Um modelo de competição baseada em tempo nos mercados financeiros

O objetivo deste trabalho é modelar o comportamento estratégico dos indivíduos diante de um choque estocástico que desloca o preço de determinado ativo financeiro do seu equilíbrio inicial. Investiga-se o caminho do preço de mercado em direção ao novo equilíbrio, conduzido pelas sucessivas negociações dos agentes em busca de oportunidades de obter lucros imediatos. Os operadores, que por suposição possuem funções de utilidade avessas ao risco, devem escolher a quantidade ótima transacionada e quanto devem aguardar para executar as suas ordens, tendo em vista a diminuição da volatilidade do preço do ativo à medida que as transações se sucedem após o choque. Procura-se demonstrar que os operadores que aceitam incorrer em riscos mais elevados negociam com maior frequência e em volumes e velocidades maiores, usufruindo lucros esperados mais altos que os demais.

Preferences, common knowledge and speculative trade

We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pareto efficient, there is no further trade generated by new information. The key to this result is that the information partitions and other characteristics of the agents must be common knowledge and that contracts, or asset markets, must be complete. It does not depend on learning, on 'lemons' problems, nor on agreement regarding beliefs and the interpretation of information. The only requirement on preferences is state-additivity; in particular, traders need not be risk-averse. We also prove the converse result that "no-trade results" imply that traders' preferences can be represented by state-additive utility functions. We analyze why examples of other widely studied preferences (e.g., Schmeidler (1989)) allow "speculative" trade.

Beyond indifferent players: on the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences

Why don’t agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PD’s are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or enmity may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results.

On the differentiability of the consumer demand function

For strictly quasi concave differentiable utility functions, demand is shown to be differentiable almost everywhere if marginal utilities are pointwise Lipschitzian. For concave utility functions, demand is differentiable almost everywhere in the case of differentiable additively separable utility or in the case of quasi-linear utility.

Estimando a aversão ao risco, a taxa de desconto intertemporal, e a substutibilidade intertemporal do consumo no Brasil usando três tipos de função utilidade

Nesse trabalho estima-se, usando o método generalizado dos momentos e dados brasileiros, os parâmetros estruturais do modelo CCAPM (consumption capital asset pricing model) a partir de três classes de funções utilidade distintas: função utilidade potência (CRRA), utilidade com hábito externo, e aversão ao desapontamento (Kreps-Porteus). Estes parâmetros estruturais estão associados à aversão ao risco, à elasticidade de substituição intertemporal no consumo e à taxa de desconto intertemporal da utilidade futura. Os resultados aqui obtidos são analisados e comparados com resultados anteriores para dados brasileiros e americanos. Adicionalmente, testa-se econometricamente todos os modelos estruturais estimados a partir do teste de restrições de sobre-identificação, para investigar, da forma mais abrangente possível, se há ou não equity premium puzzle para o Brasil. Os resultados surpreendem, dado que, em raríssimas ocasiões, se rejeita as restrições implícitas nesses modelos. Logo, conclui-se que não há equity premium puzzle para o Brasil.

Do dividends signal more earnings?

Signaling models have contributed to the corporate finance literature by formalizing "the informational content of dividends" hypothesis. However, these models are under criticism of empirical literature, as weak evidences were found supporting one of the main predicitions: the positive relation between changes in dividends and changes in earnings. We claim thaht the failure to verify this prediction does not invalidate the signaling approach. The models developed up to now assume or derive utility functions with the single-crossing property. We show thaht signaling is possible in the absence of this property and, in this case, changes in dividend and changes in earnings can be positively or negatively related.

Integrability and the demand for monetary assets: an alternative approach to an old problem

This note provides necessary and su¢cient conditions for some speci…c multidimensional consumer’s surplus welfare measures to be well posed (path independent). We motivate the problem by investigating partial-equilibrium measures of the welfare costs of in‡ation. The results can also be used for checking path independence of alternative de…nitions of Divisia indexes of monetary services. Consumer theory classically approaches the integrability problem by considering compensated demands, homothetic preferences or quasi-linear utility functions. Here, instead, we consider demands of monetary assets generated from a shopping-time perspective. Paralleling the above mentioned procedure, of …nding special classes of utility functions that satisfy the integrability conditions, we try to infer what particular properties of the transacting technology could assure path independence of multidimensional welfare measures. We show that the integrability conditions are satis…ed if and only if the transacting technology is blockwise weakly separable. We use two examples to clarify the point.

