Globalization and the Industrial Revolution

This paper argues that trade specialization played an indispensable role in supporting the Industrial Revolution, allowing the economy to shift resources to the manufacture without facing food and raw materials shortage. In our arti cial economy, there are two sectors agriculture and manufacture and the economy is initially closed and under a Malthusian trap. In this economy the industrial revolution entails a transition towards a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin economy. The model reproduces the main stylized facts of the transition to modern growth and globalization. We show that two-sectors closed-economy models cannot explain the fall in the value of land relative to wages observed in the 19th century and that the transition in this case is much longer than that observed allowing for trade.

Democracy and capitalist revolution

Democracy became the preferred and consolidated form of government only in the twentieth century. It is not sufficient to explain this change solely by reference to rational motives, nor by detecting processes and leadership. A historical approach is required. The new historical fact that led to the change of preference from aristocratic rule to democracy is the capitalist revolution, which changed the manner of appropriating the economic surplus from violence to the market. This is the first necessary condition for democracy. The disappearance of the fear of expropriation, the rise of middle classes and the pressures of the poor or of the workers are the second, third and fourth new historical facts that opened the way for the transition from the liberal to the liberal-democratic regime. After these four conditions were fulfilled, the elites ceased to fear that they would be expropriated if universal suffrage was granted. Eventually, after the transition, the democratic regime became the rational choice for all classes. The theory presented here does not predict transitions, since countries often turn democratic without fully realized historical conditions, but it predicts democratic consolidation, since no country that has completed its capitalist revolution falls back into authoritarianism.

Globalization and the Industrial Revolution (revised)

This paper argues that trade specialization played an indispensable role in supporting the Industrial Revolution. We calibrate a two-good and two-sector overlapping generations model to Englandís historical development and investigate how much different Englandís development path would have been if it had not globalized in 1840. The open-economy model is able to closely match the data, but the closed-economy model cannot explain the fall in the value of land relative to wages observed in the 19th century. Without globalization, the transition period in the British economy would be considerably longer than that observed in the data and key variables, such as the share of labor force in agriculture, would have converged to Ögures very distant from the actual ones.

Inglorious revolution : sovereign debt, tropical credibility, and financial underdevelopment in imperial Brazil

In 1824 the creation of institutions that constrained the monarch’s ability to unilaterally tax, spend, and debase the currency put Brazil on a path toward a revolution in public finance, roughly analogous to the financial consequences of England’s Glorious Revolution. This credible commitment to honor sovereign debt resulted in successful long-term funded borrowing at home and abroad from the 1820s through the 1880s that was unrivalled in Latin America. Some domestic bonds, denominated in the home currency and bearing exchange clauses, eventually circulated in European financial markets. The share of total debt accounted for by long-term funded issues grew, and domestic debt came to dominate foreign debt. Sovereign debt yields fell over time in London and Rio de Janeiro, and the cost of new borrowing declined on average. The market’s assessment of the probability of default tended to decrease. Imperial Brazil enjoyed favorable conditions for borrowing, and escaped the strong form of “original sin” stressed by recent work on sovereign debt. The development of vibrant private financial markets did not, however, follow from the enhanced credibility of government debt. Private finance in Imperial Brazil suffered from politicized market interventions that undermined the development of domestic capital markets. Private interest rates remained high, entry into commercial banking was heavily restricted, and limited-liability joint-stock companies were tightly controlled. The Brazilian case provides a powerful counterexample to the general proposition of North and Weingast that institutional changes that credibly commit the government to honor its obligations necessarily promote the development of private finance. The very institutions that enhanced the credibility of sovereign debt permitted the systematic repression of private financial development. In terms of its consequences for domestic capital markets, the liberal Constitution of 1824 represented an “inglorious” revolution.

The public choice perspective and Knight's institutionalist bent

A close scrutiny of a sample of the works of the chief protagonists of the Public Choice "Revolution" is a revelation. Endless cases of contradiction, basic assumptions and motivations which have much in common with Marxism are detected. Knight's legitimizing role is an illusion (not to say a fraud). Knight's affinities with the institutionalists are established. Distinction is made between the contradictions assignable to the Ricardian Vice and unavoidable contradictions arising from complexities in the phenomena and partiality in the theories. The languages of abstract, applied an professional economics are identified and critically examined.

A green revolution in Mozambique: a study about the government possibilities to launch a sustainable green revolution

The present study is focused on the analysis of the political, economical and social factors that may interfere with the possibility of a Green Revolution as a solution for Mozambique to reach self-sufficiency and to reduce poverty. In order to perform such analysis, the study analyzes the consequences of the decolonization process in Mozambique focusing that the independence process in Mozambique did not create non-colonial models for the Agriculture Sector. Later on, the study tries to understand the impact of HIV/AIDS and Malaria on the labor force. By then, it explores the concepts of the Green Revolution and its successful history in India. At the end, it tries to evaluate if a Green Revolution is possible in Africa, especially in Mozambique, first identifying the factors, which characterized the Green Revolution in India, and trying to link those factors with the reality of Mozambique. The report is structured as followed; Chapter 2, ¿The decolonization process and its impacts on the agriculture sector¿. It gives information about the decolonization process, and explores its consequences. Chapter 3, ¿The Impacts of HIV/AIDS and Malaria on the Labor Force¿. It analyzes the impact of those diseases in the labor force. Chapter 4 ¿The Green Revolution and the Agriculture Sector¿, explores the concepts of Green Revolution, its success in India and its history in Mozambique. Chapter 5, finally, centers on conclusions, findings and recommendations.

