Financial distress as a collapse of incentive scheme

This paper explaina why workers lack motivation near bankruptcy, why they tend to leave companies in financiai distreas, and why thoae who remam require higher compensation. Theae indirect costa of financiai diatresa adie becauae the optimal combination of debt and incentive achem.ea, deaigned to minimize agency costa, ends up underpaying managers when there ia a bankruptcy threat. The paper a1so providea new empirica1 implications on the intera.ction between financiai reatructuring and changea in managerial compensation. Theae predictions are supported by the findings of Gilson and Vetsuypens (1992).

Why merger talks collapse: an exploratory study about contributing factors to ‘wedding cold feet' and deal making failure in mergers and acquisitions from the perspective of active deal making professionals in Brazil

Why merger talks collapse: an exploratory study about contributing factors behind ‘wedding cold feet' and deal making failure in Mergers and Acquisitions from the perspective of active deal making professionals in Brazil. One basic question encouraged this study: after all the effort, expectations and money usually invested in dealmaking, why are so many transactions simply abandoned, even when the benefits are clear for the business, shareholders, customers and employees?