Current account and capital mobility hypothesis: Evidence from the G-7

This paper investigates an intertemporal optimization model in order to analyze the current account of the G-7 countries, measured as the present value of the future changes in net output. The study compares observed and forecasted series, generated by the model, using Campbell & Shiller’s (1987) methodology. In the estimation process, the countries are considered separately (with OLS technique) as well as jointly (SURE approach), to capture contemporaneous correlations of the shocks in net output. The paper also proposes a note on Granger causality and its implications to the optimal current account. The empirical results are sensitive to the technique adopted in the estimation process and suggest a rejection of the model in the G-7 countries, except for the USA and Japan, according to some papers presented in the literature.

Quais as motivações da classe C brasileira no consumo de turismo? - análise de caso da agência VRM Turismo

Estudo do comportamento de compra e consumo de turismo dos moradores da Rocinha, baseado no método de entrevistas em profundidade. Arcabouço teórico: fatores "push" e "pull" (Crompton, 1979; Dann, 1981) e tipologias de Plog (1977).

Practices in social media in the travel education business

Praticas na midia social se refere a vista ou a percepcao de uma marca nao so com base em suas ofertas e servicos, mas tambem sobre seus valores e cultura como percebido principalmente pelos consumidores. As organizacoes podem utilizer a imagem que é interessante e aceitavel para os clients. Nos ultimos anos, uma das formas que as organizacoes de forma consistente comercializar ou publicitar a sua marca envolve midias sociais. O ojetivo deste estudo é explorer quais sao as praticas de midia social no negocio de educacao de viagens. Para obter os dados, a pesquisadora entrevistou pessoas de seis empresas de educacao de viagens e cotejadas informacoes sobre o tema a partir de fonts primarias e secundarias existentes. O pesquisador conduziu a pesquisa para determiner praticas de marketing de midia social em que se aplicam nos sectores do turismo e educacao. Com base nos dados obtidos pelo pesquisador, as praticas de marketing de midia social incluem a utilizacao de plataformas de midia social com um alcance internacional generalizada tipo Facebook, Twitter, Instagram e YouTube. Outra estratégia é para postar constantemente as atualizações que não são apenas interessante, mas também informativo sobre os produtos e serviços oferecidos por uma marca ou organização. As empresas ou organizações devem também interagir com os clientes ou clientes on-line, a fim de manter os interesses deste último em ofertas e serviços da ex. O envolvimento do cliente é uma das razões por que os clientes optam por seguir as empresas on-line através da mídia social. A pesquisa também revela outras vantagens e benefícios da mídia social que constituem as melhores práticas, tais como a conversão de não-clientes para os clientes, o aumento da presença da mídia para aumentar a popularidade, a comunicação eficaz das metas e objetivos organizacionais, bem como a formação de um bom relacionamento com os clientes. As organizações também podem usar turístico criado conteúdo (TCC) e outros tipos de conteúdo para orientar a tomada de decisão no desenvolvimento do produto gerado pelo usuário.

Some notes about the determination of current account equilibrium real exchange rate and the relation between real exchange rate and productive specialization

The objective of these notes is to present a simple mathematical model of the determination of current account real exchange rate as defined by Bresser-Pereira (2010); i.e. the real exchange rate that guarantees the inter temporal equilibrium of balance of payments and to show the relation between Real Exchange rate and Productive Specialization at theoretical and empirical level.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (‘light-touch’) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — i.e., by investors who have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. Thus, ‘fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in (excessively) ‘friendly-regulated’ and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.

How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’

Latin America has recently experienced three cycles of capital inflows, the first two ending in major financial crises. The first took place between 1973 and the 1982 ‘debt-crisis’. The second took place between the 1989 ‘Brady bonds’ agreement (and the beginning of the economic reforms and financial liberalisation that followed) and the Argentinian 2001/2002 crisis, and ended up with four major crises (as well as the 1997 one in East Asia) — Mexico (1994), Brazil (1999), and two in Argentina (1995 and 2001/2). Finally, the third inflow-cycle began in 2003 as soon as international financial markets felt reassured by the surprisingly neo-liberal orientation of President Lula’s government; this cycle intensified in 2004 with the beginning of a (purely speculative) commodity price-boom, and actually strengthened after a brief interlude following the 2008 global financial crash — and at the time of writing (mid-2011) this cycle is still unfolding, although already showing considerable signs of distress. The main aim of this paper is to analyse the financial crises resulting from this second cycle (both in LA and in East Asia) from the perspective of Keynesian/ Minskyian/ Kindlebergian financial economics. I will attempt to show that no matter how diversely these newly financially liberalised Developing Countries tried to deal with the absorption problem created by the subsequent surges of inflow (and they did follow different routes), they invariably ended up in a major crisis. As a result (and despite the insistence of mainstream analysis), these financial crises took place mostly due to factors that were intrinsic (or inherent) to the workings of over-liquid and under-regulated financial markets — and as such, they were both fully deserved and fairly predictable. Furthermore, these crises point not just to major market failures, but to a systemic market failure: evidence suggests that these crises were the spontaneous outcome of actions by utility-maximising agents, freely operating in friendly (light-touched) regulated, over-liquid financial markets. That is, these crises are clear examples that financial markets can be driven by buyers who take little notice of underlying values — investors have incentives to interpret information in a biased fashion in a systematic way. ‘Fat tails’ also occurred because under these circumstances there is a high likelihood of self-made disastrous events. In other words, markets are not always right — indeed, in the case of financial markets they can be seriously wrong as a whole. Also, as the recent collapse of ‘MF Global’ indicates, the capacity of ‘utility-maximising’ agents operating in unregulated and over-liquid financial market to learn from previous mistakes seems rather limited.