State–society cycles and political pacts in a national–dependent society: Brazil

The history of independent Brazil may be divided into three major state–society cycles, and, after 1930, five political pacts or class coalitions can be identified. These pacts were nationalist; only in the 1990s did the Brazilian elites surrender to the neoliberal hegemony. Yet, since the mid-2000s they have been rediscovering the idea of the nation. The main claim of the essay is that Brazilian elites and Brazilian society are “national–dependent”, that is, they are ambivalent and contradictory, requiring an oxymoron to define them. They are dependent because they often see themselves as “European” and the mass of the people as inferior. But Brazil is big enough, and there are enough common interests around its domestic market, to make the Brazilian nation less ambivalent. Today Brazil is seeking a synthesis between the last two political cycles – between social justice and economic development in the framework of democracy.

Future cenario planning in Brazilian logistics and transportation sector

Nas últimas décadas o setor de logística passou por grandes transformações pelo mundo. Assim, a eficiência do sistema logístico é importante para o crescimento econômico, a diversificação, redução dos custos operacionais e da pobreza. Segundo o Banco Mundial, o Brasil tornou-se uma das maiores economias do mundo, mas os custos logísticos elevados colocam em risco esse crescimento. Estes custos são em grande parte o resultado de diferenças em infraestrutura de cada região, juntamente com os encargos do setor rodoviário, que corresponde por 60% do total do transporte de carga do país. Entretanto, a logística brasileira está às portas de uma nova revolução, em práticas de negócios e eficiência, e também na qualidade e disponibilidade da infraestrutura de transportes e comunicações, e novos projetos e práticas para superar a situação. O objetivo deste estudo não é analisar o presente e as atuais tendências de logística do Brasil e do setor de transporte, mas sim modelar possíveis cenários futuros para os próximos anos. Em outras palavras, este trabalho mostra diferentes possibilidades de como o setor de logística e transporte poderá ser no futuro. Para isso, este trabalho irá utilizar a metodologia de cenários prospectivos e entrevistas com especialistas relacionados da área.

Development, progress and economic growth

Progress was an idea of the 18th century; development, a project of the 20th century that continues into the 21st century. Progress was associated with the advance of reason, development with the fulfillment of the five political objectives that modern societies set for themselves: security, freedom, economic well-being, social justice and protection of the environment. Today we can view progress and development as equivalent. Both were products of the capitalist revolution, and of the economic development that began with it. Economic development or growth, in its turn, is the process of capital accumulation with the incorporation of technical progress that, mainly through productive sophistication and the increase of the value of labor, increases wages and improves standards of living. The five objectives that define development, as well as the three social instances existing in society change in an interdependent way.

Growth and distribution: a revised classical model

This paper discusses distribution and the historical phases of capitalism. It assumes that technical progress and growth are taking place, and, given that, its question is on the functional distribution of income between labor and capital, having as reference classical theory of distribution and Marx’s falling tendency of the rate of profit. Based on the historical experience, it, first, inverts the model, making the rate of profit as the constant variable in the long run and the wage rate, as the residuum; second, it distinguishes three types of technical progress (capital-saving, neutral and capital-using) and applies it to the history of capitalism, having the UK and France as reference. Given these three types of technical progress, it distinguishes four phases of capitalist growth, where only the second is consistent with Marx prediction. The last phase, after World War II, should be, in principle, capital-saving, consistent with growth of wages above productivity. Instead, since the 1970s wages were kept stagnant in rich countries because of, first, the fact that the Information and Communication Technology Revolution proved to be highly capital using, opening room for a new wage of substitution of capital for labor; second, the new competition coming from developing countries; third, the emergence of the technobureaucratic or professional class; and, fourth, the new power of the neoliberal class coalition associating rentier capitalists and financiers

Democracy and growth in pre-industrial countries

This paper distinguishes three types of countries (rich, middle-income, and pre-industrial) and focus on the latter, which, in contrast to the other two, didn’t complete their industrial and capitalist revolutions. Can pre-industrial countries be governed well and embody the principles of consolidated democracies? Today these countries are under pressure from the imperial West to eschew institutions and developmental strategies that, in the past, allowed rich and middle-income countries to industrialize. At the same time, they are pressured by these same Western parties (and by its own people) to be democratic, even though their societies are not mature enough to fulfill that. In fact, no country completed its industrial and capitalist revolution within the framework of even a minimal democracy, suggesting that such demands are unfair. Added to this, pre-industrial countries are extremely difficult to govern because they usually don’t have a strong nation and capable states. This double pressure to renounce development strategies that have worked for the West while being required to become a democracy represents a major obstacle to their development.