of-sample forecasting regressions. Due to the panel structure, we propose different methodologies of estimating cay and making forecasts from the one applied by Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). The results indicate that cay is in fact a strong and robust predictor of future stock return at intermediate and long horizons, but presents a poor performance on predicting one or two-quarter-ahead stock returns.

Life Cycle Models, Heterogeneity of Initial Assets,and Wealth Inequality

Life cycle general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents have a very hard time reproducing the American wealth distribution. A common assumption made in this literature is that all young adults enter the economy with no initial assets. In this article, we relax this assumption – not supported by the data - and evaluate the ability of an otherwise standard life cycle model to account for the U.S. wealth inequality. The new feature of the model is that agents enter the economy with assets drawn from an initial distribution of assets, which is estimated using a non-parametric method applied to data from the Survey of Consumer Finances. We found that heterogeneity with respect to initial wealth is key for this class of models to replicate the data. According to our results, American inequality can be explained almost entirely by the fact that some individuals are lucky enough to be born into wealth, while others are born with few or no assets.

Consumption-Wealth Ratio and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Panel Data on G7 Countries

Using the theoretical framework of Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), we perform an empirical investigation on how widespread is the predictability of cay {a modi ed consumption-wealth ratio { once we consider a set of important countries from a global perspective. We chose to work with the set of G7 countries, which represent more than 64% of net global wealth and 46% of global GDP at market exchange rates. We evaluate the forecasting performance of cay using a panel-data approach, since applying cointegration and other time-series techniques is now standard practice in the panel-data literature. Hence, we generalize Lettau and Ludvigson's tests for a panel of important countries. We employ macroeconomic and nancial quarterly data for the group of G7 countries, forming an unbalanced panel. For most countries, data is available from the early 1990s until 2014Q1, but for the U.S. economy it is available from 1981Q1 through 2014Q1. Results of an exhaustive empirical investigation are overwhelmingly in favor of the predictive power of cay in forecasting future stock returns and excess returns.

Essays on health care reform, wealth inequality, and demography

This thesis contains three chapters. The first chapter uses a general equilibrium framework to simulate and compare the long run effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and of health care costs reduction policies on macroeconomic variables, government budget, and welfare of individuals. We found that all policies were able to reduce uninsured population, with the PPACA being more effective than cost reductions. The PPACA increased public deficit mainly due to the Medicaid expansion, forcing tax hikes. On the other hand, cost reductions alleviated the fiscal burden of public insurance, reducing public deficit and taxes. Regarding welfare effects, the PPACA as a whole and cost reductions are welfare improving. High welfare gains would be achieved if the U.S. medical costs followed the same trend of OECD countries. Besides, feasible cost reductions are more welfare improving than most of the PPACA components, proving to be a good alternative. The second chapter documents that life cycle general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents have a very hard time reproducing the American wealth distribution. A common assumption made in this literature is that all young adults enter the economy with no initial assets. In this chapter, we relax this assumption – not supported by the data – and evaluate the ability of an otherwise standard life cycle model to account for the U.S. wealth inequality. The new feature of the model is that agents enter the economy with assets drawn from an initial distribution of assets. We found that heterogeneity with respect to initial wealth is key for this class of models to replicate the data. According to our results, American inequality can be explained almost entirely by the fact that some individuals are lucky enough to be born into wealth, while others are born with few or no assets. The third chapter documents that a common assumption adopted in life cycle general equilibrium models is that the population is stable at steady state, that is, its relative age distribution becomes constant over time. An open question is whether the demographic assumptions commonly adopted in these models in fact imply that the population becomes stable. In this chapter we prove the existence of a stable population in a demographic environment where both the age-specific mortality rates and the population growth rate are constant over time, the setup commonly adopted in life cycle general equilibrium models. Hence, the stability of the population do not need to be taken as assumption in these models.

The spenders-hoarders theory of capital accumulations, wealth distribution and fiscal policy

This paper proposes a simple OLG model which is consistent with the essential facts about consumer behavior, capital accumulation and wealth distribution, and yields some new and surprising conclusions about fiscal policy. By considering a society in which individuais are distinguished according to two characteristics, altruism and wealth preference, we show that those who in the long run hold the bulk of private capital are not so rnuch motivated by dynastic altruism as by preference for wealth. Two types of social segmentation can result with different wcalth distribution. To a large extcnt our results seem to fit reality better than those obtained with standard optimal growth models in which dynastic altruism ( or r ate o f impatience) is the only source of heterogeneity: overaccumulation can appear, public debt and unfunded pensions are not neutra!, estate taxation can improve the welfare of the top wealthy.