Inflation targeting, credibility and confidence crises

We study the interplay between the central bank transparency, its credibility, and the ination target level. Based on a model developed in the spirit of the global games literature, we argue that whenever a weak central bank adopts a high degree of transparency and a low target level, a bad and self conrmed type of equilibrium may arise. In this case, an over-the-target ination becomes more likely. The central bank is considered weak when favorable state of nature is required for the target to be achieved. On the other hand, if a weak central bank opts for less ambitious goals, namely lower degree of transparency and higher target level, it may avoid condence crises and ensure a unique equilibrium for the expected ination. Moreover, even after ruling out the possibility of condence crises, less ambitious goals may be desirable in order to attain higher credibility and hence a better coordination of expectations. Conversely, a low target level and a high central bank transparency are desirable whenever the economy has strong fundamentals and the target can be fullled in many states of nature.

Essays on international finance, default and inflation

This thesis is composed by three papers, each one of them corresponding to one chapter. The first and the second chapters are essays on international finance appraising default and inflation as equilibrium outcomes for crisis time, in particular, for confidence crisis time that leads to speculative attack on the external public debt issued by emerging economies. With this background in mind, welfare effects from adopting common currency (chapter 1) and welfare effects from increasing the degree of economic openness (chapter 2) are analyzed in numerical exercises, based on DSGE framework. Cross-countries results obtained are then presented to be compared with empirical evidence and to help on understanding past policy decisions. Some policy prescriptions are also suggested. In the third chapter we look to the inflation targeting regime applied to emerging economies that are subject to adverse shocks, like the external debt crisis presented in the previous chapters. Based on a more theoretical approach, we appraise how pre commitment framework should be used to coordinate expectations when policymaker announcement has no full credibility and self fulfilling inflation may be possible.

Internet share of advertising expenditure : growth drivers and inhibitors in the brazilian market

Os investimentos com publicidade na Internet como uma percentagem das despesas totais de publicidade variam significativamente de um país para outro. O número é tão baixo quanto 4,7% no mercado brasileiro e tão alto como 28,5% no mercado britânico (ZenithOptimedia, 2011b). Algumas razões explicam tal disparidade. No nível macro, a participação dos gastos com publicidade na Internet está fortemente ligada a variáveis como o produto interno bruto per capita e à penetração da Internet na população. No nível micro, uma pesquisa qualitativa foi feita para identificar os fatores que contribuem e inibem o crescimento da participação da publicidade online no mercado brasileiro. A vasta lista de inibidores parece ter profundo impacto sobre como os profissionais de mercado tomar decisões de alocação de investimento em publicidade por tipo de mídia. Devido à legislação, à auto-regulamentação e às dinâmicas da indústria, grande parte da tomada de decisão é realizada por agências de publicidade. Estas parecem ter fortes incentivos econômicos para selecionar outros tipos de mídia e não a Internet ao definir planos de mídia. Ao mesmo tempo, a legislação e a auto-regulamentação fornecem desincentivos para corretores de mídia a operar no mercado local. A falta de profissionais qualificados e a padronização limitada também desempenham papéis importante para inibir uma maior participação da Internet nos gastos com publicidade no Brasil. A convergência dos resultados quantitativos com os qualitativos indica possíveis motivos pelos quais a participação da publicidade online no Brasil é tão baixa. Em primeiro lugar, a participação é explicada pelo estágio de desenvolvimento dos países. Quanto mais rico e mais desenvolvido um país, maior a proporção de gastos com publicidade online tende a ser. Em segundo lugar, o estágio econômico emergente do Brasil potencialmente dá espaço para o aumento do ineficiências do mercado, tais como programas de descontos oferecidos de forma desproporcional para os principais decisores de alocação de investimentos de mídia. Este fato aparentemente produz um feedback negativo, contribuindo para manter a baixa participação da publicidade online no total dos investimentos publicitários.

Motivations for knowledge sharing in virtual social networks: a comparative study between Brazil and France

Sociedades pós-modernas caracterizam-se pela transição de economias baseadas em ativos tangíveis para economias de conhecimento, onde indivíduos vivenciam uma imprescindível conectividade, mas ao mesmo tempo, experimentam um enfraquecimento das estruturas sociais, que tem generado uma crescente necessidade de se criar bases cognitivas e afetivas para a vida (Rheingold, 1992; Wasko & Farah, 2005; Arvidsson, 2008). Nesse cenário se desenvolve o fenômeno das redes sociais virtuais, agregando milhões de pessoas que compartilham mensagens de texto, imagens e vídeos todos os dias (Nielsen, 2012) fazendo com que organizações privadas foquem cada vez mais seus investimentos para acompanhar as novas tendências (McWilliam, 2000; Reichheld & Schefter, 2000; Yoo, Suh & Lee, 2002; Arvidsson, 2008). Consequentemente, uma das mais importantes questões que vem ganhando importância no meio academico e entre profissionais da área é justamente: por que as pessoas compartilham conhecimento online? (Monge, Fulk, Kalman, Flanigan, Parnassa & Rumsey, 1998; Lin, 2001) Por meio de uma metodologia de estudo de caso conduzida no Brasil e na França, este estudo objetiva produzir uma relevante revisão teórica acerca do tema, trazendo novas idéias de diferentes contextos, e propondo um modelo para avaliar as principais motivações que conduzem indivíduos a compartilhar conhecimento em redes sociais virtuais. Essas razões foram estruturadas em cinco dimensões: capital estrutural, cognitivo e relacional, motivações pessoais e razões monetárias (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Wasko & Faraj, 2005; Chiu et al, 2006). As evidências sugerem que o processo de participar e compartilhar conhecimento em redes sociais virtuais é resultado de uma complexa combinação de motivações de orientação pessoal e coletiva, que parecem variar pouco de acordo com os diferentes objetivos e contextos dessas comunidades, onde as razões financeiras parecem ser secundárias.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.