Acordos preferenciais de comércio e a OMC: um estudo sobre seus mecanismos de solução de controvérsias

Este trabalho analisa os Acordos Preferenciais de Comércio (APCs) com ênfase em seus Mecanismos de Solução de Controvérsias (MSC). A partir da seleção de alguns APCs bilaterais celebrados por Estados Unidos e União Europeia com outros parceiros comerciais, o trabalho objetiva (i) explicar como funcionam os MSC previstos pelos APCs para, em seguida, (ii) testar a hipótese de que a forma como os MSC são negociados nos APCs possibilita, em alguma medida, sua coexistência com o Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC) da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC). This paper analyzes Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) focusing in its Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (DRM). Bilateral agreements signed by the United States and the European Union with other countries were selected with the aim to (i) explain how the DRMs stablished by PTAs work and, aftwards, (ii) test the hypothesis that the way the DRMs are negotiated in the PTAs enables its coexistence with the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization.

Monetary union and productivity differences in mercosur countries

This paper investigates cross-country productivity convergence among Mercosur members plus associates (Chile and Bolivia) and Peru, during the period 1960-1999. The testing strategy is based on the definitions of time-series convergence by Bernard and Durlauf (1995), and applies sequentially the multivariate unit root tests proposed by Sarno and Taylor (1998), Flôres, Preumont and Szafarz (1995) and Breuer, Mc Nown and Wallace (1999). The last two tests allow to identify the countries that converge. Our results show evidence of convergence among the four Mercosur countries, using either Argentina or Brazil as benchmark. Weaker evidence of convergence is also found with Bolivia. The results point out that monetary union among the Southern Cone economies, though a far objective, is not without sense.

On common agency with informed principals

This thesis consists of three chapters that have as unifying subject the frame-work of common agency with informed principals. The first two chapters analyze the economic effects of privately informed lobbying applied to tariff protection (Chapter 1) and to customs unions agreements (Chapter 2). The third chapter investigates the choice of retailing strutures when principals (the producers) are privately informed about their production costs. Chapter 1 analyzes how lobbying affects economic policy when the interest groups have private information. I assume that the competitiveness of producers are lobbies private information in a Grossman and Helpman (1994) lobby game. This allows us to analyze the e¤ects of information transmission within their model. I show that the information transmission generates two informational asymmetry problems in the political game. One refers to the cost of signaling the lobby's competitiveness to the policy maker and the other to the cost of screening the rival lobby's competitiveness from the policy maker. As an important consequence information transmission may improve welfare through the reduction of harmful lobbying activity. Chapter 2 uses the framework of chapter 1 to study a customs union agreement when governments are subject to the pressure of special interest groups that have better information about the competitiveness of the industries they represent. I focus on the agreement's effect on the structure of political influence. When join a customs union, the structure of political pressure changes and with privately informed lobbies, a new effect emerges: the governments can use the information they learn from the lobby of one country to extract rents from the lobbies of the other country. I call this the "information transmission effect". This effect enhances the governments'bargaining power in a customs union and makes lobbies demand less protection. Thus, I find that information transmission increases the welfare of the agreement and decreases tari¤s towards non-members. I also investigate the incentives for the creation of a customs union and find that information transmission makes such agreement more likely to be politically sustainable. Chapter 3 investigates the choice of retailing structure when the manufacturers are privately informed about their production costs. Two retailing structures are analyzed, one where each manufacturer chooses her own retailer (exclusive dealing) and another where the manufacturers choose the same retailer (common agency). It is shown that common agency mitigates downstream competition but gives the retailer bargaining power to extract informational rents from the manufacturers, while in exclusive dealing there is no downstream coordination but also there are no incentives problem in the contract between manufacture and retailer. A pre- liminary characterization of the choice of the retailing structure for the case of substitute goods shows that when the uncertainty about the cost increases relatively to the size of the market, exclusive dealing tends to be the chosen retailing structure. On the other hand, when the market is big relatively to the costs, common agency emerges as the retailing structure. This thesis has greatly benefited from the contribution of Professors Humberto Moreira and Thierry Verdier. It also benefited from the stimulating environment of the Toulouse School of Economics, where part of this work was developed during the year of 2007.

Government actions to support coffee producers - an investigation of possible measures from the European Union

We outline possible actions to be adopted by the European Union to ensure a better share of total coffee revenues to producers in developing countries. The way to this translates, ultimately, in producers receiving a fair price for the commodity they supply, i.e., a market price that results from fair market conditions in the whole coffee producing chain. We plead for proposals to take place in the consuming countries, as market conditions in the consuming-countries side of the coffee producing chain are not fair; market failures and ingenious distortions are responsible for the enormous asymmetry of gains in the two sides. The first of three proposals for consumer government supported actions is to help in the creation of domestic trading companies for achieving higher export volumes. These tradings would be associated to roasters that, depending on the final product envisaged, could perform the roasting in the country and export the roasted – and sometimes ground – coffee, breaking the increasing importers-exporters verticalisation. Another measure would be the systematic provision of basic intelligence on the consuming markets. Statistics of the quantities sold according to mode of consumption, by broad “categories of coffee” and point of sale, could be produced for each country. They should be matched to the exports/imports data and complemented by (aggregate) country statistics on the roasting sector. This would extremely help producing countries design their own market and producing strategies. Finally, a fund, backed by a common EU tax on roasted coffee – created within the single market tax harmonisation programme, is suggested. This European Coffee Fund would have two main projects. Together with the ICO, it would launch an advertising campaign on coffee in general, aimed at counterbalancing the increasing “brandification” of coffee. Basic information on the characteristics of the plant and the drink would be passed, and the effort could be extended to the future Eastern European members of the Union, as a further assurance that EU processors would not have a too privileged access to these new markets. A quality label for every coffee sold in the Union could complement this initiative, helping to create a level playing field for products from outside the EU. A second project would consist in a careful diversification effort, to take place in selected producing countries.