Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: evidence from Brazil

This paper applies an endogenous lobby formation model to explain the extent of trade protection granted to Brazilian manufacturing industries during the 1988- 1994 trade liberalization episode. Using a panel data set covering this period, we find that even in an environment in which a major regime shift has been introduced, more concentrated sectors have been able to obtain policy advantages, that lead to a reduction in international competition. The importance of industry structure appears to be substantial: In our baseline specification, an increase in concentration by 20% leads to an increase in protection by 5%-7%.

On the use (fulness) of CGE modelling in trade negotiations and policy

This paper discusses a series of issues related to the use and different possible applications of CGE modelling in trade negotiations. The points addressed range from practical to methodological questions: when to use the models, what they provide the users and how far the model structure and assumptions should be explained to them, the complementary roles of partial and general equilibrium modelling, areas to be improved and data questions. The relevance of the modeller as the final decision maker in all these instances is also highlighted.

Trade liberalization and the evolution of skill earnings differentials in Brazil

Rio de Janeiro

Ideological changes and tax structure: Latin American countries during the nineties

Sabatini (2002) and Roberts and Wibbles (1999) Pointed Out That Voters in Latin American Countries are no Longer Choosing According to Their Ideological Preferences. Ashworth and Heyndels (2002) Showed That the Tax Choice In Oecd Countries Does not Follow the Ideological Pattern of Party Preferences. the Most Robust Result of This Work Shows That the Tax Choice in Latin American Countries Still Depends on This Ideological Preference. We Also Verified That Changes in the Tax Structure Depend on Changes Both in the Tax Burden and the Openness of the Economy

Regional trade agreements and the world trade organization

A Década de 1990 foi Marcada por uma Considerável Proliferação de Acordos Regionais de Comercio (Arcs). Esses Acordos, que em Princípio Teriam Caráter Excepcional no Sistema Multilateral de Comércio, Espalharam-Se por Várias Partes do Mundo E, Atualmente, são Raros os Casos de Países que não Participam de Pelo Menos um Acordo Preferencial. este Artigo tem como Objetivo Analisar os Acordos Preferenciais e suas Implicações no Sistema Multilateral de Comércio E, para Tanto, são Considerados os Aspectos Normativos e Econômicos Relacionados ao Tema. Além Disso, Apresenta-Se a Sistematização das Principais Questões Alusivas À Interpretação das Regras da Omc Relativas Aos Acordos Regionais de Comércio. Finalmente, com o Intuito de Fornecer Elementos Adicionais para a Avaliação do dos Acordos Preferenciais Serão Analisados os Impactos Econômicos de Alguns dos Principais Acordos para o Mercosul.

Economic cycles and term structure: application to Brazil

The objective of this work is to describe the behavior of the economic cycle in Brazil through Markov processes which can jointly model the slope factor of the yield curve, obtained by the estimation of the Nelson-Siegel Dynamic Model by the Kalman filter and a proxy variable for economic performance, providing some forecasting measure for economic cycles

New evidence on trade liberalization and productivity growth

Although the subject of a large number of studies, the debate on the links between trade reform and productivity growth is still unresolved and most studies at the micro level have not been able to establish a relationship between the two phenomena. Brazil provides a natural experiment to study this issue that is seldom available: it was one of the closest economies in the world until 1988, when trade reform was launched, and intra-industry data are available on an annual basis before, during and after liberalization. Using a panel of industry sectors this paper tests and measures the impact of trade reform on productivity growth. Results confirm the association between the former and the latter and show that the magnitude of the impact of tariff reduction on the growth rates of TFP and output per worker was substantial. Our data reveal large and widespread productivity improvement, so that the estimations in this paper are an indication that liberalization had an important effect on industrial performance in the country. Cross-sectional differences in protection are also investigated.

Trade liberalization and the evolution of skill earnings differentials in Brazil

Rio de Janeiro

Monopoly power, trade protection and growth: cross industry evidence

This paper investigates the impact of monopoly power on trade policy. Annual panel-databases of Brazilian industries for the years 1988 through 1994 were used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator, concentration index, control variables and sample size, and suggest that industries with higher monopoly power are more protected than competitive sectors. In the period of study the country experienced a major trade liberalization, but the results in the paper show that the reduction in protection was smaller in sectors with higher monopoly power. We thus have evidence favoring recent growth literature which stresses that interest groups with control over creasing productivity. The results here confirm the first part of this argument and show that organized groups in fact are able to obtain policy advantages that reduce competition.

Trade barriers and productivity growth: cross-industry evidence

This article investigates the impact of trade protection on the evolution of labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) of the Brazilian manufacturing sector. An annual panel-dataset of 16 industries for the years 1985 through 1997, a period that includes a major trade liberalization, was used. The regressions reported here are robust to openness indicator (nominal tari®s and e®ective protection rate were used), control variables and time period and suggest that barriers to trade negatively a®ects productivity growth at industry level: those sectors with lower barriers experienced higher growth. We were also able to link the observed increase of industry productivity growth after 1991 to the widespread reduction on exective protection experienced in the country in the nineties.

Trade Liberalization and Regional Impacts on Residual Wage Inequality: Evidence from Brazil

O objetivo deste trabalho é entender mais sobre o papel da liberalização sobre a desigualdade salarial, mais precisamente, sobre a desigualdade residual dos salários. Usando a abertura comercial brasileira, a extensa redução tarifária que ocorreu entre 1987 e 1995, é investigado empiricamente se os diferentes níveis de exposição ao comércio entre os estados contribuíram para os diferentes movimentos da desigualdade. Os resultados indicam que estados mais expostos à liberalização comercial experimentaram um aumento relativo da desigualdade residual dos salários ou, de forma equivalente, uma menor redução. Estes resultados enriquecem a discussão dos efeitos da abertura comercial sobre a desigualdade.

Trade liberalization and the evolution of skill earnings differentials in Brazil

From 1988 to 1995, when trade liberalization was implemented in Brazil, relative earnings of skilled workers decreased. In this paper, we investigate the role of trade liberalization in explaining these relative earnings movements, by checking all the steps predicted by the HeckscherOhlin- style trade transmission mechanism. We find that: i) employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and each Sector increased its relative share of skilled labor; ii) relative prices fell in skill intensive sectors; iii) tariff changes across sectors were not related to skill intensities, but the pass-through from tariffs to prices was stronger in skill intensive sectors; iv) the decline in skilled eamings differentials mandated by the price variation predicted by trade is very elose to the observed one. The results are compatible with trade liberalization, accounting for the observed rei ative eamings changes in Brazil.

Trade diversion and declining tariffs : evidence from Mercosur

This paper empirically examines the alternative posed by Richardson (1993) to the traditional view that trade integration may exacerbate inefficiencies through trade diversion. Richardson’s hypothesis boldly predicts that trade diversion may actually cause tariffs to decline! The hypothesis is fundamentally attributable to the presence of a political component in the governments’ objective functions. A cross-sectionally rich data-set on trade and tariffs from the Mercosur-pact countries, primarily Argentina, is used. The evidence yields surprising conclusions about the validity of the political economy construct in models of trade integration.