Brazilian international and inter-state trade flows: an exploratory analysis using the gravity model

Recent efforts toward a world with freer trade, like WTO/GATT or regional Preferential Trade Agreements(PTAs), were put in doubt after McCallum's(1995) finding of a large border effect between US and Canadian provinces. Since then, there has been a great amount of research on this topic employing the gravity equation. This dissertation has two goals. The first goal is to review comprehensively the recent literature about the gravity equation, including its usages, econometric specifications, and the efforts to provide it with microeconomic foundations. The second goal is the estimation of the Brazilian border effect (or 'home-bias trade puzzle') using inter-state and international trade flow data. It is used a pooled cross-section Tobit model. The lowest border effect estimated was 15, which implies that Brazilian states trade among themselves 15 times more than they trade with foreign countries. Further research using industry disaggregated data is needed to qualify the estimated border effect with respect to which part of that effect can be attributed to actual trade costs and which part is the outcome of the endogenous location problem of the firm.

The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.

Trade liberalization and industrial concentration: evidence from Brazil

This paper applies an endogenous lobby formation model to explain the extent of trade protection granted to Brazilian manufacturing industries during the 1988- 1994 trade liberalization episode. Using a panel data set covering this period, we find that even in an environment in which a major regime shift has been introduced, more concentrated sectors have been able to obtain policy advantages, that lead to a reduction in international competition. The importance of industry structure appears to be substantial: In our baseline specification, an increase in concentration by 20% leads to an increase in protection by 5%-7%.

Preferences, common knowledge and speculative trade

We study the proposition that if it is common knowledge that en allocation of assets is ex-ante pareto efficient, there is no further trade generated by new information. The key to this result is that the information partitions and other characteristics of the agents must be common knowledge and that contracts, or asset markets, must be complete. It does not depend on learning, on 'lemons' problems, nor on agreement regarding beliefs and the interpretation of information. The only requirement on preferences is state-additivity; in particular, traders need not be risk-averse. We also prove the converse result that "no-trade results" imply that traders' preferences can be represented by state-additive utility functions. We analyze why examples of other widely studied preferences (e.g., Schmeidler (1989)) allow "speculative" trade.

Trade and infrastructure: evidences from the Andean Community

This paper presents evidence on the key role of infrastructure in the Andean Community trade patterns. Three distinct but related gravity models of bilateral trade are used. The first model aims at identifying the importance of the Preferential Trade Agreement and adjacency on intra-regional trade, while also checking the traditional roles of economic size and distance. The second and third models also assess the evolution of the Trade Agreement and the importance of sharing a common border, but their main goal is to analyze the relevance of including infrastructure in the augmented gravity equation, testing the theoretical assumption that infrastructure endowments, by reducing trade and transport costs, reduce “distance” between bilateral partners. Indeed, if one accepts distance as a proxy for transportation costs, infrastructure development and improvement drastically modify it. Trade liberalization eliminates most of the distortions that a protectionist tariff system imposes on international business; hence transportation costs represent nowadays a considerably larger barrier to trade than in past decades. As new trade pacts are being negotiated in the Americas, borders and old agreements will lose significance; trade among countries will be nearly without restrictions, and bilateral flows will be defined in terms of costs and competitiveness. Competitiveness, however, will only be achieved by an improvement in infrastructure services at all points in the production-distribution chain.

Trade liberalization and the evolution of skill earnings differentials in Brazil

Rio de Janeiro

Trade and poverty in latin american countries: conceptual and methodological challenges

This paper addresses topics - either relevant or confusing or needing more attention - related to measuring the trade and poverty nexus. It sheds a critical light on the existing material and suggests needed research lines. It starts with questions akin to the LAC realities; then, keeping this view, general methodological issues are also examined. In a broader perspective, further ideas for the research agenda are formulated. The main conclusion is that relevant findings still demand considerable efforts. Moreover, the Information-measurement-model-evaluation paradigm is not enough, policy guidelines being usually too general. In LAC, it must be extended and deepened, accounting more for the heterogeneity of cases, including, whenever possible, the physical constraints and incorporating new ways of integrating both the local and global perspectives. Other aspects, like the role of specific juridical measures, should play a role. How all this can be combined into more encompassing evaluations remains open

Trade or investment? location decisions under regional integration

This paper studies the production and trade patterns that may arise between two different countries if plant location is introduced as a first step in the producers' decision making. A three-stage game is used: the first deals with location and the next two with capacity and final sales decisions. Demand and cost structures differ by country, and the latter contain specific elements related to the foreign operation. The structure of possible Nash-equilibria is examined and an analysis of the changes in the solution, if the countries engage in an integration process, is made. As in previous models, though global welfare gains may not be very high, single country ones may be considerable, due to changes in the location of the plants. However, even if full integration takes place, global Marshallian welfare may decrease. Conditions which determine a tendency towards multinationalisation are obtained. Assuming a move toward integration, conditions are also provided to characterize when exporting will be preferred to local production. The fact that producers may retain a certain discriminating power, notwithstanding the elimination of barriers to arbitrage, creates a tendency to locate production in the country where prices are higher. This explains why welfare gains may not be obvious. An empirical illustration, with real data from two MERCOSUL countries (Brazil and Argentina) illustrates the possible outcomes.

Trade and co-operation in the EU-MERCOSUL free trade agreement

Rio de Janeiro

The EU-Mercosul free trade agreement: Quantifying mutual gains

We identify trade in goods opportunities in a EU-Mercosul free trade area. Gains for Mercosul are rather concentrated, being mostly associated to a few agricultural commodities nowadays facing high protection barriers. EU gains are evenly spread, comprising a variety of market penetration possibilities. Trade deviation by the EU products is never higher than trade creation, confirming their international competitiveness and signalling that a great distortion of Mercosul’s imports won’t take place. Balanced gains exist for both sides; for Mercosul, the agreement can act as a first serious trial for future liberalisations with other developed partners, and as a warning on needed competitiveness improvements.

Regional trade agreements and the world trade organization

A Década de 1990 foi Marcada por uma Considerável Proliferação de Acordos Regionais de Comercio (Arcs). Esses Acordos, que em Princípio Teriam Caráter Excepcional no Sistema Multilateral de Comércio, Espalharam-Se por Várias Partes do Mundo E, Atualmente, são Raros os Casos de Países que não Participam de Pelo Menos um Acordo Preferencial. este Artigo tem como Objetivo Analisar os Acordos Preferenciais e suas Implicações no Sistema Multilateral de Comércio E, para Tanto, são Considerados os Aspectos Normativos e Econômicos Relacionados ao Tema. Além Disso, Apresenta-Se a Sistematização das Principais Questões Alusivas À Interpretação das Regras da Omc Relativas Aos Acordos Regionais de Comércio. Finalmente, com o Intuito de Fornecer Elementos Adicionais para a Avaliação do dos Acordos Preferenciais Serão Analisados os Impactos Econômicos de Alguns dos Principais Acordos para o Mercosul.

A test for strong hysteresis in international trade

The article suggests a new test for strong hysteresis in international trade. The variables that capture the effects of hysteresis are based on the model of Dixit (1989) with calibrations using a state-space model to determine the parameters for each point in time. These variables are then applied to a cointegration test with breaks, where it is possible to verify whether the hysteresis effect is essential in determining the long-term equilibrium.