Intrahousehold allocation in an unintentional random experiment

None

What causes violent crime?

This study uses a new data set of crime ratesfor a large sample of countriesfor the period 1970- 1994, based on information from the United Nations World Crime Surveys, to ana/yze the determinants ofnational homicide and robbery rates. A simple model of the incentives to commit crimes is proposed, which explicit/y considers possible causes of the persistence of crime over time (criminal inertia). Several econometric mode/s are estimated, attempting to capture the . determinonts of crime rates across countries and over time. The empirical mode/s are first run for cross-sections and then applie'd to panel data. The former focus on erplanatory variables that do not change markedly over time, while the panel data techniques consider both the eflect of the business cyc1e (i.e., GDP growth rate) on the crime rate and criminal inertia (accountedfor by the inclusion of the /agged crime rate as an explanatory variable). The panel data techniques a/so consider country-specific eflects, the joint endogeneity of some of the erplanatory variables, and lhe existence of some types of measurement e"ors aJjlicting the crime data. The results showthat increases in income inequality raise crime rates, dete"ence eflects are significant, crime tends to be counter-cyclical, and criminal inertia is significant even after controlling for other potential determinants of homicide and robbery rates.

Incomplete contracts and the problem of social harm

We construct a model in which a first mover decides on its location before it knows the identity of the second mover; joint location results in a negative extemality. Contracts are inherently incomplete since the first mover's initial decision cannot be specified. We analyze several kinds of rights, including damages, injunctions, and rights to exclude (arising from covenants or land ownership). There are cases in which allocating any of these basic rights to the first mover-i.e., first-party rights-is dominated by second-party rights, and cases in which the reverse is true. A Coasian result (efficiency regardless of the rights allocation) only holds under a limited set of conditions. As corollaries of a theorem ranking the basic rights regimes, a number of results emerge contradicting conventional wisdom, including the relative inefficiency of concentrated land ownership and the relevance of the generator's identity. We conclude with a mechanism and a new rights regime that each yield the first best in all cases.

Lighting and violent crimes: evaluating the effect of an electrification policy in rural Brazil on violent crime reduction

This paper estimates the effect of lighting on violent crime reduction. We explore an electrification program (LUZ PARA TODOS or Light for All - LPT) adopted by the federal government to expand electrification to rural areas in all Brazilian municipalities in the 2000s as an exogenous source of variation in electrification expansion. Our instrumental variable results show a reduction in homicide rates (approximately five homicides per 100,000 inhabitants) on rural roads/urban streets when a municipality moved from no access to full coverage of electricity between 2000 and 2010. These findings are even more significant in the northern and northeastern regions of Brazil, where rates of electrification are lower than those of the rest of the country and, thus, where the program is concentrated. In the north (northeast), the number of violent deaths on the streets per 100,000 inhabitants decreased by 48.12 (13.43). This moved a municipality at the 99th percentile (75th) to the median (zero) of the crime distribution of municipalities. Finally, we do not find effects on violent deaths in households and at other locations. Because we use an IV strategy by exploring the LPT program eligibility criteria, we can interpret the results as the estimated impact of the program on those experiencing an increase in electricity coverage due to their program eligibility. Thus, the results represent local average treatment effects of lighting on homicides.