7 resultados para Two Measures
em Repositório digital da Fundação Getúlio Vargas - FGV
Resumo:
A common feature in programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the use of conditionalities, macroeconomic and structural measures that a requesting country should adopt to obtain an assistance package. The objective of this work is to conduct an empirical analysis of the economic and political determinants of such conditionalities. In particular, our main contribution consists in the development of a new measure of conditionality, fiscal adjustment, and its comparison with the most used in the literature, the number of conditions. We choose fiscal adjustment because it is an adequate proxy for program austerity, since its implementation carries economic and political costs. In the empirical exercise, we use data from 184 programs in the period of 1999 and 2012, and estimate how our two measures of conditionalities respond to the economic and political factors. Our results suggest that they are quite different. The main determinant of the number of conditions is the political proximity of the borrowing country to the Fund’s major shareholders, the members of G5. On the other hand, the main determinant of fiscal adjustment is the size of the government fiscal deficit. Finally, we did not find correlation between the size of fiscal adjustment and the number of conditions. These results suggest that the analysis of the content of IMF programs should take into account the different measures of agreed conditionality.
Resumo:
Market timing performance of mutual funds is usually evaluated with linear models with dummy variables which allow for the beta coefficient of CAPM to vary across two regimes: bullish and bearish market excess returns. Managers, however, use their predictions of the state of nature to deÞne whether to carry low or high beta portfolios instead of the observed ones. Our approach here is to take this into account and model market timing as a switching regime in a way similar to Hamilton s Markov-switching GNP model. We then build a measure of market timing success and apply it to simulated and real world data.
Resumo:
We outline possible actions to be adopted by the European Union to ensure a better share of total coffee revenues to producers in developing countries. The way to this translates, ultimately, in producers receiving a fair price for the commodity they supply, i.e., a market price that results from fair market conditions in the whole coffee producing chain. We plead for proposals to take place in the consuming countries, as market conditions in the consuming-countries side of the coffee producing chain are not fair; market failures and ingenious distortions are responsible for the enormous asymmetry of gains in the two sides. The first of three proposals for consumer government supported actions is to help in the creation of domestic trading companies for achieving higher export volumes. These tradings would be associated to roasters that, depending on the final product envisaged, could perform the roasting in the country and export the roasted – and sometimes ground – coffee, breaking the increasing importers-exporters verticalisation. Another measure would be the systematic provision of basic intelligence on the consuming markets. Statistics of the quantities sold according to mode of consumption, by broad “categories of coffee” and point of sale, could be produced for each country. They should be matched to the exports/imports data and complemented by (aggregate) country statistics on the roasting sector. This would extremely help producing countries design their own market and producing strategies. Finally, a fund, backed by a common EU tax on roasted coffee – created within the single market tax harmonisation programme, is suggested. This European Coffee Fund would have two main projects. Together with the ICO, it would launch an advertising campaign on coffee in general, aimed at counterbalancing the increasing “brandification” of coffee. Basic information on the characteristics of the plant and the drink would be passed, and the effort could be extended to the future Eastern European members of the Union, as a further assurance that EU processors would not have a too privileged access to these new markets. A quality label for every coffee sold in the Union could complement this initiative, helping to create a level playing field for products from outside the EU. A second project would consist in a careful diversification effort, to take place in selected producing countries.
Resumo:
This paper measures the importance of indirect network effects in the adoption by colleges and students of ENEM, a standardized exam for high-school students in Brazil that can be used in college application processes. We estimate network effects and find that they are economically significant. Students are more likely to take ENEM the larger the number of colleges adopting it. Similarly, colleges are more likely to adopt it the larger the number of students taking the exam. Moreover, we find evidence that colleges play strategically and that heterogeneity determines their decisions. A college is less likely to adopt ENEM the larger the number of competitors adopting it. Colleges’ characteristics such as ownership and organization affect adoption decisions. In a counterfactual exercise we compare colleges’ adoption decisions under competition and under joint colleges’ payoffs maximization. Adoption rates are significantly reduced when colleges internalize the competitive effect, i.e., the effect of their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs. On the other hand, they increase when indirect network effects - the effect of students’ response to their decisions on other colleges’ payoffs - are also internalized. Competitive adoption rates are found to exceed joint optimum rates by a small difference. These results suggest that, without considering students’ welfare, adoption rates are excessive, but close to the joint optimum.
Resumo:
In this paper I will investigate the conditions under which a convex capacity (or a non-additive probability which exhibts uncertainty aversion) can be represented as a squeeze of a(n) (additive) probability measure associate to an uncertainty aversion function. Then I will present two alternatives forrnulations of the Choquet integral (and I will extend these forrnulations to the Choquet expected utility) in a parametric approach that will enable me to do comparative static exercises over the uncertainty aversion function in an easy way.
Resumo:
This article proposes an alternative methodology for estimating the effects of non-tariff measures on trade flows, based on the recent literature on gravity models. A two-stage Heckman selection model is applied to the case of Brazilian exports, where the second stage gravity equation is theoretically grounded on the seminal Melitz model of heterogeneous firms. This extended gravity equation highlights the role played by zero trade flows as well as firm heterogeneity in explaining bilateral trade among countries, two factors usually omitted in traditional gravity specifications found in previous literature. Last, it also proposes a economic rationale for the effects of NTM on trade flows, helping to shed some light on its main operating channels under a rather simple Cournot’s duopolistic competition framework.
Resumo:
This article proposes an alternative methodology for estimating the effects of non-tariff measures on trade flows, based on the recent literature on gravity models. A two-stage Heckman selection model is applied to the case of Brazilian exports, where the second stage gravity equation is theoretically grounded on the seminal Melitz model of heterogeneous firms. This extended gravity equation highlights the role played by zero trade flows as well as firm heterogeneity in explaining bilateral trade among countries, two factors usually omitted in traditional gravity specifications found in previous literature. Last, it also proposes a economic rationale for the effects of NTM on trade flows, helping to shed some light on its main operating channels under a rather simple Cournot’s duopolistic competition framework