International integration and long- run persistence of the GNP distribution

We use the Ramsey model of g,Towth elaborated by Bliss [1995] and Ventlira [1997] to show how international integration results in long-nm persistellce Df GNPs distribution, while allowing, under certain conditions on parameters, for convergellce during the transition. First, we pi·ovide relationships which explicitly relate, in the neighborhood of the steady-state, the magnitude of conditional convergence or divergence to the fundamentaIs of the economies. Second, we present ali analysis of the Cobb Douglas case with a broad dass of utility functions and show that there is always transitional convergenee with this technology. Third, directions for testing the Illodel against the traditional dosed-ecollomy setting are proposed. These lead to adding specific and world-wide regTessors to traditional growth regressions.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Do dividends signal more earnings? a theoretical analysis

The signaling models have contributed to the literature of corporate finance by the formalization of "the informational content of dividends hypothesis". However, these models are under criticism of empirical works, as weak evidences were found supporting one of the main predictions: the positive relation between changes in dividends and changes in earnings. We claim that the failure to verify this prediction does not invalidate the signaling approach. The mo deIs developed up to now assume or derive utility functions with the single-crossing property. We show that signaling is possible in the absence of this property and, in this case, changes in dividend and changes in earnings can be positively or negatively related.

Asymmetric preferences in investment decisions in the Brazilian financial market

The main objective of this article is to test the hypothesis that utility preferences that incorporate asymmetric reactions between gains and losses generate better results than the classic Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions in the Brazilian market. The asymmetric behavior can be computed through the introduction of a disappointment (or loss) aversion coefficient in the classical expected utility function, which increases the impact of losses against gains. The results generated by both traditional and loss aversion utility functions are compared with real data from the Brazilian market regarding stock market participation in the investment portfolio of pension funds and individual investors.

Estimating the stochastic discount factor without a utility function

Using the Pricing Equation in a panel-data framework, we construct a novel consistent estimator of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) which relies on the fact that its logarithm is the serial-correlation ìcommon featureîin every asset return of the economy. Our estimator is a simple function of asset returns, does not depend on any parametric function representing preferences, is suitable for testing di§erent preference speciÖcations or investigating intertemporal substitution puzzles, and can be a basis to construct an estimator of the risk-free rate. For post-war data, our estimator is close to unity most of the time, yielding an average annual real discount rate of 2.46%. In formal testing, we cannot reject standard preference speciÖcations used in the literature and estimates of the relative risk-aversion coe¢ cient are between 1 and 2, and statistically equal to unity. Using our SDF estimator, we found little signs of the equity-premium puzzle for the U.S.

Testing production functions used in empirical growth studies

We estimate and test two alternative functional forms, which have been used in the growth literature, representing the aggregate production function for a panel of countries: the model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1992), and a mincerian formulation of schooling-returns to skills. Estimation is performed using instrumental-variable techniques, and both functional forms are confronted using a Box-Cox test, since human capital inputs enter in levels in the mincerian specification and in logs in the extended neoclassical growth model.

On the consistency of arbitrary money-demand functions with the Sidrauski and the shopping-time models

This paper investigates which properties money-demand functions have to satisfy to be consistent with multidimensional extensions of Lucasí(2000) versions of the Sidrauski (1967) and the shopping-time models. We also investigate how such classes of models relate to each other regarding the rationalization of money demands. We conclude that money demand functions rationalizable by the shoppingtime model are always rationalizable by the Sidrauski model, but that the converse is not true. The log-log money demand with an interest-rate elasticity greater than or equal to one and the semi-log money demand are counterexamples.

Essays on asymmetric information problems without the single-crossing property: applications to corporate finance

The objective of this dissertation is to re-examine classical issues in corporate finance, applying a new analytical tool. The single-crossing property, also called Spence-irrlees condition, is not required in the models developed here. This property has been a standard assumption in adverse selection and signaling models developed so far. The classical papers by Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) and Riley (1979) assume it. In the simplest case, for a consumer with a privately known taste, the single-crossing property states that the marginal utility of a good is monotone with respect to the taste. This assumption has an important consequence to the result of the model: the relationship between the private parameter and the quantity of the good assigned to the agent is monotone. While single crossing is a reasonable property for the utility of an ordinary consumer, this property is frequently absent in the objective function of the agents for more elaborate models. The lack of a characterization for the non-single crossing context has hindered the exploration of models that generate objective functions without this property. The first work that characterizes the optimal contract without the single-crossing property is Araújo and Moreira (2001a) and, for the competitive case, Araújo and Moreira (2001b). The main implication is that a partial separation of types may be observed. Two sets of disconnected types of agents may choose the same contract, in adverse selection problems, or signal with the same levei of signal, in signaling models.