On the welfare costs of business cycles in the 20th century

Lucas (1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research, that the welfare cost of business cycles are relatively small. Using standard assumptions on preferences and a reasonable reduced form for consumption, we computed these welfare costs for the pre- and post-WWII era, using three alternative trend-cycle decomposition methods. The post-WWII period is very era this basic result is dramatically altered. For the Beveridge and Nelson decomposition, and reasonable preference parameter and discount values, we get a compensation of about 5% of consumption, which is by all means a sizable welfare cost (about US$ 1,000.00 a year).

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century

Lucas (1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research: the welfare cost of business cycles are very small. Our paper has several original contributions. First, in computing welfare costs, we propose a novel setup that separates the effects of uncertainty stemming from business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation. Second, we extend the sample from which to compute the moments of consumption: the whole of the literature chose primarily to work with post-WWII data. For this period, actual consumption is already a result of counter-cyclical policies, and is potentially smoother than what it otherwise have been in their absence. So, we employ also pre-WWII data. Third, we take an econometric approach and compute explicitly the asymptotic standard deviation of welfare costs using the Delta Method. Estimates of welfare costs show major differences for the pre-WWII and the post-WWII era. They can reach up to 15 times for reasonable parameter values -β=0.985, and ∅=5. For example, in the pre-WWII period (1901-1941), welfare cost estimates are 0.31% of consumption if we consider only permanent shocks and 0.61% of consumption if we consider only transitory shocks. In comparison, the post-WWII era is much quieter: welfare costs of economic growth are 0.11% and welfare costs of business cycles are 0.037% - the latter being very close to the estimate in Lucas (0.040%). Estimates of marginal welfare costs are roughly twice the size of the total welfare costs. For the pre-WWII era, marginal welfare costs of economic-growth and business- cycle fluctuations are respectively 0.63% and 1.17% of per-capita consumption. The same figures for the post-WWII era are, respectively, 0.21% and 0.07% of per-capita consumption.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century

Lucas(1987) has shown a surprising result in business-cycle research: the welfare cost of business cycles are very small. Our paper has several original contributions. First, in computing welfare costs, we propose a novel setup that separates the effects of uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and economic-growth variation. Second, we extend the sample from which to compute the moments of consumption: the whole of the literature chose primarily to work with post-WWII data. For this period, actual consumption is already a result of counter-cyclical policies, and is potentially smoother than what it otherwise have been in their absence. So, we employ also pre-WWII data. Third, we take an econometric approach and compute explicitly the asymptotic standard deviation of welfare costs using the Delta Method. Estimates of welfare costs show major diferences for the pre-WWII and the post-WWII era. They can reach up to 15 times for reasonable parameter values = 0:985, and = 5. For example, in the pre-WWII period (1901-1941), welfare cost estimates are 0.31% of consumption if we consider only permanent shocks and 0.61% of consumption if we consider only transitory shocks. In comparison, the post-WWII era is much quieter: welfare costs of economic growth are 0.11% and welfare costs of business cycles are 0.037% the latter being very close to the estimate in Lucas (0.040%). Estimates of marginal welfare costs are roughly twice the size of the total welfare costs. For the pre-WWII era, marginal welfare costs of economic-growth and business-cycle uctuations are respectively 0.63% and 1.17% of per-capita consumption. The same gures for the post-WWII era are, respectively, 0.21% and 0.07% of per-capita consumption.

On the welfare costs of business-cycle fluctuations and economic-growth variation in the 20th century and beyond

The main objective of this paper is to propose a novel setup that allows estimating separately the welfare costs of the uncertainty stemming from business-cycle uctuations and from economic-growth variation, when the two types of shocks associated with them (respectively,transitory and permanent shocks) hit consumption simultaneously. Separating these welfare costs requires dealing with degenerate bivariate distributions. Levis Continuity Theorem and the Disintegration Theorem allow us to adequately de ne the one-dimensional limiting marginal distributions. Under Normality, we show that the parameters of the original marginal distributions are not afected, providing the means for calculating separately the welfare costs of business-cycle uctuations and of economic-growth variation. Our empirical results show that, if we consider only transitory shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles is much smaller than previously thought. Indeed, we found it to be negative - -0:03% of per-capita consumption! On the other hand, we found that the welfare cost of economic-growth variation is relatively large. Our estimate for reasonable preference-parameter values shows that it is 0:71% of consumption US$ 208:98 per person, per year.

The market strategies alternatives of an e-business start-up in Brazil

The e-business market is one of the fastest growing markets in Brazil, with e-business sales accounting for BRL 14.8 billion in 2010 and a growth of 40% per year (+1000% over the past 7 years). Sales-event clubs and collective bargaining websites are one of the most dynamic segments of the e-business market: the number of new players is increasing rapidly, with over 1200 collective bargaining websites currently operating in Brazil. In that context, growth and differentiation seem to be two key success factors for Coquelux. According to webshopper (23rd Edition, e-bit), growth can be achieved by targeting middle and low-income consumers from class C, who represent 50% of the total e-commerce sales. But Coquelux, which is specialized in desire and luxury brands, has built its reputation and competitive advantage through its “exclusivity”, by targeting wealthier consumers from classes A and B who are attracted by its fashionable and high-end positioning. The evolution (growth?) of this market and the development of its competition naturally raise a strategic question for Coquelux’s managers: can Coquelux grow and still maintain its competitive advantage? Should it grow by expanding its consumer base to class C? If so, how? Consumers from classes A, B or C must be targeted through the same online communication channels. Recent studies from the ABEP/ABIPEME emphasized the importance of social networks as a tool for converting new clients and gaining their loyalty, regardless of their social class. However, high-income and low-income e-consumers do not have the same consumption habits, do not respond to the same type of marketing strategies, and most importantly, do not share the same values. Thus, it seems difficult to expand Coquelux’s consumer base to class C without changing its marketing strategies and altering its image Three options were identified for Coquelux: reinforcing its leadership on the luxury segment and focusing on a small niche market (1), which would threaten its survival in the long run; completely changing its strategy and competing for a mass market through commercial brands (2), which requires major financial investments that managers don’t have access to; or finding an intermediary solution (3). This thesis’ recommendation for the third option consists in focusing on premium brands (rather than luxury) in order to increase sales volume (Coquelux’s most profitable sales happened with local desire brands) with products that appeal to class B but also attract the emerging class C which is looking for brand recognition. It could thus implement a slow entry strategy towards the mass market without damaging its main competitive advantage.