On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Unconditional transfers goes to health? Evidence from Brazilian municipalities

This study assesses the impact of unconditional transfer resources on the health indicators of Brazilian municipalities. This transfer refers to the Participation Fund of Municipalities (FPM) where at least 15% of its value should be spent on public health. Based on a discontinuity of the rules of transfers, we explore Regression Discontinuous Design for the years 2002 to 2010, and find: (i) no significant effect of FPM on mortality reduction; (ii) a robust and significant reduction in morbidity, treated municipalities – on the right side of thresholds – on average have a per capita rate of morbidity 0.00821% lower than those on the left side of the cutoff points; (iii) the mechanisms through which a reduction on morbidity could be operated would be due to estimated increases in preventive measures such as consultations and medical and nurses visits, these were bigger for the treated group in, respectively, 0.32%, 0.038% and 0.039%.